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THE MENACE OF NATIONALISM IN EDUCATION

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BY

JONATHAN FRENCH SCOTT, PH.D.

AUTHOR OF "PATRIOTS IN THE MAKING"

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TO

MY MOTHER


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FOREWORD

THIS book is the outcome of several months' travel and research in France, Germany and England. It is based principally on the study of textbooks in the collections of the Musée Pédagogique of Paris, the Deutsche Bücherei of Leipzig, and the London County Council.

I take this occasion to thank the officials of these institutions for the help they have given me in my work and for their uniform kindness and courtesy. I am also under obligations to many other persons in all three countries, for suggestions and information. I am especially grateful to Mr. E. J. Frazer Hearne, of Littlehampton, for generously going over the manuscript.

JONATHAN F. SCOTT.

LITTLEHAMPTON, SUSSEX, ENGLAND.
July 13, 1925.

CONTENTS

		PAGE
	FOREWORD	7
CHAPTER		
I.	EDUCATION AND THE PROBLEM OF WORLD PEACE	11
II.	THE PATRIOTIC PURPOSE IN FRENCH EDUCATION	19
III.	ENGLAND INTERPRETED IN THE FRENCH TEXT-BOOKS	37
IV.	GERMANY AND THE GREAT WAR IN THE FRENCH TEXTBOOKS	52
V.	TOWARD INTERNATIONAL PEACE	77
VI.	NATIONALISM VERSUS INTERNATIONALISM IN GERMAN DECREES AND PROGRAMMES	95
VII.	THE GERMAN TEXTBOOKS	111
VIII.	NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN BRITISH EDUCATION	143
IX.	FRANCE IN THE BRITISH TEXTBOOKS	161
X.	GERMANY AND THE GREAT WAR IN THE BRITISH TEXTBOOKS	172

CHAPTER PAGE

XI. THE UNITED STATES IN BRITISH TEXTBOOKS . 186

XII. CONCLUSION 206

APPENDIX

I. A LETTER FROM A TEACHER IN GERMANY . . 215

II. AN AMERICAN TEXTBOOK INTERPRETATION OF SOME OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR OF 1812 217

INDEX 219

The Menace of Nationalism in Education

CHAPTER I

EDUCATION AND THE PROBLEM OF WORLD PEACE

It is one of the healthiest symptoms of the world's gradual recovery from war-madness that the search for some road leading to permanent peace is both insistent and persistent. Practically everybody wants world peace; people differ only as to the means by which it can best be attained. One man pins his faith to the League of Nations, another to the World Court, a third to the outlawry of war, a fourth to progressive disarmament, and a fifth to a pact among the Great Powers. In general, demand concentrates on the establishment of some form of international supervision or control; and much has already been done to turn theory into practice. Such progress stimulates hope.

If in all this there is good ground for hope, however, there is little for the short-sighted optimism that rests content with half measures. Even though all the nations of the world join the League, even though they agree with solemn oath to outlaw war, to submit all international disputes to adjudication, to take predetermined steps against the aggression of any

oath-breaking country, they cannot guarantee perpetual peace. To ensure peace the nations have long made treaties with one another; and the pages of history are strewn with broken treaties. To ensure peace, to moderate barbarities in time of war, the nations slowly and painfully built up a great body of international law. But during four years of conflict, international law was honoured rather in the breach than in the observance. The establishment of machinery of international control, necessary though it be, leaves the problem of preventing war not half solved—not a quarter solved. It is but a good beginning.

The essential difficulty is that no machinery of international control can eradicate the psychological causes of war. And these are the most fundamental, their roots extending deep down into the subsoil of human nature. It is safe to say that the government of no great nation really desires to involve itself in war with any other great nation. Nor does the normal man in normal times desire conflict. But in time of intense national crisis the normal man becomes abnormal. Inhibitions relax their stern rule. The psychological causes of war come into play, and public opinion becomes angry, suspicious and pugnacious. And these causes operate the more dangerously in modern times because they have long been under the influence of one of the most powerful of psychological stimulants: mass education.

Of the psychological causes of war perhaps the most important is fear. Fear, ages old, ever present or hovering in the background of consciousness, is ever ready to see peril where there is none, to exaggerate it where it is slight. It is largely fear that leads a nation to maintain and train intensively a large army

or navy. It is precisely this large army or navy that excites the fears of other nations. It is largely fear that leads a victorious nation to demand territorial concessions from the defeated. And these territorial concessions in turn raise the fears of the defeated country, impelling it at the same time to antagonism and the desire for *revanche*, thus paving the way for a new war. It was largely fear of Germany that led to the formation of the Triple Entente. It was largely fear of the Triple Entente that led the States of the Triple Alliance to increase their war preparations. And it was from the mutual fears and suspicions of the two groups that the Great War finally came. Each group believed the other the aggressor. "Every war appears to the people who conduct it as defensive, precisely because every war is to some extent based upon fear." [1]

If shrinking fear leads to war, so also do some of the more aggressive qualities of mankind, such as pugnacity and love of power. Plain, primitive pugnacity, ordinarily dormant, rises rapidly to the forefront of consciousness in time of crisis. It seems to be curiously strong in the old and the elderly, with whom it is none the less vehement for being vicarious. Love of power works hand in hand with fear to promote war; for what one man wants for security, another desires for the sake of power. Partridge holds this love of power to be the most fundamental of all war's causes,[2] though others would place fear first. Closely associated with love of power is pride, stupidly involving the individual or the group in difficulties, stupidly blocking extrication for fear of loss of what is miscalled "honour." It is this pride which stiffens the backs of diplomats and statesmen when they ought

[1] Partridge, *Psychology of Nations*, p. 73. [2] Ibid., p. 52.

to compromise, and turns an "incident" into a disaster.

Finally, there is the so-called "herd instinct." "Thanks to his herd instinct," says MacCurdy, "which makes man accept the opinions of those immediately around him—herd, or 'mob' suggestion—only that seems to be right which is done by his group, and an abnormal suspicion of the acts of other groups develops. Thus a state of antagonism develops which is much augmented by the aggressive tendency latent in human nature. The antagonism is cumulative, so that sooner or later a state of extreme tension is reached. At this point, when action of some sort seems imperative, the primitive unconscious instincts of man assert themselves (as they constantly tend to do), and the herd, finding in this a ready weapon, relaxes the ban, making of blood lust a virtue." [1]

In what is called the civilized world, the "herd" to-day is the nation. And the nation is afflicted with what Clutton-Brock has called "pooled self-esteem": "a kind of national egotism, having all the symptoms and absurdities and dangers of personal egotism, or self-esteem." [2] Each nation indulges in extravaganzas of self-praise. Each tends to assert loudly its superiority to the rest. Each is conscious of its own rectitude as a nation, but fears the evil intentions and diabolical cunning of some other or others. Frenchmen are sure they will never do anything to disturb the peace of the world, but fear the renewal of German aggression. "We are a peaceable people," say the French. "All we ask is to be let alone." Germans are confident of their own good faith, but equally confident that Frenchmen are plotting the destruction

[1] *Psychology of War*, pp. 51–2.
[2] "Pooled Self-Esteem," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 1921.

of Germany. "We are a peaceable people," say the Germans. "All we ask is to be let alone." Americans are alarmed at the "Japanese peril," Japanese at the American; and out of such fears and suspicions may come an otherwise avoidable war of the Pacific.

"What is the attitude of any nation towards war in time of peace? War, of course, is damnable, all readily agree. But this is war as an abstraction. What do the citizens of any given country think of their own wars? All are excusable, some justifiable, some glorious." [1] Professor C. R. Fish, placing scholarly impartiality above narrow nationalism, has said, "Neither the war of 1812 nor the Spanish war was necessary. Those responsible for both justified themselves by referring to causes which had long been in existence." [2] But the gorge of the "hundred per cent. American" rises at such a statement. He prefers to believe that the United States has never been at all to blame in its wars. What is more, he is honest in his belief. The scientific historian may know better; but your simon-pure "patriot" pays no more attention to historical scholarship than a Fundamentalist does to the higher criticism.

It is easy to see the absurdity of this intense nationalism in the people of other countries, but very difficult in the case of our own. But how can there be enduring peace while the nations are at once so pugnacious and so full of fear, so proud of themselves, so intolerant of others, so suspicious of one another, so blind to their own faults and weaknesses? What is to prevent the new international machinery, slowly developing in the new spirit of hope, from breaking down in time of crisis, as have treaties and international law in the

[1] MacCurdy, *Psychology of War*, p. 30.
[2] *American Diplomacy*, p. 408.

past? Not until there is a more enlightened public opinion among the nations of the world, not until there is a wider and truer acceptance of the international ideal, not until there develops a spirit of national self-examination and self-criticism, can a solid foundation be laid for enduring peace.

Now, as has already been indicated, there is one great force militating against that enlightened public opinion which constitutes the most effective guarantee of peace. That force is education. While statesmen and jurists at Geneva are exercising the highest intelligence and the most careful diplomacy in smoothing the path to a new world order, writers of textbooks and teachers of reading, history, geography and civics are training the world's children to nationalistic narrowness, to nationalistic prejudices. To their own country, teachers and texts give disproportionate attention, magnifying its achievements and those of its leaders, past and present, keeping silent in regard to its faults or "rationalizing" these into virtues. Other countries they tend to neglect, disparage or criticize severely. To the international idea some lip service is paid; but there is little real enthusiasm for it where it appears to conflict with some cherished national prejudice. Thus, what should be a training for world culture and an international point of view becomes education in compartments. And the prejudices thus inculcated in the impressionable years of childhood, remain throughout life, and form the basis of that miscalled patriotism to which an opportunist and chauvinistic press so easily appeals, and which in time of crisis it stirs to arms.

For the most part, of course, teachers and writers of textbooks are unconscious that they distort the truth. Patriotism they conceive as one of the highest virtues.

And all too frequently they fail to distinguish between a true, quiet, self-sacrificing love of country and that blatant egotistical nationalism, which, in the United States, for example, has passed under the title of "hundred per cent. Americanism." For of course no one can rightly object to teaching children to love their country, any more than one can rightly object to teaching them to love their family. But as between the family and the State it is definitely admitted that the interest of the former must give way to that of the latter. It has not been so generally admitted that the interest of the nation ought to yield to the interest of humanity as a whole.

That narrow nationalism is a persistent menace to world peace has been clearly recognized long ere this. It has been clearly recognized, too, that this narrow nationalism is fostered by education. During the war the part played by German historians and German teachers in paving the way for the conflict was frequently pointed out. But if the relationship between narrowly nationalistic education has been so long realized, why has so little action been taken? Why have the internationally-minded statesmen of the world concentrated on the development of the machinery of a League of Nations and a World Court, on the outlawry of war and on progressive disarmament, almost to the exclusion of attention to this great force militating against their aims?

The justification for the present investigation, then, lies in the fact that so little has been done to call general attention to the problem of nationalistic education, still less to solve it. The Dotation Carnegie, it is true, has collected valuable material[1] relating to the nationalism of post-war school books in various

[1] *Enquête sur les Livres Scolaires d'après Guerre.*

countries. Its revelations of the narrow nationalism permeating many French texts constitute a distinct contribution to the cause of world peace. Unfortunately, however, its report is itself not completely free from nationalistic bias. It has taken little or no account of "revisionist scholarship" regarding the causes of the Great War, as it obviously should do, if it is to test what the textbooks have to say regarding these causes. It harks back to the biassed view of the origins of the war that prevailed during the conflict itself. Furthermore, the investigation of the school books of each country considered was entrusted by the Dotation in each case to natives of the country concerned—except in the case of Belgium and Germany (the Belgian books are grouped, reasonably enough, with the French). But the investigation of the nationalism of the German textbooks was made and reported on by Frenchmen! Entirely apart, however, from the merits or demerits of the *Enquête* of the Dotation Carnegie, further investigation and more publicity are needed. If it be true that the fundamental causes of war are psychological, and if nationalistic education is stimulating the development of these causes, it follows that this type of training ought to be thoroughly understood and then reformed. Its character will be illustrated in succeeding chapters of this book by examples taken from texts used in France, Germany and England. A few possible remedies will be suggested. It is intolerable that in the name of love of country the world's children should be taught to distrust, even to hate, one another. Let the nations disarm as they will, there can be no enduring peace without disarmament of the human spirit.

CHAPTER II

THE PATRIOTIC PURPOSE IN FRENCH EDUCATION

THE "tragic year" of 1870–71 marks the beginning of a new impetus to French patriotism. The influence of that impetus affected vitally the development of education in the formative days of the Third Republic and persists in French education to-day. It reveals itself in school programmes and textbooks.

The year 1870 found France unprepared. When the seasoned, scientifically trained and disciplined troops of Von Moltke crossed the border, the French armies, after initial stout resistance, fell back, alarmed, confused, disordered. The tragedy of Sedan, the capture of Metz, the siege and capitulation of Paris, all followed in quick succession. Then came the humiliating treaty of Frankfort, with the imposition of a heavy indemnity and the loss to France of Alsace-Lorraine. The French army, once the pride of French rulers and the terror of Europe, had been beaten, terribly and decisively beaten, by the once-despised dreamers across the Rhine. But the French, intellectually resilient, their pride persisting even after their fall, began at once to analyse the causes of their defeat and to prepare for another conflict which they felt sure would some day come with Germany.

The causes of defeat they found in part, of course, in the training and discipline of the German army, in

the organization of the German staff, in the inefficiency of their own military preparation. But they carried their reasoning further. And they came to believe that Prussian victory could be traced, in the last analysis, to the Prussian school, to the intelligence and morale there developed. It became a popular aphorism that " the Prussian schoolmaster won at Sedan." The lesson was taken to heart by the French. Education, they felt, ought to be more widespread; and the French school must be impregnated with a new nationalism. It must mould in the mind of the youth of France a psychology of defence. It must, many thought, sustain the idea of *revanche*, foster the hope, the determination, of recovering the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. If the Prussian schoolmaster won at Sedan, the French schoolmaster must develop the morale that would win the next war.

But not immediately could French education be thoroughly nationalized. Internal difficulties delayed this consummation. Immediately after the battle of Sedan, as soon as the news of the defeat reached Paris, the Third Republic was proclaimed. The tarnished, tinselled splendour of the Second Empire collapsed with the capture of Napoleon the Third by the Germans. But it was not clear until nearly ten years later that France was to continue to be a Republic. The Assembly which had been elected in the emergency following the fall of the Second Empire, contained a majority of Monarchists; and these, with their followers throughout the country, were watchfully biding their time, waiting to bring to the throne some representative of one of the dynasties that had formerly governed the country, or in lieu of that, some new adventurer, some " man on horseback." It is not necessary to go into the details of the Parliamentary

struggle that followed between Monarchists and Republicans. A brief summary will be sufficient. The Monarchists selected as their candidate for the throne the Comte de Chambord. But he later made himself unavailable by his insistence on the white flag of the Bourbons, whose lilies on a white field recalled all the glories, all the despotism of the Ancien Régime, as well as all the hateful abuses that had led to the French Revolution. The Monarchists, however, secured the establishment of the seven-year term for the Presidency, a term long enough, it was thought, to give them time to mature their plans and prepare for final triumph. They brought about the election, as President, of Marshal MacMahon, war hero and avowed Monarchist. Events moved slowly. But finally MacMahon raised the issue of personal power in 1877, by appointing a royalist ministry, pleasing to himself but utterly out of sympathy with the Republican majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house established by law two years earlier. At this arbitrary act the country took fire. After all, the principles of the French Revolution had been working like a leaven among the masses of the people for more than seventy-five years, and under various forms of government, making them more and more receptive to the Republican idea. Elections were held ; a Chamber of Deputies triumphantly Republican was returned. The country had spoken decisively. MacMahon, said Gambetta, must either " submit or resign." In 1879 he resigned.

In all this decade of struggle the Church had sided with the Monarchists. A few years before the overthrow of Napoleon III, the Roman Pontiff, in his " Syllabus of Errors," had proclaimed officially that the Republican idea was incompatible with Roman

Catholic beliefs and institutions. The Church had many schools of its own; and it exercised a large measure of control over the State schools.[1] Thus the clergy had tremendous influence over the children of France, and frequently used this influence to incline their charges towards monarchism. Outside the schools they intrigued with the Royalists. "Clericalism—that is the enemy," Gambetta had said during the struggle. And the defeat of monarchism, signalized by the resignation of MacMahon in 1879, naturally carried with it the defeat of clericalism.

The field was now free for the Republicans. For the first time they were in a position to carry out definitively the principles of the French Revolution, to conclude the oft-interrupted work of the men of 1789. Laws were passed giving to the Press a generous and enduring freedom, permitting freedom of association, and granting to hitherto-repressed workingmen the right to form unions. Finally, by a series of measures extending from 1881 to 1886, elementary education was made free, compulsory and secular. All children from six to thirteen years of age were required to go to school; no clergyman was to teach in the State schools; no religious instruction was to be given in them. Church schools continued to exist; many attended them. But the masses went to the State-supported *école laïque* (lay school). The influence of the Republic had become predominant in education.

Thus the school, once used to foster in the children of France piety and loyalty to the Roman Catholic

[1] By the law of 1850, a private school (usually a church school) "in any commune might be accepted by the Academy Council as the public school for that commune on condition that the commune pay in that private school the tuition fees of all indigent children," Reisner, *Nationalism and Education*, p 70.

Church, now became saturated with the spirit of nationalism. It is surprising, in view of the early origins of nationalism, that even in France it should have reached full maturity so late. It is not astonishing that the nobles of France in the early fifteenth century should have been so unpatriotically immersed in internecine quarrels that they awaited a Jeanne d'Arc to unite them against the English invader; but it is astonishing to find that as late as 1864 there were in France school children who did not realize what their own country was. "It is shameful to say," reported a school inspector in that year, "that in a school of the (department of the) Lozère, there is not to be found a single child to respond to this question: 'Are you English or Russian?' or even to this: 'In what country is the department of the Lozère?' The thoughts of the greater part of these children do not extend beyond the radius of the little commune in which they live." [1]

Fervent Republicans, fervent patriots, the men responsible for the establishment of *l'école laïque*, counted on it to cure such evils, to develop knowledge of the nation and loyalty to it. Ignorance of country, such as that described, could not be tolerated. Future voters, to whom the destinies of the Republic were later to be entrusted, must understand something of the Republican form of government in order to vote intelligently. They must be trained to be ready to defend that form of government against any possible attack. At the time of the establishment of the "lay school," the Republic was still decidedly an experiment. France had had thirteen different governments since 1789. What was there to guarantee

[1] *Annexes au rapport P. Bert sur la proposition Barodet*, quoted in Beigbeder, *La Formation du Futur Citoyen*, p. 143.

that the Third Republic would endure? What guarantee was there against the appearance, some day, of a "man on horseback," who would stir the people to successful revolt? Against such a possibility the school must guard, as it must guard against the dangers of clericalism; and it must fortify the morale of youth against the possibility of a new war with Germany. Such were the theories of the Republican founders and sponsors of the new school system. In place of the religious ideal in education was to be substituted the patriotic.

It is not our purpose here to discuss the development of the intensely nationalistic education of the *école laïque* from the time of its establishment to the end of the Great War. That story has been told elsewhere.[1] Suffice it to say that the school seems to have fulfilled the aims of its founders. It fostered loyalty to the republican form of government, hostility to monarchy and one-man rule of any sort, hostility to clericalism. It helped to keep alive the idea of *revanche*, and it is probably largely responsible for the remarkable morale of the French soldiers during the Great War. Its influence, as has been said, persists to-day. What this influence is at the present time an examination of official programmes of instruction and of school text-books will reveal. To understand the significance of these, however, it is necessary first to know something of the relation of the French Government to education at the present time.

So centralized is the government of France that it has been said that if a king were to ride victoriously into Paris, he would find awaiting him all the machinery of absolute government. This centralization dominates the school system. The official programmes of instruc-

[1] Scott, *Patriots in the Making.*

tion are issued for primary, secondary and normal schools, under the authority of the Superior Council of Public Instruction, and of the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts. Writers of textbooks in preparing manuals, teachers in the class-room, are expected to conform to the principles and instructions set forth in the programmes. So highly centralized, in fact, is the educational system of France that it was formerly said that the Minister of Public Instruction could take out his watch at a given moment and tell just what lesson in just what subject every child of a certain age in France was studying at that instant. Even if this statement is not literally true, it is nevertheless highly significant of the power of the central authorities. Since that statement was first made there has been, it is true, some modification of State control. Indeed it is affirmed by their authors that the recently published programmes are shorter, less encyclopaedic than ever before, allowing the teachers a very great liberty.[1] But to natives of countries accustomed to decentralization in government, they still seem specific and restrictive enough.

There has been a general reorganization of the school programmes since the war. The programmes for the higher primary schools and primary normal schools were issued in 1920, those for the elementary primary schools (*écoles primaires élémentaires*) and the secondary schools were published in 1923. New programmes of a general character are issued only at infrequent intervals; the present programmes for the elementary primary schools, for example, supplant those of 1887. These recent changes, therefore, afford the investigator excellent opportunity to determine the official

[1] *Programmes Officiels des Ecoles Primaires Elémentaires*, p. 23; *Organisation et Programmes des Ecoles Normales Primaires*, p. 40.

attitude of the school authorities at the present time toward the teaching of patriotism.

Many subjects in the curriculum lend themselves to the inculcation of patriotism, such as reading, writing, singing, the French language and literature. But the subjects which the official programmes emphasize as vehicles for this sort of teaching are moral and civic instruction, geography, history, and—in the normal school—sociology. Moral and civic instruction was introduced into the public school in the early eighties of the last century, at the time when the school was made free and secularized. It was generally recognized by the founders of the lay school that if no religious teaching was to be allowed within its doors some substitute must be found that would be equally or more effective in the development of character. Such a substitute they hoped to find in the teaching of a secular morality; and in this secular morality the highest emphasis was placed on patriotism. It was hoped that thus could be developed as fervent and self-sacrificing a devotion to country as had ever been given to Christianity and the Church.

In its details the experiment has not been altogether a success. Much of the teaching has been too didactic, much of it has been over the heads of the children.[1] In some cases the example of the teacher was widely at variance with his precept. Consequently, there is not to be found in the new programmes of the elementary schools as much emphasis on the teaching of patriotism through the medium of moral and civic instruction as there was in the programmes of 1887.[2] A considerable amount still remains, however. The

[1] Beigbeder, *La Formation du Futur Citoyen*, p. 179.
[2] Ibid.

cours moyen [1] or intermediate course, is required to include lessons on "the principal duties of life in society (the family, the fatherland)"; [2] the *cours supérieur* includes "ideas regarding the political and judicial organization of France. The citizen, his rights, his duties." [3] The programmes of the higher primary schools require more detailed teaching of patriotism in connection with moral and civic instruction,[4] and the programmes of the primary normal schools still more, in connection with the study of sociology.[5] It is significant that the 1920 programmes for the normal schools prescribe instruction regarding "the rôle of the school in maintaining and developing the spirit of national unity and in developing patriotism." [6]

As for history and geography, a war of words has long been waged as to whether these subjects, especially history, should be used to inculcate patriotism or solely to teach truth. The authors of the elementary school programmes believe that they can do both. The authorities refuse to oppose the scientific point of view to the "patriotic" point of view. "French patriotism," according to the new programmes, "has nothing to fear from the truth. The place of France in the world is great enough, her rôle noble enough, for a type of instruction clear and careful of truth to the point of *intransigéance*, to foster the development

[1] The elementary primary school has three main divisions: a *cours élémentaire* for children from seven to nine years of age, a *cours moyen* for those from nine to eleven, and a *cours supérieur* for those from eleven to thirteen.

[2] *Programmes Officiels des Ecoles Primaires Elémentaires.*

[3] Ibid.

[4] *Organisation et Programmes des Ecoles Primaires Supérieures de Garçons et des Ecoles Normales Primaires*, pp. 13–20.

[5] Ibid., pp. 20–29. In the primary normal school what used to be moral and civic instruction has now been renamed "sociology."

[6] Ibid.

and expansion of the sentiment of patriotism. And such should be the purpose of the teaching of geography and history in the primary school." [1]

Certainly true patriotism has nothing to fear from truth. Whether the sort of patriotism taught in the French schools has anything to fear from truth is another question.

As in the elementary schools, so in the normal schools, history is officially intended to be a "patriotic" subject. "If the programme of the normal schools, in contrast with that of the higher primary schools, which is almost exclusively reserved for the history of France, carries with it the history of the Great Powers of Europe and of the world, France ought none the less to remain in the forefront of the professor's aims. The history of France possesses an educative value, wholly unique, because France has at all times been, in the period of the Crusades as during the epoch of the Revolution, under Louis the Fourteenth as in the Age of the Enlightenment, the educator of the human race. Even when one studies the other nations it is the rôle of France and her historic mission which ought to be revealed to the pupil-teachers. When they become instructors, they will be, in each commune, the representatives of the national spirit. The normal schools would fail in their foremost duty if, for lack of instruction in history, inspired by a just feeling of nationality, their pupils entered on their careers of teaching without loving the genius of France." [2]

Certainly France has played a leading part in European history; certainly she has excelled in intellectual achievement. But she has not been "at all times

[1] *Programmes Officiels des Ecoles Primaires Elémentaires*, p. 53.
[2] *Organisation et Programmes des Ecoles Normales Primaires*, 1920, p. 43.

the educator of the human race" ; and one wonders whether other countries could not advance claims on other grounds at least to equal recognition in world history : England, for example, on the score of leadership in the art of government, colonization, economic development. Yet there is no special emphasis on English history in the programmes of the French elementary schools. No ! it would seem that the authors of the programmes wish history to teach patriotism for nationalistic reasons, and that they are trying to "rationalize" their aim, to justify it on other grounds than the patriotic. Their assertions show how easy it becomes to boast and to dogmatize, once one begins to over-emphasize the patriotic purpose in education.

But what tends far more to the development of a narrow nationalism than official emphasis on the direct teaching of patriotism is what might be called the nationalistic exclusiveness of the elementary curriculum. Survey the entire subject-matter of the curriculum—*morale, lecture, écriture, langue française,* and all the rest of it—and you will find only two studies that really lend themselves to any knowledge of countries other than France ; history and geography. Of course much might be taught in regard to foreign countries through these two subjects ; but it is not. The two years of instruction in history in the *cours élémentaire,* for example, are given over entirely to the history of France from its origins to the year 1610,[1] the two years of the *cours moyen* to the history of France from that date to the present.[2] The *cours supérieur* includes "very brief notions of antiquity" and "the great questions of French history in their relations with general history."[3] Very, very little is taught

[1] *Programmes Officiels des Ecoles Primaires Elémentaires,* p. 10.
[2] Ibid., pp. 13–14. [3] Ibid., p. 18.

regarding the history of the great nations of to-day other than France, or, for that matter, of the little countries.

With geography it is much the same. The elementary course concerns itself with physical geography, local geography, the great divisions of the earth, and very brief ideas of the geography of France;[1] the intermediate course solely with "France and her colonies."[2] The *cours supérieur*, it is true, does deal with Europe in general and "the great countries of the world," but even this course concludes with an extensive review of the geography of France and her colonies.[3]

The net result of this nationalistic exclusiveness of the curriculum can scarcely be over-emphasized. Unless he obtains it fortuitously, the French child of the elementary school acquires his knowledge of other countries almost entirely from this minimum of history and geography. And his history informs him of other nations chiefly through the medium of their wars with France—instruction calculated rather to develop prejudices against them than friendship for them. The geography teacher, it is true, is in a key position; he has the opportunity, if he chooses to use it, and if he has the requisite skill, to arouse in his pupils an interest in other lands. But even his opportunity is greatly restricted, owing to the disproportionate amount of time he is required to devote to France; and, in any case, it is only the rare teacher who can arouse the right sort of interest. True, it is important from the psychological point of view to begin with local geography and history, to proceed from the known to the unknown. But it is equally important from the

[1] *Programmes Officiels des Ecoles Primaires Elémentaires*, p. 10.
[2] Ibid., p. 14.
[3] Ibid., p. 18.

international point of view, to reach far out into the unknown, to widen the horizon of those who one day will be not only citizens of France but citizens of the world. It is true also that the curriculum of the secondary and normal schools is broader and more varied than that of the elementary schools. But the vast majority of the children, whose concepts are later to be the basis of public opinion in France, never reach these schools. Perforce the masses remain mentally isolated.

Other signs and portents point to the narrowly patriotic purpose of the educational authorities. On the third of June 1922, M. Léon Bérard, then Minister of Public Instruction, issued a circular forbidding the teaching of Esperanto in the various grades of public schools. M. Bérard held that such instruction tended to bring about "the separation of language and fatherland." He held it to be "the instrument of a systematic internationalism, enemy of the national languages."[1] As such he opposed it. Dr. Roman has pointed out that in 1921 military training was added to the normal school curriculum. At first it was made compulsory. Later, though it became theoretically voluntary, the pressure brought to bear on the students to take it up, made it almost compulsory.[2] In the elementary schools physical education is intended in part to be military preparation. The actual military exercises, it is true, which were formerly required for the elementary schools are required no longer; but this is rather because the conception of military preparation has changed than because of intention to do away with it. The experience of the last war showed that there was little military value in having

[1] Beigbeder, *La Formation du Futur Citoyen*, p. 183.
[2] *The New Education in Europe*, p. 129.

boys play soldiers; it was much more important to develop in them physical, intellectual and moral qualities which would later stand the test of military service.[1] In the secondary schools military training has been required since 1902. It is not the spirit of aggression that one should read into these measures, but rather fear of the probability, if not the inevitability of a new war.[2] They imply little hope of the success of the international ideal. Fortunately, they do not tell the whole story. That the educational authorities have not lost hope of the development of the idea of international solidarity will be shown later.

If the official programmes emphasize the teaching of patriotism and organize the curriculum of the elementary schools in the spirit of national exclusiveness, it may be taken for granted that the majority of the textbooks will adapt themselves to these concepts. Teachers and texts are expected to conform to the programmes in subject matter and in spirit. Certain writers of historical and geographical texts avow frankly that their purpose is patriotic. Among these is the distinguished historian Lavisse, who thus addresses those school children who read and study one of his little histories of France:

"You will see that your forefathers, who lived before you in this beautiful land of France, have not always been happy and free as you are to-day, and that during long years they have worked and suffered to give you liberty.

[1] Beigbeder, *La Formation du Futur Citoyen*, pp. 180–181.

[2] I have been informed by a French citizen that when the French went into the Ruhr a ministerial circular was sent to the schools, asking the teachers to show the children why the occupation was justifiable. Thus children were sometimes required to learn by heart a statement, the purport of which was that the French troops were occupying the Ruhr because the Germans had wrought destruction to French mines during the war.

"You will see that they have shed their blood in glorious battles that France might be honoured among all the nations.

"You will learn thus what you owe to your forefathers, and why your first duty is above all to love your fatherland." [1]

Similarly Faubert and Huleux, in the preface of a historical manual, state that "while trying to preserve the strictest impartiality, they have brought out the facts in a spirit of profound sympathy for France and everything French." [2] Devinat's historical text for the *cours moyen* teaches "as living and beneficent realities the Republic and democracy, the civic duty and the social duty." [3] Such attempts to make history the vehicle of a preconceived type of patriotism are practically certain, whatever the writers may claim, to work injury to that spirit of impartiality which should be the first care of the true historian.[4]

The language of the programmes in prescribing the teaching of patriotism is for the most part restrained, as befits the language of officialdom. That of the *livres scolaires*, on the other hand, often becomes rhetorical and extravagant. "France represents to the world the land of liberty and justice. She has always protected the small nations against the oppression of the great. By her heroic rôle during the war she saved the liberty of the world." [5] In spite of the terrible experience through which the country has

[1] Lavisse, E., *La Première Année d'Histoire de France*, Foreword; Gallouédec et Maurette, *Cours de Géographie*, Cours Elémentaire, p. 50; Blanchard et Faucher, *Cours de Géographie*, Cours Moyen, p. 58; Blanchet et Toutain, *L'Histoire de France à l'Ecole*, p. 3.

[2] Faubert et Huleux, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. vi.

[3] Devinat, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, Préface.

[4] A teacher of forty years' experience in the French elementary schools said to me: "I have never yet seen a thoroughly neutral textbook in history."

[5] *Collection des Examens*, p. 151.

recently passed, war is glorified. Not that there is direct incitement to fight ; but war's heroes are lauded in such a way as to encourage emulation ; and war's perils are clothed with all the fascinations of romance. Thus Lavissa tells the story of the youthful Bara :

" One day, in the year 1793, a soldier went from Palaiseau to the army of the Vendée. Bara begged his mother so hard to permit him to follow the soldier that she allowed him to go. The general who commanded the army did not wish Bara to become a soldier in a regiment, for Bara was only fourteen years old ; nevertheless he allowed him to remain near himself ; and gave him a horse and a hussar's tunic.

" For several months Bara was in all the battles, and the soldiers admired this child who always went in front, in the thick of balls and bullets. On one occasion he made two prisoners all by himself. They admired his filial piety also ; for the brave lad sent his pay home to his mother.

" But one day Bara was surprised by a troop of Vendéans ; he would not surrender, and fell, shot through with bullets.

" France does not forget those who die fighting for her. In the month of September 1881, a monument was raised at Palaiseau to perpetuate the memory of the young hero." [1]

It is the old story of stirring the blood and thrilling the heart of youth, and thus stimulating the psychology of war.

Enough has been said to make clear the pervasive

[1] Lavisse, op. cit., pp. 158–9 and passim ; Habert et Bouillot, *Lectures Choisies d'Auteurs Contemporains*, pp. 11–13 and passim ; Fournier, *Pour Notre France !* passim ; Mironneau, *Choix de Lectures*, pp. 147, 188, 204 ; Devinat, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, passim ; Bruno, G., *La Tour de l'Europe pendant la Guerre*, passim, etc.

influence of the patriotic purpose in French education. Moral and civic instruction is required by the programmes to inculcate patriotism definitely and directly. History and geography are expected to minister to it as occasion may serve. Many textbooks frankly proclaim a patriotic purpose and emphasize the history of wars and battles, the biographies of war heroes. Through gymnastics in the elementary school, through military training in the secondary school, youth is supposed to acquire physical and mental readiness for war's emergencies. In the elementary school a curriculum nationalistically narrow emphasizes information in regard to France at the expense of knowledge of other countries, and thus hinders the development of an international outlook.

There is less justification to-day for an education intensely nationalistic than there was at the time of the establishment of the lay school. At that time the issue of nationalism verses internationalism had not been raised. At that time the State seemed to face very real internal and external dangers against which the Government felt it necessary to safeguard the morale of the country through the teaching of patriotism and loyalty. As has been shown, the school was to help stabilize the Third Republic, to fortify against the possible menace of monarchism and clericalism, to develop a spirit of strong resistance to Germany in the event of another war, even to foster the idea of *revanche.*

To-day, however, the Third Republic has proved its strength. The *Action Française* may foam at the mouth. Léon Daudet may write a book on "the stupid nineteenth century." But clericalism and monarchism resemble rather terriers yelping at the heels of the Republic than wolves ready to spring at

its throat. Germany has been met and defeated. Alsace-Lorraine has been incorporated in France. The new Germany is far weaker than the old ; for not only is disarmament being forced on her, but she has lost much of her territory and her economic resources. A new international organization has come into being, asking the support of right-minded men everywhere. Education, however, ever tends to lag behind the progress of ideas. A given type always tends to persist after the forces that gave it birth have weakened or become inoperative. So the intensely nationalistic education born of the exigencies of the early days of the Third Republic still persists. But the future beckons. The times demand a truer, less narrow conception of patriotism in education, one that accords better with the developing ideal of international solidarity.

CHAPTER III

ENGLAND INTERPRETED IN THE FRENCH TEXTBOOKS

It has been shown that what little the French child of the primary schools learns about the strange countries beyond the borders of *La Patrie* he acquires chiefly through geography and history. Hence the crucial importance of these two subjects in developing a favourable or unfavourable impression of other nations. But it must not be supposed that the nationalistic ideal is always dominant in the teaching of these subjects. Far from it. After all, the primary purpose of education is to educate; to this purpose even the development of patriotism must be subordinated. Consequently, most of the instruction regarding other countries is simply informative, neither nationalistic nor international in character, but neutral. Geography, particularly where it deals with lands other than France, is from its very nature primarily occupied with the description of their physical, economic and political characteristics, rather than with nationalistic propaganda. Only here and there does a patriotic purpose appear.

In the teaching of history there is less neutrality. Of course, the historian professes devotion to the ideal of scholarly impartiality. But sometimes his sympathies get the better of his critical faculties. Moreover, in telling the story of wars, he may be carried

away by his own narrative ; and " intoxicated by the exuberance of his own verbosity," he may unconsciously teach hostility to the " wicked enemies of France." These factors certainly play a part, as will be shown later, in the treatment writers of historical texts accord Germany.

Here, however, the question is of England. For centuries England and France were intermittently engaged in deadly warfare. Does the story of that warfare in the French textbooks tend to develop a bias against England ? This question can be answered in part by examining the textbook treatment of such great crises in that warfare as the Hundred Years' War, the Seven Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, perchance, we can discover whether the ghost of past hatreds still haunts and disturbs present friendships.

The Hundred Years' War began in 1337, when Edward III of England claimed the throne of France, and lasted until 1453. The responsibility for causing it, the writers of the French textbooks place squarely on the shoulders of England and England's king : their general opinion is that it was brought on by Edward's ambition. According to one writer the English had never sincerely renounced those provinces which they had once controlled in France and which they had later been forced to give up to the French king, Philip Augustus. They simply sought an occasion for attack.[1]

That occasion offered itself when Edward III claimed the French throne. The main line of French kings, the Capetian, had come to an end. Two relatives of the late king claimed the throne, Philip of Valois and Edward. Edward claimed succession through his mother. Certain of the textbook writers make the

[1] Faubert et Huleux, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, pp. 50–1.

point that Edward was debarred by reason of the Salic law, which is supposed to have excluded women from succession to the throne of France, as well as succession through the female line.[1] An assembly of nobles and lawyers chose Philip, who then succeeded to the throne.[2] "Edward the Third, furious at having been excluded from the throne, did not despair of seizing it by force."[3] One textbook, very elementary, avoiding details, sums the whole matter up thus: "In the reign of Philip VI of Valois, the king of England, Edward III, resolved to conquer France, and began the Hundred Years' War."[4]

On the whole the French point of view is fairly well justified. Professor A. L. Cross, who, being an American, starts with no nationalistic bias on the question of the Hundred Years' War, summarizing the results of impartial historical research, states that Edward's claim was a mere pretext. "The peers of France decided in favour of Philip, son of Charles of Valois." But Professor Cross also points out that Philip irritated the king of England by encroaching on the Duchy of Guyenne, a possession of the English ruler in France. Furthermore, Philip aided the Scots, at that time warring with the pugnacious Edward.[5] These causes of conflict do not justify Edward's invasion; they simply make it appear less unjustifi-

[1] Un Comité de Professeurs, *Précis d'Histoire de France*, Cours Elémentaire, p. 57; Gauthier et Deschamps, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 20.

[2] Faubert et Huleux, op. cit., pp. 50–1; Gauthier et Deschamps, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 20; Melin, *Nouveaux Eléments*, pp. 56–7; Métin et Flandre, *Histoire*, p. 68; Lavisse, *Première Année d'Histoire de France*, p. 12.

[3] Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., p. 20.

[4] Une Réunion de Professeurs, *Histoire de France*, Cours Préparatoire, p. 47. See also Blanchet et Toutain, *L'Histoire de France à l'École*, p. 32.

[5] *A History of England and Greater Britain*, pp. 190–1.

able. And these mitigating circumstances the representative French school books, to which I have referred, fail to mention.

Furthermore, it is generally recognized by scholars that the Salic law did not in actuality exclude succession through the female line.[1] The French nobles and lawyers naturally did not desire a foreign prince called in to rule over them. They pretended to find legal justification in this old law of the Salian Franks. Pagès, the author of a little historical text much used in French schools, frankly acknowledges this :

" Edward III, duke of Guyenne and king of England, was the nearest heir of Charles IV ; his mother was a daughter of Philip the Fair. But the nobles, who preferred Philip VI, declared that women had no right to the throne. Later they called this new custom the Salic law, because they pretended to have found it among the old laws of one of the Frankish peoples, the Salian Franks." [2]

The story of the Hundred Years' War in these books is such as to fire the imagination of the children who read it. The English invaders swarm into France, pillage the cottages, ravage the fields, massacre the peasants.[3] French knights in armour yield to English bowmen at Crécy and Poitiers. The French hero, " Grand Ferré," is attacked on his death-bed by twelve English soldiers. " Brigands," shouts the giant, " you have come to take me while I am in bed, but even so you will not capture me," and jumping from his couch he seizes an axe, falls on the assassins, kills

[1] *Petit Larousse Illustré* (ed. 1922). Salique (loi).

[2] *Histoire Sommaire de France jusqu'en*, 1610, pp. 109–10.

[3] Faubert et Huleux, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 56 ; *Journal des Instituteurs et des Institutrices*, February 2, 1924. (This is not a textbook but contains lesson-types for use of teachers.)

seven of them and puts the rest to flight. Then, falling back on his couch, he dies.[1]

In spite of such exploits the French, disorganized, quarrelling among themselves, yield almost everywhere to the " cruel and insolent " invader.[2] But *in extremis* patriotism is born. Never before in French history had it definitely surmounted local feeling. Now hatred of the foreigner unites the people.[3] The Maid of Orleans rallies the French, draws them together, and drives out the foreigner. But she herself is captured by the English and burned at the stake. As she dies, the English, ashamed and frightened at their crime, cry out : " We are lost. We have burned a saint." [4]

Inevitably the narrative of the Hundred Years' War becomes to the French child something more than a romantic tale of knights in armour, bowmen and heroes, as it might appear, for example, to some American children, or a weary catalogue of events and dates as it might seem to others. It is part of his country's struggle for freedom ; as such it excites his sympathies and develops his animosities. It is easy for a bias against England to bud.

Carping criticism, it is true, might easily exaggerate this bias. When all is said and done, the Hundred Years' War has faded so far into the past, it was so much more a struggle of knights than of nations, that little prejudice against England would

[1] Un Comité de Professeurs, *Précis d'Histoire*, Cours Elémentaire, p. 57 ; Faubert et Huleux, op. cit., p. 56.

[2] Métin et Flandre, *Histoire*, p. 68.

[3] Lavisse, *La Première Année*, etc., p. 13 ; Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., p. 20 ; Faubert et Huleux, p. 56 ; Métin et Flandre, *Histoire*, p. 68. " Hors de France, les Goddam ! " became the rallying cry of the French, according to a lesson-type given in the *Journal des Instituteurs*, etc., for February 2, 1924 ; Blanchet et Toutain, *L'Histoire de France à l'Ecole*, p. 32.

[4] Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., p. 20.

probably develop through the story of it, provided it stood alone, the sole conflict between France and England.

But it does not stand alone.

The Seven Years' War began in Europe in 1756. But the vital struggle between England and France was colonial, in India and in North America, and had its beginnings some two years earlier than the continental conflict. From the point of view of most of the French writers of historical texts, as far as I have examined them, the primary cause of the struggle in North America lay in the covetousness of England.[1] England, it is maintained, was jealous of the French colonies and disquieted at their prosperity.[2] She desired *revanche* for previous defeat.[3] She was anxious to ruin the French navy.[4] English merchants wished to ruin French commerce and take the French colonies,[5] while the English colonists themselves were eager to hunt the French out of America.[6] Finally William Pitt, bitter enemy of France, to render war inevitable, caused French vessels of commerce to be attacked on the high seas.[7] This was an act of brigandage, for war had not yet been declared.[8] The impression is gathered that the French were simply forced to defend themselves against the aggressions of "perfidious Albion."[9]

[1] Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., p. 82; Faubert et Huleux, op. cit., p. 134, etc.

[2] Melin, *Nouveaux Eléments*, p. 61; Un Comité de Professeurs, op. cit., p. 106.

[3] Melin, op. cit., p. 61.

[4] Lavisse, op. cit., p. 119.

[5] Métin et Flandre, *l'Histoire*, p. 200.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Guiraud, *Histoire de France*, p. 40.

[8] Lavisse, op. cit., p. 119.

[9] "L'Angleterre, jalouse de notre puissance maritime, nous chercha querelle. Elle demanda et obtint le rappel de Dupleix; elle captura nos vaisseaux marchands sans déclaration de guerre," Blanchet et Toutain, *L'Histoire de France à l'Ecole*, p. 58. In

This impression is not justified by the findings of historical research. Fundamentally, the issue in North America was one of expansion. The French controlled two great areas of territory: Canada, with the St. Lawrence region, and Louisiana, which included the valley of the Mississippi River to its mouth. Naturally they were anxious to unite these two regions. Equally naturally the British colonists were determined to prevent them; for if the French were successful in their aims the British would be confined to a narrow strip between the mountains and the sea. They would be virtually enclosed by the French and shut off from westward expansion. They felt themselves in danger of being expelled later from America. This general issue was complicated by boundary disputes; and when the French, in pursuance of their plans, began to construct a chain of forts in the ill-defined Ohio region, the English sprang to arms to dislodge them. There were other causes of conflict; but this issue of the "No Man's Land" of the frontier was the chief. Historical research, then, by no means frees the British from all responsibility; nor on the other hand does it completely justify the French.[1]

One or two of the primary school texts that I have examined approximate the scholarly point of view. For example, Métin and Flandre, after making a statement, based on assumption, that the English merchants desired to ruin the commerce and take the colonies of France, point out that the French had discovered the

the Seven Years' War Prussia was aided by "notre inlassable ennemie l'Angleterre," Devinat, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 101.

[1] *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vi, pp. 410–12; Beer, *British Colonial Policy*, p. 14; Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, vol. i, p. 313; Cross, op. cit., pp. 720–2.

course of the Ohio River and planned to construct forts along it. They were anxious to unite Canada with Louisiana. This disquieted the Anglo-American colonists and they attacked the French.[1] Another writer says that the French were shutting off from the English colonists all possibility of expansion into the interior; they were "enveloppés par nos possessions."[2] But the point is not that a few writers recognize the divided responsibility for the war in North America, or perceive that conflict was almost inherent in the circumstances of the situation, but that so many write from the nationalistic point of view, and place responsibility for the war's inception entirely or almost entirely on England. The note of bitterness frequently recurs because of the part played by England in causing the loss of France's first colonial empire.[3]

Such nationalism as tinges the treatment of the Napoleonic period, is modified by one factor: criticism of Napoleon. For the conquering Corsican the majority of French textbook writers have about as little love as has Mr. H. G. Wells. To praise Napoleon would be to inculcate Napoleonism. To inculcate Napoleonism would be to help pave the way for another "man on horseback." France desires no more of that sort of thing; she has had enough experience of kings and conquering rulers. Influenced, therefore, by the feeling against one-man rule, and, it is only fair to add, by the canons of historical inquiry, the authors of the *livres scolaires* are quite willing to place on the shoulders of Napoleon I a

[1] Op. cit., p. 200.

[2] *Collection du Courrier des Examens*, p. 45.

[3] "En 1783, au traité de Versailles, nous obtenions un commencement de *revanche*. L'Angleterre perdait une de ses plus belles colonies, ce qui était une satisfaction pour l'orgueil national français, humilié au traité de Paris," ibid., p. 51.

large share of responsibility for the wars that bear his name.

But that does not mean that they completely absolve England. By no means.

There is particular insistence on England's breach of peace in 1803. The year previous to that, England and France had agreed to the Treaty of Amiens, after having fought for nearly a decade; and for the only time between 1792 and 1814, France was at peace with all the world.[1] Then England declared war.

"The principal cause of the war was the ambition of Napoleon," according to some textbook writers.[2] But others differ. The one thought of the kings, contends one writer, was to stifle for ever the aspirations toward liberty and equality which were winning over the monarchical states; and at the head of all their secret conspiracies were England and the *émigrés* in London, who were paid by Pitt.[3] "Pitt, irreconcilable enemy of the French Revolution and of France, desired war, war, war! No man did more evil to Europe than Pitt."[4] Furthermore, England refused to evacuate the island of Malta, as she had promised to do.[5] It is certain that Bonaparte, in 1803, sincerely desired peace.[6] Such are some of the opinions expressed.

[1] "For the first time since the beginning of the Revolution, France found herself at peace with all the world. And what a glorious peace, which assured us our natural boundaries and made us masters of Europe," Devinat, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 151.

[2] Faubert et Huleux, Cours Moyen, p. 193; Métin et Flandre, op. cit., pp. 301–2.

[3] Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., p. 224; Métin et Flandre, op. cit., pp. 301–2.

[4] Ibid., p. 225; Devinat, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 155.

[5] Métin et Flandre, op. cit., pp. 301–2. "Without declaring war, England had taken or destroyed two hundred French and Dutch vessels," Devinat, op. cit., p. 155.

[6] Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., p. 224.

That England must share with Napoleon responsibility for the protracted warfare of the whole period, is the assertion of some of these writers. "England," says Lavisse, "is in part the cause of the wars of the Empire. It was she who forced Napoleon to fight and to conquer successively all the peoples of Europe; but Napoleon was much at fault, in treating Europe as if she ought to obey his will." [1] England was the soul of all the coalitions against France.[2] A country of manufacturers and merchants, she "wished to be alone in possessing colonies and carrying on commerce on the seas. That is why France and England have been almost continually at war, under Louis XIV, under Louis XV, under the Convention, the Directory and Napoleon I." [3] So, despite Bonaparte's enormous faults, the impartial historian in all justice must admit—according to one text—that England forced him either to conquer without respite or to yield.[4]

It is scarcely necessary to say that scholarly opinion does not sustain *in toto* this indictment of the English. But it does in part. In 1803, for example, it was the English who actually declared war. Furthermore, Napoleon had not violated the letter of the Treaty of Amiens, while the English had distinctly failed to carry out certain of its provisions. For one thing, they had not evacuated the island of Malta, as they had agreed to do in the treaty.[5] Furthermore, the British had succeeded in establishing a virtual monopoly of sea power and sea commerce; and they were ready to fight to prevent that supremacy from passing

[1] Lavisse, *La Première Année d'Histoire de France*, p. 186.
[2] Faubert et Huleux, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 193; Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., p. 247; Blanchet et Toutain, *L'Histoire de France à l'Ecole*, p. 80.
[3] Clémendot, *L'Histoire*, p. 106.
[4] Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., p. 247.
[5] Cross, op. cit., p. 849.

over to Napoleon.[1] Such are some of the impartial opinions of general writers, based on the results of research.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that throughout the whole period the warfare of Napoleon was almost entirely aggressive, that of the English defensive. Shortly after the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon himself admitted that " a renewal of war was necessary for his existence." [2] At that very time he was extending his influence in the Austrian Netherlands and Holland, in Italy and along the Rhine. He was stirring up trouble in India and planning to regain Egypt.[3] Already France had grown through conquest far beyond her boundaries of 1789 ; and Napoleon was bringing more and more territory under his control. Much might be said in criticism of British imperialism. But during the Napoleonic wars, England, generally speaking, was fighting for the *status quo ante bellum*, for the preservation of the balance of power. Once grant the right of men to fight at all, and it is difficult to see how England could have laid down her arms until Napoleon had ceased to menace the balance of power in Europe, until France had been reduced approximately to her boundaries of 1789.

In their treatment of the great wars with England, then, there is a tendency on the part of the authors of the *livres scolaires* to place on the shoulders of that country a greater burden of responsibility than is justified by the findings of historical research. Furthermore, in recounting the events of these wars there is a tendency to stir the imagination of youth against the ancient foe of France.

[1] Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, vol. i, pp. 536–7.
[2] Cross, op. cit., p. 849.
[3] Ibid.

But a more bitter indictment of " perfidious Albion " than anything I have discovered in the textbooks is to be found in an article in a journal for the guidance of teachers. " Do you wish to know in what way England is our friend ? " asks the author of the article, and proceeds to give his own answer. After the defeat of France at Waterloo, he says, foreign regiments occupied French soil as far as Brittany. When the Prussian soldiers acted like Vandals, the French king, Louis XVIII, had to ask help of the Duke of Wellington. The duke, stiff and haughty, sometimes deigned to intervene. Then again, when France undertook her expedition against Spain, England threatened her with war ; and England's hostility increased up to 1830. Still later, Napoleon III, in defending British interests in the Orient, caused 100,000 Frenchmen to perish at Sebastopol. And finally, after the Great War, England, having gotten all she could from the Treaty of Versailles, is trying to ruin those clauses which might be advantageous to France.

In conclusion, the author of the article quotes Theodore Roosevelt : " When you wish to deal with England, you would better carry with you ' a big stick.' " [1]

Presumably the spirit of such an article, written as it is in a teacher's magazine, influences the teaching of history in more than one French school-room.

But the picture must not be overdrawn. The very violence of the article just quoted serves to set in relief the more restrained language of the textbooks. Furtnermore, over against the criticism of England must be set, here and there, a word or two of praise. Fournier, the author of a little history of the Great

[1] Brossolette, L., " Avec Une Grosse Canne," *Journal des Instituteurs et des Institutrices*, October 18, 1924.

War, comments with warm approval on the part played by the troops from across the channel. For centuries, he says, the English had been more often the enemies of the French than their friends. But previous to the war a friendlier feeling had led to an *entente cordiale*. Not only was England France's best customer, but France had recognized that she was one of the freest and most generous nations on earth. In the war itself her part was heroic. Free to remain neutral, she had thrown herself heart and soul into the conflict, and the fighting qualities of her improvised army were the admiration of the French veterans who fought by her side.[1] So, too, the authors of a *Grammaire Anglaise*, quote from an English writer a friendly comparison between Englishman and Frenchman :

" An Englishman is pleasant because he is not noisy, not troublesome, not obtrusive, not contradictory. The Frenchman is agreeable because he is lively, amusing, amiable, successful in the battle against dulness." [2]

And the writers of a geography commend the Englishman's passion for sports, spirit of initiative, *sang froid*, and liking for adventure ; but they contrast these admirable qualities with his abuse of strong drinks, his egoism, rapacity and cruelty.[3]

Foncin, whose geographies have long been widely used in the schools of France, says of the English :

" They consider themselves the first people in the world (and so they are, at least in wealth, colonial expansion, extension of commerce and language). Their patriotism is proud, tenacious and ardent. They are devoted to independence, are very practical, very

[1] *Pour Notre France*, pp. 190–3.
[2] Bascan et Ledoux, *Grammaire Anglaise Illustrée*, p. 55.
[3] Allain et Hauser, *L'Europe*, p. 97.

individualistic. In the field of economic rivalry they defend their interests energetically. In the domain of morality, they are capable of great generosity, and of heroic devotion. Their literature is one of the richest and most beautiful of modern times." [1]

In general, however, the impression of England left with the French child of the primary school is unlikely to be very favourable. Prejudice grows naturally out of the teaching of nationalistic history, whether or not the authors of the textbooks intend it to, the very emphasis on patriotism lending itself to a disparaging contrast between the beloved fatherland and lands less loved. Were it not for the effect of this over-emphasis on patriotism, it would be difficult to understand how a scholar with the reputation of Ernest Lavisse could have lent his name to a text so lacking in impartiality as is his *Première Année d'Histoire de France*. True, here and there, in certain texts one finds a word of friendliness or praise for England. True, also, the canons of scholarly impartiality may somewhat restrain the nationalism of the historian. In the higher schools the influence of historical research is strong, and many textbooks approach impartiality. But all this is not enough to offset the influence of the teaching of nationalistic history in the elementary schools, and of carelessly critical generalizations about England and the English scattered through texts of various kinds.

France desires and needs the friendship of England. There is no reason to gloss it over: France has no desire to go back to the dangerous isolation of the period following the Franco-Prussian War. So the Government of France is careful to cultivate and maintain amicable relations with the Government of

[1] Foncin, *Géographie*, Cours Supérieur, p. 55.

England. But if relations are to remain permanently and solidly friendly, the French Government needs the firm support of a French public opinion thoroughly sympathetic with this point of view. No one wants to ride a balky horse on the edge of a precipice. The more sober portion of the French Press recognizes this and is cautious and conciliatory in its attitude toward England; it realizes the harm that may be wrought by a hasty, ill-judged word. But the school, controlled though it is by the Government, is carelessly allowed to create and develop in the minds of children unnecessary, but abiding prejudice against England.

It would be quite possible for enlightened opinion in France to stimulate a revision of French textbooks. The French Government would be in an exceptionally advantageous position to take the lead in such a movement, because of the centralized character of the school system. The revision could be made gradually, as new manuals appear, as new editions of old texts are issued. If the causes of wars between England and France must be discussed, they can be treated with greater impartiality: more attention to the results of research, foreign as well as French, will facilitate fairer treatment. If the exploits of war must be treated, those of English as well as French heroes can be praised. From reading books and geographies, over-critical generalizations regarding England and the English can be omitted; and in such texts can be inserted more material of a character friendly to the people across the channel. Thus can a far-sighted diplomacy strengthen Anglo-French friendship against a possible day of storms.

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY AND THE GREAT WAR IN THE FRENCH TEXTBOOKS

FRENCH nationalism glows with reminiscent ardour in recounting ancient wars with England. But it reaches white heat when it treats of recent wars with Germany. Before the decade ending in 1870, France had little cause to fear or hate her neighbours across the Rhine. Up to that time Germany was not a nation, but a "geographical expression," a disorganized collection of quarrelling states, and, outside of Prussia, a land of inefficiency, of poets and dreamers. Prussia, it is true, had acquired some power and prestige through her drill-sergeant, Hohenzollern rulers, students of economics and masters of men. But even Prussia caused France no vital anxiety. Wars with Prussia had been fought, for the most part, on German soil. France, not Prussia, had been the invader.

Then came Bismarck, the mailed fist, wars with Denmark and Austria, growing unity under Prussian leadership, the humiliation of France, all culminating in the melodramatic proclamation of the German Empire in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, on January 18, 1871. Nor was this the end. There followed an amazing economic development of that empire, whose power, as Keynes has said, was built, "not on blood and iron, but on coal and iron." Accompanying this development came an astoundingly rapid growth of

German population, the " shining armour " of the most powerful army in the world, world-wide commerce, a huge navy, the great conflict. Two wars, the one ending in bitter defeat, the other in hard-earned victory, but both tragic in their disastrous results to France, taught that country the dread power of united Germany. Both these disasters are reflected in certain phases of the nationalism taught to-day in the French schools.

The intensity of this nationalism in relation to the Great War has been clearly revealed by Monsieur Prudhommeaux in the *Enquête sur les Livres Scolaires d'après Guerre*," published by the Dotation Carnegie. To his scholarly and courageous contributions to that inquiry the reader is referred for detailed study of the treatment of the war in the French textbooks. School book nationalism in relation to Germany will be illustrated in the present investigation, first by the attitude of the writers toward the causes of the Franco-Prussian War. Second, textbook discussion of the causes of the Great War will be compared with the results of the newer research on that subject. Third, textbook treatment of the conduct of the Germans during the war will be touched briefly.

For the Franco-Prussian War scholarly opinion holds the Governments of both Prussia and France responsible.[1] A war with France Bismarck believed to be "in the logic of history." Through the war of 1866 with Austria he had succeeded in forcing that power out of Germany, and had formed a closely-knit union of the German states north of the River Main, under Prussian leadership. He welcomed a war with France because he believed, correctly as events proved, that it would unite the South German states with the

[1] Lord, *Origins of the War of* 1870, passim.

north against a common foe, and complete tne process of German unification. After 1866 the old feeling of antagonism to France grew stronger, and was voiced by the Prussian Press.

The French Government, on the other hand, had taken alarm at the rapid growth of Prussian power. France, after 1866, attempted to prevent the unification of Germany. Napoleon III, seeing his own prestige and that of his dynasty rapidly slipping from him, vainly negotiated with Bismarck for some bit of territory to serve as compensation for Prussia's territorial gains. He failed; and the French felt themselves tricked. "Revenge for Sadowa!" [1] became the rallying-cry of the Chauvinists. The Press took it up. From 1868 to 1870 the two countries glared at each other. It needed but an accident or an incident to precipitate war.

The lighted match thrown into this dynamite was the candidacy of Leopold of Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain. The Chauvinists of France feared that their country would be in deadly peril, lying between the Hohenzollerns of Prussia and the Hohenzollerns of Spain. As a result of pressure from France, Leopold withdrew his candidacy. This was a great diplomatic triumph for France and a bitter disappointment to Bismarck. But the war party in Paris threw away its victory. It demanded through Benedetti, the French ambassador to Prussia, that the king of Prussia, who was head of the House of Hohenzollern, should promise that the candidacy of Leopold would never be renewed. This was too much. The king refused; and from Ems, where Benedetti had interviewed him,

[1] The battle of Sadowa marked the decisive defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1866, and thus made the latter State far more powerful than it had ever been before.

Abeken telegraphed to Bismarck an account of the king's refusal. That Machiavellian statesman took the dispatch, "and by extensive and judicious omissions and combinations produced a new version of the telegram that suited his purpose." [1] Released to the Press in this form, its publication inflamed both Germans and French. It was the "red rag to the Gallic bull." Against the wishes of Napoleon III and the protests of the Republicans, the war party in Paris forced through the Chamber of Deputies a declaration of war against Germany.

To summarize: Germany is responsible for acceptance of Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron," of unification through war, a logical result of which was the Franco-Prussian conflict. She is responsible in that Bismarck's shifty hints of compensation to Napoleon, his whole policy in relation to the Hohenzollern candidacy, and the chauvinistic antagonism that developed against France after Prussia's defeat of Austria, all tended toward war. Furthermore, Bismarck intentionally manipulated the Ems dispatch in order to excite France to war. France is responsible in that the demand of "revenge for Sadowa," the chauvinistic attitude of a portion of the French Press, the insistence that the Hohenzollern candidacy should never be renewed, likewise made for war. Finally, she is responsible for the actual declaration of hostilities, a declaration which her most level-headed statesmen and politicians opposed.

In discussing the causes of this war, some of the French textbooks impute it entirely or almost entirely to Germany; others acknowledge the considerable responsibility of France. Segond, for example, lays the responsibility squarely on Germany:

[1] Lord, op. cit., pp. 100–1.

"In 1866, Prussia, victorious over Austria at Sadowa, had destroyed the Germanic Confederation and put herself at the head of Germany.

"Without declaring himself formally for her, Napoleon III had favoured her ambition. He hoped to have in return some compensation. He obtained none.

"The Prussians, far from being disposed to recognize this service, dreamed only of taking a new *revanche* for Jena, of taking away from us Alsace and Lorraine, which they had not been able to obtain in 1815. Hatred of France was taught in their schools, even to the little children." [1]

Lavisse, condensing for children, speaks only of the Hohenzollern candidacy: "The French Government declared that it could not suffer a Prussian prince to reign over Spain. This was the occasion for a war between France and Prussia." [2] Baudrillard maintains that the first cause of the conflict was "the ambition of Prussia who wished to unify Germany to her own profit by making her king emperor of Germany." The second was "the criminal foolishness of the government of Napoleon III, who did not know how to give France a large and strong army. Thus Prussia was encouraged to make war on us, which she would not have done had she known us to be well prepared." He goes on to say that Bismarck, "who wished war because he was assured that his country would be victorious, had the skill to cause it to be declared by France." [3]

No suggestion here of French Chauvinism, of French diplomatic victory thrown foolishly away in unjustified

[1] Segond, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, pp. 350–1.
Lavisse, *La Première Année*, etc., p. 228.
Baudrillard, *Notre Histoire Nationale*, Cours Moyen, p. 78.

insistence that the Hohenzollern candidacy should not be renewed. If Baudrillard criticizes the "criminal foolishness" of the government of Napoleon III, it is for unpreparedness, not for Chauvinism.

In contrast with such one-sided explanations of the origins of the war of 1870, are the more accurate accounts of such writers as Faubert and Huleux, Clémendot, Métin and Flandre, Gauthier and Deschamps. According to the first-named, the war was above all the work of Bismarck, a man "brutal and without conscience, but very intelligent," who wanted to make his sovereign emperor of Germany. "He awaited only an occasion to attack France." But in France, too, there was "a party, grouped around the Empress Eugénie," who wanted war in order to regain through military successes the lost prestige of the dynasty. The story of the Hohenzollern candidacy follows.[1] Clémendot's account is much the same, except that he puts Napoleon III with the Empress as desiring war, and that he mentions the opposition of Thiers to it.[2] Métin and Flandre speak of the conciliatory attitude of the King of Prussia.[3] Gauthier and Deschamps point out that Napoleon, sick and unpopular, did not know how to defend himself against the imprudent counsels of his entourage, who wanted war; and these authors praise, by implication, the vain but vehement protests of Thiers, Gambetta, and Jules Favre. "I will not take the responsibility," cried Thiers, "for a war so little justified."[4]

If some authors of the little histories, then, expressly

[1] Faubert et Huleux, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, pp. 238–9; Devinat, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 194, gives much the same idea.

[2] Clémendot, *L'Histoire*, pp. 123–4.

[3] Métin et Flandre, *Histoire*, p. 380.

[4] Gauthier et Deschamps, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 118,

or by implication find Germany alone at fault in causing the war of 1870, others do not hesitate to criticize the French Government severely. At first blush this criticism seems to indicate freedom from nationalism, unswerving devotion to truth. But on second thought it is clear that the very Franco-Prussian War that brought defeat and humiliation to France brought also the overthrow of the Second Empire. France repudiated Napoleon III and all his works. Moreover, this overturn brought into power those very Republicans who had opposed entering the war. One has only to imagine what the effect would be on the teaching of the causes of the last war, were a Communist Revolution to triumph over the present forms of government in Western Europe or the United States, to realize how the overthrow of Napoleon III must have affected in France the teaching of the causes of the war of 1870.

This does not mean that the overthrow of the Government of the Second Empire is the sole cause for the frank treatment of the origins of the war of 1870 in many textbooks. A writer like Clémendot would not hesitate to face the truth, nationalism or no nationalism. But it does mean that had there been no change of government, the tendency to criticize France for her share in causing the war would have been less marked. The French Government's responsibility would have been painted in softer colours. Whatever the reasons, however, the fact remains that the causes of this conflict are treated in many school histories with relative impartiality.

Not so the causes of the World War.

The origins of this great conflict of the nations are still beclouded with uncertainties. Unfortunately a number of historians in all the belligerent countries

have deserted the cause of truth to serve that of nationalistic propaganda; and even if they had not done so it would still be years before they could be seen in accurate perspective. But one thing is clear to thoughtful scholarship: the war was something more than a sudden cataclysm, for which some one nation or alliance is to be held responsible. Its roots go down to the deep sub-soil of such fundamental influences as industrialism, over-population, nationalism and imperialism. The innocent inventors of the spinning-jenny and the flying-shuttle may have indirectly shared in causing the Great War. For these and other inventions led to the development of modern industrialism; and as one country after another underwent industrial transformation, the situation became more and more difficult for them all. The great European Powers all found themselves with a surplus of goods of which they must dispose, a surplus of capital seeking investment, and all except France with a surplus of mouths to feed. Consequently the economically and politically backward regions of the world took on an importance they had never before had, as markets for manufactured goods, sources of raw material, fields for capital seeking investment. Hence keen colonial ambitions, bitter rivalry in northern Africa and the Balkans, friction, war.

All this rivalry was made more intense by the growth of nationalism, stimulated as this was by the school, the Press, the pulpit and the governments themselves. French schools taught hostility to Germany. German schools taught hostility to France. All the great nations fostered "pooled self-esteem."

Stimulated by the spirit of nationalism, the peoples of the great countries came to look on the imperialistic ventures of the capitalists and their governments as

somehow their own. National honour seemed to be involved in success or failure. " Plain men who have no financial interest in copper," says Walter Lippmann, " will feel aggrieved if American copper interests in a foreign land are attacked. The German people felt ' humiliated ' because German trade was thwarted in Morocco.

" The most obvious reason for this is that the private citizens are in the main abysmally ignorant of what the real stakes of diplomacy are. They do not think in terms of railroad concessions, mines, banking and trade. When they envisage Morocco they do not think of the Mannesmann Brothers, but of ' German prestige ' and ' French influence.' When the Triple Entente compelled Germany to recede in the Moroccan affair of 1911, the rage of the German people was not due to a counting of their economic losses. They were furious, not that they had lost Morocco, but that they had lost the dispute. There is small doubt that the masses of people in no country would risk war to secure mining concessions in Africa. But the choice is never presented to them that way. Each contest for economic privileges appears to the public as a kind of sporting event with loaded weapons. The people wish their team, that is, their country, to win. Just as strong men will weep because the second baseman fumbles at the crucial moment, so they will go into tantrums of rage because corporations of their own nationality are thwarted in a commercial ambition." [1]

To these general causes of the great conflict must be added the political developments of international diplomacy. Out of these developments grew the system of alliances. Europe was divided into two armed camps: the Triple Alliance, composed of

[1] Lippmann, *Stakes of Diplomacy*, p. 78.

Germany, Austria and Italy, on one side, and the Triple Entente, made up of France, England and Russia, on the other. The ever-increasingly bitter feeling between these two alliances, and their ever-growing suspicion, were signalized by the race of armaments. Finally a series of crises, beginning even before the completion of the Entente, and ending with the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria, on June 28, 1914, intensified friction and paved the way for war. Back of these crises was the pressure of the forces of industrialism, over-population, nationalism and imperialism. The Great Powers were playing a dangerous game for commerce, colonies, the investment of capital, national prestige. Such were the "stakes of diplomacy." None of the Great Powers desired war. *All risked it.*

Such were the influences underlying the development of the war psychosis.

Of these great underlying influences the French textbooks that I have examined take little account. According to the majority of these it was wilful, ambitious Germany who deliberately unchained the great calamity.[1] According to one, the Emperor William hoped "to extend his domination over the centre of Europe." He dreamed "of founding a central empire, by uniting under his control, not only Austria-Hungary, but Belgium and Holland, which would have

[1] Devinat, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 210; Blanchet et Toutain, *L'Histoire de France à l'Ecole*, p. 110; Un Comité de Professeurs, *Précis d'Histoire de France*, Cours Elémentaire, pp. 148–9; Guiraud, *Histoire de France*, p. 149; Segond, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 381; Gauthier et Deschamps, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 142; Lavisse, *Histoire de France*, La Première Année, p. 246; Faubert et Huleux, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, pp. 267–70; Fournier, *Pour Notre France*, pp. 25–6; *Collection du Courrier des Examens*, p. 143; Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête sur les Livres Scolaires*, pp. 1–154, passim.

given him access to the ocean." [1] According to Lavisse, " Germany wished to establish her domination over all Europe. She was preparing for forty-four years for this new war." [2] Still others refuse to confine Germany's supposed ambitions to a mere continent, and state that she started the war in order to establish her domination over the whole world.[3] " Germany," conclude Faubert and Huleux, " is alone responsible." [4]

Certain writers of elementary texts contrast the pacific attitude of the Triple Entente with the aggressive attitude of the Triple Alliance :

" The two great liberal states of Europe, France and England, united in face of the common enemy and concluded an *entente cordiale.*

" France, strong and pacific, spread throughout the whole earth ideas of justice and solidarity ; and the nations, seeing with what prudence we shunned all pretext of war, and with what fervour we defended civilization, sought our friendship.[5]

" The nations of the Triple Entente wished peace. On the side of the Triple Alliance Italy wished peace. But it was entirely otherwise with Germany and Austria-Hungary. For a long time these two powers meditated aggression." [6]

Such explanations and implications regarding the origins of the war are, of course, unscholarly and one-sided. They are unscholarly because they fail to set

[1] Guiraud, *Histoire de France,* p. 149.

[2] Lavisse, *La Première Année,* p. 246 ; Un Comité de Professeurs, *Précis d'Histoire de France,* Cours Elémentaire, pp. 148–9.

[3] Une Réunion de Professeurs, *Histoire de France,* Cours Préparatoire, p. 106 ; Segond, op. cit., Cours Moyen, p. 381 ; Faubert et Huleux, *Histoire de France,* Cours Moyen, p. 268.

[4] *Histoire de France,* Cours Elémentaire, p. 179.

[5] Gauthier et Deschamps, *Histoire de France,* Cours Moyen, p. 138.

[6] Faubert et Huleux, *Histoire de France,* Cours Moyen, p. 268 ; Blanchet et Toutain, *L'Histoire de France à l'Ecole,* p. 108.

forth at all adequately the deeper causes of the war. They are unscholarly in that the contentions set forth so dogmatically are impossible to prove: there is no evidence to prove that Germany deliberately unchained a war in order to dominate the world, the whole of Europe, or even a part of Europe. They are one-sided in that they place the responsibility for the conflict on Germany alone or on Germany and her Allies, rather than on all the Great Powers, where it properly belongs.

The contrast between a saintly Entente and a Machiavellian Triple Alliance is founded on the "rationalizations" of prejudice rather than on the sober deductions of reason. There is no evidence to show that either alliance deliberately plotted a world war. There is evidence, however, to show that countries belonging to each endangered world peace through their colonial ambitions, their imperialistic designs. England and Russia divided Persia, much as Prussia, Russia and Austria partitioned Poland in the eighteenth century. Austria and Italy plotted in regard to territory in the Balkans and northern Africa. Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Italy seized Tripoli. France schemed to secure Morocco; Germany threatened her with the mailed fist to prevent her from realizing her aims. Germany strove to extend her economic power in the Near East through control of the Bagdad Railway. The Entente Cordiale gave England a free hand in Egypt, France a free hand in Morocco. The imperialistic ambitions of Russia and Japan in the Far East led to open conflict. All these plots and counter-plots, agreements and disagreements, crises and conflicts, intensified hatreds, fears and suspicions, and led up to the Great War. "The root of the evil," says Gooch, "lay in the

division of Europe into two armed camps, which dated from 1871, and the conflict was the offspring no less of fear than of ambition." [1]

The interpretations of the immediate causes of the war that prevailed during the conflict itself, have been distinctly challenged since that time by the opening of the German and Austrian archives, by certain revelations from the Russian archives, and by the appearance of a vast amount of other material bearing on the question. In the light of this new evidence, the German Government appears less guilty than Allied opinion had believed, the Austrian Government, Serbian leaders and Russian militarists more so. Recent evidence has implicated the French Government, too, through its close association with Russia.

The best analysis in English of the revelations of the archives is that of Professor S. B. Fay, whose conclusions appeared in the *American Historical Review* during the years 1920 and 1921,[2] though even his careful findings have been modified by the appearance of more recent evidence. According to him the chief direct, individual responsibility for the outbreak of the war lay with Count Berchtold of Austria, who was resolved, after the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, to crush Serbia. Professor Barnes, however, writing more recently, holds that Berchtold himself was " but a vain, lazy, weak-willed vacillating tool, dominated entirely by the war-party led by Hötzendorf." [3] However that may be, grave responsibility attaches to the Austrian Government. Berchtold sent an agent into Serbia, after the assassination of the

[1] *History of Modern Europe*, p. 559.

[2] " New Light on the Origins of the World War," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, July and October 1920, and January 1921.

[3] " Assessing the Blame for the World War," *New York Times Current History*, May 1924, p. 179

Archduke, to secure evidence of the complicity of the Serbian Government in the plot. It has recently been shown that that government was actually cognizant of the plot, but Berchtold's agent failed to secure evidence of this; whereupon Berchtold suppressed his report, concealing it both from his own and the German Government. Later Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia, so framed as to invite war. In drawing up Austria's note to Serbia, Germany, contrary to what has often been stated, had no share; nor had she knowledge of its contents.[1]

Germany's chief immediate responsibility lay in giving Austria *carte blanche* in dealing with Serbia. This action was taken at a Crown Council on July 5. But "Bethmann and the Kaiser were not criminals plotting a World War; they were simpletons 'putting a noose about their necks' and handing the other end of the rope to a stupid and clumsy adventurer who now felt free to go as far as he liked."[2] Later, realizing the gravity of the danger, these two made a last minute, desperate effort to prevent war.[3] The Kaiser appealed to the Tsar to aid in keeping peace. Bethmann sent frantic telegrams to Berchtold to persuade him to some solution that would avert the world catastrophe. These telegrams Berchtold ignored. He was drawing the noose tighter.

Contemporary historical research is dealing rather roughly with the war-time illusion that no member of the Entente bore any responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war. Russia, of course, let it be understood that she was behind Serbia, much as

[1] Fay, *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, July 1920, p. 636.
[2] Ibid., July 1920, p. 628.
[3] "During these three days, July 29th to 31st, Germany was making a real, though belated, effort to induce Austria to accept a peaceful solution," ibid., October 1920, p. 38.

Germany stood behind Austria. But Russia's gravest responsibility lies in the fact that shortly after Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, the Russian leaders carried out a general, instead of a partial mobilization, a mobilization not merely against Austria but against Germany.[1] Gooch holds that Russia's mobilization might have been answered by counter-mobilization by Germany, instead of by a declaration of war.[2] In the Franco-Russian treaty of alliance, however, it had been laid down as a general principle that "general mobilization constitutes a declaration of war." As Morhardt expresses it: "La mobilisation générale, c'est la guerre."[3] In any case, as Gooch says:

"The world-war was . . . precipitated by the action of Russia at a moment when conversations between Vienna and Petrograd were being resumed, when Bethmann-Hollweg was at length endeavouring to restrain his ally, and when the Tsar and the Kaiser were in telegraphic communication."[4]

Behind the scenes France was playing a more important part than has been generally realized. As early as 1912, Poincaré, "through Isvolsky, gave Russia a relatively free hand in the Balkans, promising unconditional French support if she was attacked by Austria or Germany."[5] French newspapers were subsidized by Russian gold, with the connivance of

[1] Fay, op. cit., January 1921, p. 250.

[2] Op. cit., p. 547.

[3] *Les Preuves*, Preface, p. xi. Professor Fay says, on this point, that "according to the doctrine, generally accepted by militarists everywhere in Europe, that 'mobilization means war,' the news of Russian general mobilization forced Germany to take similar measures and rendered war inevitable," *American Historical Review*, April 1925, p. 647.

[4] Op. cit., p. 547.

[5] Barnes, "Assessing the Blame for the World War," *New York Times Current History*, May 1924, p. 184.

Poincaré, to stir up aggressive Franco-Russian feeling.[1] And it is now clear that in the crisis of July 1914, the French Government gave assurances to Russia of French support in the event of war at that time. Thus the Russian militarists had definite encouragement for those plans which culminated in general mobilization, and brought Germany's declaration of war on Russia.[2] Professor Barnes asserts that without this encouragement the Russian militarists would not have dared to act.[3] The probability is that Poincaré believed war inevitable, and developed his policy in accordance with this belief. England, during the whole period of the crisis, was desperately trying to keep the peace. If England be excepted from it, possibly historians will come, in time, to accept the epigrammatic indictment of the Frenchman, Fabre-Luce, that :

" The acts of Germany and Austria made the war possible ; those of the Triple Entente made it inevitable."[4]

In the last analysis, however, the immediate causes of the Great War were psychological. The stage of European diplomacy was filled with crazed actors, so-called statesmen, hurling accusations and pleas at one another, clutching frantically at reason, sanity, a peaceful, but " honourable solution " of the crisis. At one moment national pride was uppermost, at another fear, finally despair. Even Berchtold paled at the last. As Lloyd George once said :

" The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various countries of what happened before the

[1] *New York Nation and New Republic*, February 6, 1924.
[2] Barnes, op. cit., p. 190.
[3] Barnes, " Liquidating War's Illusions," *New York Nation*, February 11, 1925, p. 154.
[4] Ibid., p. 155 (quoting Fabre-Luce).

first of August, 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly, and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it." [1]

The results of recent historical research on the question of the war's origins have been generally ignored by the authors of French school histories, even those results which began to be available immediately after the close of the conflict. Direct guilt for the outbreak of hostilities they usually assign either to Germany alone, or to Germany and Austria. A typical account is that of Segond, who says :

" For a long time Germany had nourished the ambition of making Europe and the world submit by force to her supremacy. In July 1914, having finished her military preparations, she sets herself, together with Austria, to realize her scheme. On the 28th, at her instigation, the Austrians hurl themselves on Serbia, who has roused their wrath. The Tsar having mobilized the Russian army in order to defend the Serbs in case of need, the Emperor of Germany immediately declares war on him (1st of August), and two days afterward, on a lying pretext, he declares war on France." [2]

That the assassination of the Archduke merely furnished a convenient pretext for a war long planned, is the contention of a number of writers.[3] " Under pretext of avenging this crime," says one, " Austria had proposed the subjugation, and later the annexation

[1] Quoted in Gooch, op. cit., p. 559.

[2] Segond, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 381.

[3] Gauthier et Deschamps, op. cit., Cours Moyen, pp. 138, 142 ; Segond, op. cit., Cours Moyen, p. 381 ; Devinat, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 210.

of Serbia." [1] According to Guiraud, "the assassination of the prince, heir to the Austrian throne, by a Serb, and Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, furnished the desired pretext for a European struggle." The Emperor of Germany "began his preparation for war immediately after the assassination of the prince . . . realizing that this could become the occasion of a European conflict." [2] It was Germany who pushed Austria to war, according to Gauthier and Deschamps, and other writers.[3] After the assassination, says Lavisse, "William II . . . seized this occasion and declared war on Russia and France, who had been allied since 1895." [4] "War!" exclaims Fournier. "Cursed be he who unchained it. May the blood of his victims fall on his own head." [5]

These are typical textbook explanations of the immediate causes of the conflict. No suggestion that the Kaiser made sincere, if belated, efforts for peace, that he and Hollweg were desperately alarmed when they at last realized whither their stupidly pledged word to Austria was leading them. Rather the idea that Germany, determined on war, was forcing forward a subservient Austria. No suggestion that Russian mobilization on the German frontier made it extremely difficult, if indeed it did not make it virtually impossible, for the Kaiser's Empire to avoid a declaration of war. No suggestion that responsible French political leaders were involved in chauvinistic intrigues with Russia. Of course, the new evidence does not relieve Germany of grave responsibility, both underlying and

[1] *Collection du Courrier des Examens*, p. 143.
[2] *Histoire de France*, p. 149.
[3] *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 142; Segond, *Histoire de France*, Cours Moyen, p. 381; *Collection du Courrier des Examens*, p. 143; Fournier, *Pour Notre France*, p. 26; etc.
[4] *La Première Année*, etc., p. 246.
[5] *Pour Notre France*, pp. 25–6.

immediate. But it does "clear the German Government of the charge that it deliberately plotted or wanted the war." [1]

Of the elementary school texts that I have examined, but one reveals a broad-minded point of view regarding the causes of the war: that of Monsieur Clémendot.

His account of the immediate causes of the conflict need not be discussed. Suffice it to say that it is moderate in tone, with no attempt to arouse passions. It is his analysis of the underlying causes that more clearly reveals his comparative impartiality. Among these he mentions: (1) *La guerre commerciale.* "The difficulty of disposing of constantly increasing manufactures," he says, "led to a very lively commercial war." (2) Imperialistic rivalries. (3) German expansion in the Orient. (4) German covetousness. The Pan-Germans hoped to secure, through a war, petroleum and iron resources in the Orient, the French and Belgian colonies, perhaps even Belgium itself and the north of France. (5) The German commercial deficit. Germany was buying more than she was selling. (6) The violation of racial rights. Germany, Austria, Russia and Turkey held under their yoke many peoples unwilling to accept this domination. "This oppression joined to the other causes of hatred among the European nations rendered war difficult to avoid." [2]

In another passage, discussing the settlement of the Moroccan crisis of 1911, he says that there were persons both in France and Germany who were dissatisfied with the arrangement.

"On both sides, violent minorities urged the two peoples to hurl themselves at each other.

[1] Fay, op. cit., *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, October 1920, pp. 51–2.
[2] *L'Histoire*, pp. 143–4.

"In 1914, these men of violence obtained satisfaction: the Emperor of Germany, yielding to Pan-German incitement, unchained on Europe the most frightful war the world has ever seen." [1]

One need not agree with everything Clémendot says to realize that he has clear perception of the profundity of the causes of the conflict, clear perception that other powers than Germany and Austria were partly responsible for the war, in the selfishness of their imperialism, in the blindness of their nationalism. His approach to impartiality stands out all the more clearly in contrast with the puerile and inaccurate explanations of so many other writers.

It is always easy, however, for the arm-chair moralist, from his comfortable resting-place, to sit in judgment on the failings of others. So it would be easy to condemn outright the biassed nationalism of the majority of French textbooks dealing with the causes of the war. But to do so would be unfair. In the first place, it should be remembered that the majority of the writers of a nation which has just lost the flower of its manhood and has suffered other untold miseries from invasion, can hardly be expected to see the causes and events of the conflict with the cold, clear vision of scientific abstraction. In the second place, it should be remembered that during the war there appeared a number of documents, some of them clearly free from the taint of propaganda, which seemed to point more and more definitely to the overwhelming guilt of Germany.[2] Third, the publication of many of the texts antedates the appearance of some, and in certain cases, of all, of the results of "revisionist scholarship."

[1] *L'Histoire*, p. 142.

[2] Such as the Lichnowsky revelations and Wangenheim's story to Ambassador Morganthau at Constantinople.

The new evidence appearing since the war, and distributing the responsibility more widely, will necessarily be cautiously received and slowly assimilated. It is not unnatural, then, that the immediate causes of the conflict should have been somewhat misunderstood. But all this does not excuse the lack of caution of so many writers, their willingness to set forth to children as final truth some of the baseless conjectures of wartime. If Clémendot could see that there was more than one side to the question of war-guilt, some of these other writers could have done so, too.

In their treatment of the conduct of the war, even more than in the treatment of its causes, writers of textbooks are fostering a spirit of bitter hostility to Germany. In the Dotation Carnegie's *Enquête* Monsieur Prudhommeaux has given example after example to illustrate the character of these teachings.[1] A few will suffice here. One is from a little reading book for very young children by Monsieur Fournier. So popular is this book that in 1924 over four hundred thousand copies of it had been sold. The selection here quoted is entitled, " Les Petits Mutilés."

" It is the first year of the Great War. It is autumn ; the people are shivering here in the damp fog. The streets are full of mud. But the people are thinking neither of cold nor of mud. Our village is almost deserted. All the men have gone. Many are dead, alas ! . . .

" Each morning, on entering school, we see, in place of our instructor, a young girl who smiles at us. Our master is out there, with the others. He fights valiantly and has already won the Croix de Guerre.

" To-day the little girls and boys are seated side by side on the same benches. The little girls are knitting

[1] Pp. 41–136, passim.

socks, sweaters, mufflers for the soldiers at the front. We only wish we knew how to knit, too, we boys.

"When we are seated, the door opens. A young Belgian from Dinant enters. We all stand up and cry: 'There is Marcel! Good morning, Marcel!'

"The poor little fellow, whose mother is a refugee among us, has had his two hands cut off. It is the Germans who have thus made a martyr of him. Besides this they have killed his father, his sister, his big brother.

"Some minutes pass. In the corridor is heard a sound of crutches. Another schoolboy enters, wearing over one ear a soldier's cap. He has but one leg! The children hasten to help him put away his crutches. He gives us the military salute, gravely, like an old soldier. The bomb of a Taube, at Crépy, has cut off his leg and killed his grandmother.

"What had they done, those poor little children, to be thus mutilated? Ah! wicked Germans, the children of France will long curse you in their hearts. . . ."[1]

Thus the school is helping to perpetuate the myth of the maimed Belgian children. In other books children are taught that the Germans devastated the land, burned the harvests, and massacred inoffensive people.[2] They pitilessly cut down the trees,[3] bombarded the beautiful cathedral of Reims,[4] set fire to hundreds of villages and cities.[5] "Other German brutes boasted of killing the wounded."[6] Truth and legend are inextricably mingled in the attempt to

[1] Fournier, *Les Lectures des Petits*, pp. 111–3.
[2] Fournier, *Pour Notre France*, p. 61.
[3] Delavoix et Gohin, *Lecture Courante*, pp. 347–8.
[4] Une Réunion de Professeurs, *Histoire de France*, Cours Préparatoire, p. 106.
[5] Clémendot, *L'Histoire*, p. 147.
[6] Ibid.

prove the wickedness of the Germans.[1] The war, says Segond, "is truly the struggle of European civilization against Germanic barbarism."[2]

However, they may try to rationalize it, the authors of these textbooks are teaching hate.

If nationalistic instruction becomes most bitter, then, in the treatment of Germany, it is here that it deviates most from truth. The causes of the war of 1870, indeed, many writers now discuss with relative impartiality, whether because the French Government that helped to bring it on was repudiated during the war itself, or because time has softened bitterness a little, or because of the influence of historical scholarship. Yet even to-day there are texts in use in the schools which attribute the war entirely or almost entirely to "perfidious Prussia," failing to take account of the French cry for compensation after Sadowa, the Chauvinism of the Empress Eugénie and her entourage, the unwise and unjustified demand on the King of Prussia to promise that the Hohenzollern candidacy should never be renewed. In treating of the Great War the authors of school histories seem to forget or ignore those principles of historical criticism, which they would be so careful to observe, were they dealing with some exhumed controversy of the fifteenth century, placing their reliance instead on rumour, conjecture and the unsubstantial evidence that appeared during the war period itself. In discussing the war their chief anxiety seems to be to bring out the impeccability of the cause of the Allies and the guilt of the Central Powers.

For all this teaching of hate there is no justification, but there is one explanation. It lies in the theory that thereby will be developed the morale necessary to win

[1] Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête*, p. 99.
[2] Segond, *Petite Histoire Générale*, p. 288.

the next war. Not that France wants another war. But she fears it. And this fear, I think, is the chief cause of her so-called militarism. True, France emerged victorious from the world conflict. But up to the present time (June 1925) her associates in that struggle have not given France the friendly support for which she so reasonably hoped. After the Armistice her military leaders, seeking guarantees, asked for the detachment of the left bank of the Rhine from Germany. The representatives of England and the United States at the Peace Conference refused—rightly enough. But they agreed to give France a guarantee in the form of a three-power treaty. This agreement they were unable to keep. Furthermore, France was forced to cut down the impossibly large indemnity with which Germany was assessed, and to which Allied representatives had also agreed. But the French debts to other countries, which are certainly larger than she can ever pay, have not been cut down proportionately. As for that other guarantee, the League of Nations, the confidence of France in its efficacy has not been increased by the failure of the American Government to adhere to it. Partly as a result of these things, many disillusioned Frenchmen have put their faith in that old illusion, *Realpolitik*. They look to their strong right arm for security; and the teaching of hostility to Germany is supposed by some to make that right arm stronger.

That theory we believe to be absolutely incorrect. "How vain and useless," writes M. Prudhommeaux, "is the preservation of a vigilance which is accompanied with no positive recommendation and which contents itself with sustaining the remembrance of the past instead of working to construct the future!" [1]

[1] Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête*, p. 50.

But more than this. Not only does this intensely nationalistic education fail to build an effective defensive morale for France, but it develops national egoism, "pooled self-esteem," fear and suspicion of other countries, especially of Germany. In other words, the writers of texts impregnated with the spirit of intense nationalism, are laying the psychological foundations, not of national security, but of a new war. In the name of patriotism, they are doing an injury to their own country and to humanity.

CHAPTER V

TOWARD INTERNATIONAL PEACE

A FRANCE inherently bellicose might be inferred from what has thus far been said. But the inference would be unjust. If an over-emphasis on patriotism crystallizes all too readily into a boastful nationalism, there is yet in France a deep longing for conciliation among the nations. This ideal of a fraternity of the peoples of the world is of the heritage of the Revolution, invigorated to-day by reaction against the horrors of the recent war. It reveals itself significantly in education in three ways: first, in the emphasis placed on it in the official school programmes; second, in certain teachings of the textbooks of moral and civic instruction; and third, in a vigorous movement among many teachers who hold liberal or radical views, for the most part members of the teachers' syndicates.

To some persons it may cause surprise that a government which insists so stoutly on an education profoundly patriotic, should at the same time accord recognition to the international ideal. Such persons unconsciously assume that there is an inherent antagonism between the ideals of patriotism and internationalism. The authors of the school programmes, however, while acknowledging that there is a problem, in no way admit that antagonism between the two conceptions is either inherent or necessary. In the programmes for the normal schools and for

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the higher primary schools, instruction looking toward international conciliation is definitely prescribed in connection with moral and civic instruction and with sociology. In the programme for the normal schools, for example, one heading runs :

" Patriotism. Rôle of the school in maintaining and increasing national unity and in developing patriotism."

And the very next one is :

" Relations of the nations with one another, and of states with one another. Friendships and antagonisms. War and peace. Arbitration. The League of Nations." [1]

So, likewise, the programmes for the higher primary schools provide for instruction regarding :

" The relations of the nations with one another. International duties and rights. International solidarity. How the love of humanity ought to be reconciled with love of country.

" International law. International arbitration. The League of Nations." [2]

Thus the League has been officially launched in the schools. And I have been informed that the Herriot administration was strongly desirous of developing in the children of France an interest in the League of Nations, and a loyalty to it. In June 1924, the Minister of Education sent a circular to educational leaders throughout France, asking them to urge the teachers in the various grades of instruction to lay stress on the League of Nations in their teaching, to emphasize not only the institution itself, but the history of the idea. " If the Society of

[1] *Organisation et Programmes des Cours Complémentaires, des Ecoles Primaires Supérieures et des Ecoles Normales Primaires*, pp. 20–9.

[2] Ibid., pp. 13–20.

Nations, as it exists at present, does not yet bring the peoples of the world security and peace, at least it offers the sole means of (some time) realizing them." [1] Such requirements and such encouragement ought to build up a solid support for the international ideal. They constitute a definite and most important step toward world peace through education.

In accordance with the spirit of the programmes, authors of manuals of moral and civic instruction try to inculcate a reasonable, modest, balanced patriotism, and to synthesize this with internationalism. This balanced patriotism is at pains to dissociate itself from all Chauvinism, boastful nationalism, hatred or jealousy of other nations. " Patriotism, to be truly a virtue," according to one writer, " has need of being regulated by the sentiment of justice and that of humanity: for it easily becomes narrow, jealous, exclusive, unjust, barbarous. It is then a vice rather than a virtue." [2] Such writers distinguish between " false patriotism," chauvinistic, prejudiced, critical of other nations, and " true patriotism," devoted to the fatherland, but sympathetic with other nations, ready to learn from them, and above all to help them in time of trouble. " The true patriot very rightly claims that his country ought to be respected and honoured. But it would be repugnant to him to be classed among those Chauvinists who pass their lives in menacing enemies real or imaginary." [3] False patriotism " is composed of all the hatreds, all the prejudices, all the coarse antipathies which peoples nourish against one another." True patriotism, on the other hand, " is composed of all the truths, all the virtues, all the rights

[1] *Manuel Général de l'Instruction Primaire*, June 14, 1924; *Partie Générale*, p. 903.

[2] Primaire, *Manuel d'Education*, p. 125, quoting J. Barni.

[3] Faye, *Morale*, p. 76.

which people have in common, and which, while cherishing above all its own country, does not allow its sympathies to be limited by race, language, or frontier." [1] "Finally," says M. Primaire, "to be sincerely patriotic is to labour to destroy the evils from which we suffer: ignorance, misery, alcoholism, hatreds of classes or parties." [2]

It is characteristic of the boastful nationalist that however severely he criticizes other countries, he refuses to criticize his own. Advocates of a balanced patriotism, however, believe it right and useful to point out the weaknesses and faults, as well as the virtues of one's own country and countrymen. "The French," says Belot, "have a ready enthusiasm, a generous ardour, for noble causes, but they are reproached for exaggerated love of noise, frivolity, inconstancy, and it is frequently repeated that they sometimes lack a sense of the practical." [3] Primaire points out certain blots in French history, such as "the massacre of the Albigensians, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the unjust wars of Louis XIV and of Napoleon, the Red Terror and the White Terror, the crime of the second of December." "But," he continues, "we are proud that despite these deformities, France has so often been the land of liberty, of justice, of generosity. It is for that, above all, that we love her." [4] While the true patriot, says Faye, believes that his country should be respected, nevertheless he would be pained "to be confused with those who are blind to its weaknesses, who wish to conceal or to excuse its faults." [5]

[1] Primaire, op. cit., p. 125, quoting Lamartine.
[2] Ibid., p. 121.
[3] Belot, *La République Française*, p. 48.
[4] Op. cit., p. 131.
[5] *Morale*, p. 76.

A patriotism of this type, its advocates believe, can be readily synthesized with internationalism. Dheilly points out that as love of country grows naturally out of love of family, so love of humanity develops naturally out of love of country. "If the family had not given birth in our hearts to filial love, we would not love our country as a mother; if we had not known fraternal love, we could not treat all Frenchmen as brothers. . . . The same relations exist between the country and humanity. It is the family first, and then the fatherland, which expand the human heart and cause to enter therein the love of humanity." [1] In a popular little book of moral and civic instruction for higher primary schools, Faye devotes nine pages to a broad-minded, warm-hearted discussion of the relations of the nations with one another.[2] He concludes with a lesson on the League of Nations, its purposes, its organization, its work. The League, he says, aims "to create a new conscience in a new world and to proclaim the rights of peoples in a common humanity. . . . The peoples have henceforth a common law, a common authority. The League of Nations will live, if the peoples, with loyal spirit, wish it to live. But it is necessary to educate and to fortify the human conscience." [3]

Such teaching not only familiarizes children with the idea of international organization to maintain peace, but it militates against one of the chief psychological causes of war: national egotism. The spirit of this balanced patriotism is that of humility; and national humility makes for peace, as national egotism makes for war.[4] But this teaching does

[1] *Morale et Instruction Civique*, p. 200.

[2] *Morale*, pp. 122–31. [3] Ibid., pp. 128–31.

[4] I think it is Felix Adler who has said: "There can never be international peace until there is national humility."

not go far enough. The vast majority of the children of France, as has been pointed out, do not go beyond the elementary schools; and the programmes for these schools make no specific provision for instruction in regard to the League of Nations or international solidarity. Moreover, the influence of a narrowly nationalistic instruction in history persists in these and higher schools. Imagine the effect on a pupil in a higher primary school, when he goes from a class in moral and civic instruction, where he is taught the idea of international solidarity, loyalty to the League of Nations, the importance of modesty in patriotism, to a class in history, where the spirit is that of boastful nationalism, disparagement of other nations or hostility toward them!

Furthermore, the spirit in which some of the writers of texts interpret the instructions of the government is hardly one that makes for international conciliation, whatever lip service they may render to the idea. Monsieur Prudhommeaux has pointed out that there is great variation among the authors of school manuals in their attitude toward the League. Some, of course, support it heartily. Some oppose it. Some accord it but the briefest mention. Some—where they are not required by the new programme to discuss the institution—ignore it entirely. Some greet it with scepticism.[1] Payot, in his *Cours de Morale*, says:

"The sentiment of close solidarity among the nations happily penetrates the European conscience. The spectacle of Europe to-day leads one to think that horror of the abuse of force will continue to grow.

"But let us keep our powder dry, for, despite the constitution of the League of Nations, we remember

[1] Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête*, pp. 115–30, 137–51.

the bankruptcy of the Permanent Tribunal of The Hague." [1]

Other passages from the same writer serve to show how impossible it is to reconcile a boastful nationalism with the spirit of international conciliation. In one place he pleads for solidarity, friendship with other nations, the preservation of peace.

" Just as individuals, for a long time, failed to understand the solidarity which links them in good fortune and in misfortune, . . . so the nations are just beginning to visualize . . . the idea of co-operation. How our intelligence and our finer sensibilities would be impoverished if one were to suppress what we owe to the thinkers separated from us by the frontier.

" Even from the material point of view the nations are closely interdependent: we have an interest of the first order in living at peace with other peoples." [2]

Almost in the same breath the same writer vaunts the superiority of French patriotism to that of other nations, criticizes England and bitterly reproaches Germany.

" Our patriotism," he says, " is very different from that of neighbouring nations, which seems founded above all on national pride, on ideas of territorial expansion, on a sentiment of material greatness at once disputable and pretentious: their patriotism has in it something aggressive, narrow and mediocre. . . The greatest force of the future is with us, because our ideal is a moral ideal of respect for the liberty of other people." [3]

He refers to England's war with the Boers as " a struggle inspired by ' the prejudice of the square kilometer ' and by mercantile motives." [4] As for

[1] P. 179.
[2] Op. cit., pp. 178, 179.
[3] Ibid., p. 176
[4] Ibid., p. 176, footnote.

the Germans, "a chauvinistic education has over-developed in Germany her heritage of hatred and violence and legitimatized brutality, provided only that it menaces the foreigner." "Let us not forget that Germany caused (the principle of) obligatory arbitration to fail at The Hague, and that she declared an atrocious war out of pure ambition." [1]

Currents and cross-currents! Nationalism and internationalism! Pooled self-esteem and balanced patriotism! The writer just referred to is stimulating the psychological causes of war far more than he is educating for world peace. But whatever criticisms may be made, one fact remains: the idea of international solidarity has been officially introduced into the schools of France and is being taught in many places by internationally minded teachers.

A more radical influence making for world peace is associated with the syndicalist movement among the teachers. As the word is here used, a syndicate means simply a trade union. In the 'seventies and early 'eighties of the last century teachers in the State schools, with the encouragement of the Government, began to form associations known as *Amicales*.[2] But while these associations aimed to promote the professional and material interests of their members, they were in no sense trade unions. Not until the passage of the law of 1884 were trade unions among the workers permitted by the Government; and even after the passage of that law it was a question whether public functionaries, among whom were the teachers in the State schools, had a right to its benefits.[3]

[1] Payot, *Cours de Morale*, pp. 178, 181.

[2] Baudard, *Le Mouvement Syndicaliste dans le Corps des Instituteurs*, p. 17.

[3] Ibid., pp. 5, 23.

In spite of this doubt, however, on the initiative of a Parisian instructor the first teachers' syndicate was founded in 1887. Shortly afterwards a congress of teachers decided to form a self-governing association in each department of France, these departmental associations to be bound together in a national union.[1] Immediately a circular was issued by the Minister of Public Instruction, which "formally denied to the instructors all right to self-government and all right to the benefit of the law of 1884." In spite of this and later prohibitions, however, the formation of syndicates continued. The teachers in the elementary schools were recruited chiefly from the ranks of the peasants and the urban proletariat. Like these they were poorly paid. Like these they sought a remedy for their precarious economic situation in the formation of associations.[2] In 1906 was organized a federation of the teachers' syndicates, which, the following year, joined the great union of unions, the Confédération Générale de Travail.[3]

As the situation now stands, more than half the elementary school teachers of France, some 70,000 out of about 128,000, are syndicated. Most of them belong to the Fédération des Membres de l'Enseignement Laïque; but the syndicalism of a large proportion of this group is of rather a mild type.[4] The teachers of more extreme tendencies have formed a group of their own.[5] Before the war the Government ordered the dissolution of the teachers' syndicates and forbade their existence in future. The

[1] Baudard, *Le Mouvement Syndicaliste dans le Corps des Instituteurs*, pp. 20–22.
[2] Ibid., p. 16.
[3] Beigbeder, *La Formation du Futur Citoyen*, pp. 276–83.
[4] *L'Ecole Emancipée*, October 5, 1924, p. 16
[5] Beigbeder, op. cit., pp. 276–83.

accounts of the events of the war through which they themselves have lived, they doubt, with good reason, the truth of the narratives of earlier events And it naturally pains them to teach children what they themselves know is not the truth." [1]

Thus on grounds of pedagogy, of devotion to truth, of opposition to narrow nationalism, a number of the more radically minded teachers have come to believe that history should not be taught to the younger children of the schools of France.

Among Radicals and Liberals, history has, of course, its stout defenders; though many of these believe that its present content ought to be considerably altered. Suppose historians do disagree, it is argued; is that a reason for doing away with instruction in history in the primary schools? Scientists also disagree with one another. Einstein and Painlevé are at odds on certain theories of the higher mathematics; but does this mean that chemistry and physics should be eliminated from the school programmes, or that little children should not be taught that two and two make four? There is a conjectural history, it is argued, but this is not the history taught in the primary schools. The history taught in the primary schools consists of "the brief recital of facts objectively established." [2]

An obvious weakness of this argument lies in the fact that the history taught in the primary schools does not consist of "facts objectively established." It consists of a mixture of fact and legend. If it did consist only of "facts objectively established," there would be far less reason than at present for criticizing its retention in the curriculum.

[1] Piquemal, in *Ecole Emancipée*, November 16, 1924.
[2] *Revue Pédagogique*, July 1924, p. 59; Kergaravat, op. cit., p. 35.

Another reason advanced for its retention in the curriculum is that, rightly written and rightly taught, it could be made to minister to the cause of human progress, of peace and good will, as it now ministers to Chauvinism and narrow nationalism. History, it is pointed out, is becoming more and more the study of progress, of civilization, of the development of labour in all its forms. It includes a study of intellectual development. Thus it can be of assistance in promoting the moral growth of the individual, in fostering the idea of solidarity. In discussing a war it is quite possible to show its horror and uselessness; and it is quite possible, through the study of history, to develop interest and belief in a League of Nations.[1]

Finally, as Monsieur Prudhommeaux points out, if history is eliminated from the programme of the primary school, the child will get his Chauvinism elsewhere and in more virulent form: from the newspaper, from the blood-curdling films of the cinema, from the theatre, from old soldiers, from chance conversations in the home or in the street. To Chauvinism thus absorbed history properly taught would serve as a wholesome corrective.[2]

On the whole, despite the heat of the controversy generated by Clémendot's proposal, there are probably relatively few teachers who would wish to see history eliminated from the curriculum of the primary school. At a congress of teachers' syndicates, held in Paris in 1924, a vote was taken on the question. All the delegates voted for the retention of history, except

[1] Kergaravat, op. cit., p. 35; Lambert, "La Sorbonne Chez les Primaires," *Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire*, March 23, 1924, p. 190; Ferrière, "L'Enseignement de l'Histoire," *Revue de Synthèse Historique*, June 1924, pp. 100–105.

[2] Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête*, p. 125.

those from the Maritime Alps.[1] But there is a vigorous and growing demand on the part of Liberal teachers to reform the teaching of it, and to take other measures to counteract the inculcation of Chauvinism and narrow nationalism in the schools. The same congress which voted to retain history in the curriculum voted also, by a very great majority, that it ought not to be taught as at present.[2] "We ought not to forget," said one of the delegates, "that our preferred method is direct action. Therefore let us apply in our classes our own ideas in regard to history. Let us boycott the bad manuals; let us labour with the mass of our personnel in pedagogical conferences." Another proposed to stick to local history, in order that the minds of the children might not be poisoned by the recital of bloody battles.[3] At the meeting of the National Syndicate of Teachers at Lyon in August 1924, resolutions were passed calling for the retention of history in the primary school curriculum, but demanding that it be resolutely pacifist, opposed to the inculcation of hatred, and animated by a fraternal spirit.[4]

Reform is fundamentally a matter of the proper preparation of those who are to teach in the higher institutions, according to a writer in the *Revue de Synthèse Historique*. "It is therefore the duty of the Universities and the normal schools to train impartial, scientific minds. Do they do so to-day? I would not dare say so. In fact, I have often stated the contrary. Nevertheless, there lies the key to the

[1] *L'Ecole Emancipée*, September 28, 1924; Supplement, p. 3.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., pp. 2–3.
[4] *Journal des Instituteurs et des Institutrices*, October 4, 1924, pp. 26–27; *Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire et Primaire Supérieur*, March 22, 1925, p. 205.

future. And that is why, . . . by means of congresses, by the control of school books, by the Press, where it is not infeudated to the parties of reaction, of nationalism and of violence, we should, you and I, and all those who think as we do, attract to these problems the attention of public opinion, of university professors, of directors of normal schools, of teachers." [1]

The spirit of reform manifested itself with strength and audacity at the great Congress of the Ligue de l'Enseignement Laïque, which was held at Valence in November 1924. The Congress passed resolutions that demands be sent to the Minister of Public Instruction, asking him to send orders to eliminate rigorously every textbook containing an incitement to hatred among the nations, and requesting that he see to it that the history of the war of 1914–1918 be taught with impartiality. The Congress resolved also to ask that the League of Nations demand of each of the nations belonging to that organization that it should furnish the League with a copy of every textbook in history, geography and literature published in that country, and that the League's Committee for Intellectual Co-operation should make known which of these works merited approbation for their spirit of impartiality and of peace. Further, the Congress resolved to ask the aid of the League's Committee for Intellectual Co-operation in preparing international school programmes, with a view to introducing these into various countries. Finally, it called for an international congress of educators, to study the whole question of the teaching of peace.[2]

[1] Ferrière, " L'Enseignement de l'Histoire," *Revue de Synthèse Historique*, June 1924, p. 105.

[2] Crouzet, " Pour l'École Pacifique," *L'Ecole et la Vie*, November 29, 1924 ; Glay, " Le Congrès de Valence," *Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire et Primaire Supérieur*, November 16, 1924.

There are, then, two important influences working against the teaching of national egoism, Chauvinism, and hatred in the schools of France. The first, and more conservative of these, backed by the Government, attempts to place patriotism in its proper perspective. Inculcating love of country and loyalty to country, it strives, at the same time, to prevent the development of boastfulness and the spirit of militarism. It teaches respect for other nations and loyalty to the idea of international solidarity. In a word, it attempts to show how love of country may be reconciled with love of humanity. Its spirit is sane, reasonable, restrained.

The other influence breathes fire. It compromises not one whit with Chauvinism or self-centred nationalism. It demands either the complete elimination of history from the programmes of the primary school, or its thorough renovation in a spirit of truth, of peace and good will. On the whole, it prefers renovation to elimination. To expunge from the school the spirit of hatred, it is making constructive proposals to the Minister of Public Instruction, and, generally speaking, it favours co-operation with the League of Nations. It refuses to rest satisfied with that explanation of the origins of the World War, which throws the sole responsibility on the shoulders of the Central Powers. Some of its adherents, indeed, insist emphatically on assigning a share of the guilt to the Government of France. In its extreme form this influence even becomes anti-patriotic.

The potential strength of these two influences it is difficult to estimate, even roughly, at the present time. The more conservative influence has behind it the strength that comes from government sanction of its methods, as well as the power of its own " sweet

reasonableness." It has already expressed itself, and will presumably continue more and more to express itself, in the textbooks. The other movement, on the other hand, antagonizes by its vehemence, by its tendency to radicalism, by the association of its internationalism with other causes to which it bears no logical relationship: anti-clericalism, the class struggle, the increase of teachers' salaries. Such association is bound to render it unpopular with certain elements of the population of France. Its internationalism has as yet had very little effect on the textbooks; and against what is believed to be the exercise of too great freedom of speech in the schools, too much political discussion, the Government has warningly protested. On the other hand, with more than half the elementary school teachers, and many of the secondary school teachers of France, enlisted under the banners of syndicalism, this militant type of influence making for international accord is bound to be a force that counts. If the syndicalism of some of the members of the teachers' unions seems to the more extreme to be but tepid, nevertheless there is a zeal in the movement as a whole almost religious in its fervour. Anyone who saw the demonstration to the memory of Jaurès in November 1924, when the ashes of the great martyr were taken to the Pantheon, anyone who heard the cries of "Vive la Paix! A bas la Guerre!" that rent the air on that occasion, could hardly fail to be impressed with the latent power of the ideal of the fraternity of peoples. It is from the burning ardour of its supporters that the more radical influence for international peace and unity derives its strength. The French intellect is clear and logical; the French heart is warm. And as the Great War recedes more and more into

the past, as memories of bitter hatreds grow more and more dim, it is safe to predict that the conservative influence of a balanced patriotism and the more radical influence making for anti-militarism, truth in history, and the spirit of international unity, working like a leaven among the teachers, will profoundly modify the narrow nationalism now poisoning the minds of the children of France.

CHAPTER VI

NATIONALISM VERSUS INTERNATIONALISM IN GERMAN DECREES AND PROGRAMMES

REVOLUTIONS are born in moods of spiritual exaltation. Enslaved humanity, bursting its chains, seeks for the quick realization of Utopia. Idealism seems to triumph. Herbert Adams Gibbons has graphically described the fraternal, hopeful spirit of the opening days of the Young Turk Revolution, when Christian missionary and Moslem *ulema* rode joyfully side by side through the streets of Constantinople. Lincoln Steffens has depicted the generous, gentle idealism of the populace in the first Russian Revolution of 1917; and of the Revolution of 1789 Wordsworth wrote:

> Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive
> But to be young was very heaven.

It was in such a mood that Article 148 was written into the Constitution of the German Republic. In a moment of clear vision the Germans saw the abyss into which national hatreds were plunging unhappy Europe. In their revolution of 1918 they had repudiated that Government which had been so largely responsible for their own blind cult of self-centred nationalism. And from the bondage of such self-centred nationalism, with its unhappy consequences, they would fain free their children. Henceforth "Moral education, civic sentiment, and personal

and professional service in the spirit of German patriotism and international reconciliation" [1] were to be inculcated in all German schools.

Thus for the first time the lofty ideals of international solidarity through education found expression in the Constitution of a great country.

In the same spirit of hopeful idealism the Governments of various German States attempted to strengthen the principle of internationalism through measures of their own. The Government of the State of Brunswick, for example, published, in the year 1920, a regulation for the schools which might well serve as a model. This regulation requires that the teacher of history shall emphasize the progress of civilization and take pains never to glorify wars. In geography the child shall be taught the solidarity of the little and the great Fatherland, of the State and the human community. In natural history the struggle for existence is no longer to be depicted as the law of life for human beings and animals.[2] The theory of the brotherhood of man, in this Constitution, triumphs over the exaggerated nationalism of pre-war times.

In Prussia, likewise, the Ministry of Education strove to make the school at once an instrument of international reconciliation and a bulwark of Republicanism. The success of the first of these objects was naturally dependent on that of the second; for the triumph of monarchical sentiment would of course mean the triumph of old-time nationalism. The first Prussian Minister of Education after the Revolution was Herr Hoffman, an editor and a man of very

[1] Article 148 of the Weimar Constitution, quoted in Reisner, *Nationalism and Education since* 1789, p. 217.

[2] Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête*, pp. 157–8.

radical views.[1] Shortly after taking office he issued a decree forbidding in the schools the teaching of hatred, glorification of war, and opposition to the Revolution:

"Whereas previously historical instruction, together with other branches of learning, was misused to stir up hatred of peoples, this sort of thing in future is to be absolutely barred, to give place rather to a reasonable social-historical type of instruction. All tendencious and false teachings in regard to the World War and its causes are to be avoided.

"All books which glorify the war as such are to be removed from the school libraries.

"In no branches of instruction are the teachers to express unfavourable and false opinions in regard to the causes and results of the Revolution, nor in regard to the present Government, such as are of a character to weaken in the eyes of their pupils the authority and outcome of this freeing of the people."[2]

Hoffman's successor was Herr Haenisch, who remained in office some two and a half years.[3] Like his predecessor, Haenisch was determined to purge the German school of the poison of hatred and revenge.

"Germany's terrible downfall," he decreed, immediately after taking office, "puts the teacher to a severe test of insight and character. It is easy, at the present time, to foster the feeling of hatred and revenge against our enemies, and in so doing to be of the opinion that one is seeking only to awaken in youth a fervent love of Fatherland. Hatred and revenge against the enemy shall, under no circumstances, be preached to youth. There must be no

[1] Roman, *The New Education in Europe*, p. 192.

[2] *Zentralblatt für die Gesamte Unterrichts-Verwaltung in Preussen*, vol. for 1918, p. 708.

[3] Roman, op. cit., p. 192.

playing with the idea of a war of revenge even when our enemies obviously fail to do us justice. Our will to the rule of right and justice must not be dependent on the attitude of our enemies. And ever must we hold fast to the hope and to the determination that some time hatred of peoples shall wholly perish from the earth and that this war shall have been the last. To this conviction we can force no one, but we must firmly insist that the school shall never again become the seat of the teaching of hatred of peoples and of glorification of war." [1]

Further ministerial decrees and circulars develop the same principles. An order of April 10, 1920, for the normal schools calls for a decrease in the amount of time devoted to the teaching of the history of wars and dynasties, to make room for economic and social history, and for instruction in law and civics.[2] All political questions, according to another decree, must be treated by the teachers with scientific objectivity. "In the new Free State everyone has complete freedom of conviction and utterance, even the State official, and it is far from our purpose to wish to restrict in any way this freedom among the teachers in the schools under our control. In the matter of his political convictions and his political activity outside of his employment, no one will be troubled by us. On the other hand, we must clearly insist that the strictly circumscribed duties of his professional activity be fulfilled truly by the official, without intermixture of personal, political passions. . . . We must, . . . therefore, express the expectation

[1] *Zentralblatt für die Gesamte Unterrichts-Verwaltung in Preussen*, 1918, pp. 711–12. Decree of November 27, 1918.

[2] Ibid., 1920, p. 303.

that henceforth instruction be imparted throughout, in the spirit of scientific objectivity." [1]

It was provided in other decrees that martial poems should be treated from the pacifist's standpoint, that the teachers should guard against "giving the children an exaggerated opinion of the virtues of the German people," that they should try to treat other nations with greater fairness.[2]

Fighting thus valiantly for international solidarity and against the spirit of militarism, the Minister set his face against monarchical reaction. Among other things, he ordered the removal of certain evidences of past national greatness from the school-room. The spirit of this order seems to have been much misunderstood. "In complete misconstruction of my intentions," the Minister was obliged to point out, ". . . pictures of Frederick the Great, Baron von Stein, Bismarck, Moltke, Hindenburg, Weddington, etc., have frequently been removed from the schools. . . . In order to avoid such mischances in the future, I have ordered through my general decree of September 15, 1919, . . . that only the pictures of the last German Kaiser and the Crown Prince be removed, and not also those of personalities whose worth and significance stand firm historically, independently of their relation to the former Government." [3] In the same spirit pictures of the former royal family were to be excluded from newly printed school readers, as were also reading selections treating of the former *Kaiser familie*, especially selections of anecdotal character.[4] Haenisch even went so far, toward the end of the

[1] *Zentralblatt*, 1918, p. 11. Order of November 27, 1918, to teachers in the higher schools.
[2] Roman, op. cit., p. 193.
[3] *Zentralblatt*, 1919, p. 603.
[4] Ibid., pp. 601–2. Order of September 18, 1919

year 1919, as to order that for a brief period, no textbooks in history should be used in the schools. New ones were to be written, adapted to new conditions. His attitude is summed up in the statement that he cannot and will not " suffer the schools in the new Prussia to be misused as reactionary, monarchistic hot-houses." [1]

Through such measures, then, the zealous Haenisch strove to impregnate the school system with the spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity. But the path of the idealist who attempts to reduce principle to practice is ever rocky and thorny. It is one thing to issue an order, another to enforce it. If a revolution is born in a mood of spiritual exaltation, the succeeding mood is one of disillusionment and reaction. A nation cannot break suddenly with its past; if it always looks forward to the new, it ever clings to the old. So when inevitable reaction set in in Germany the Prussian Minister found his path more and more beset with difficulties. Of course some teachers continued to lend his decrees loyal support. Dr. Roman, who visited a number of schools in Berlin and other parts of Germany, found that in general the order to remove pictures of the Kaiser had been carried out.[2] But he also found that the order to remove the Kaiser's and other pictures from the school books had been " executed only in part " because the Government was " too weak to carry out its programme." [3] Even in one of his early decrees the Minister felt constrained to point out that " our people in their present difficult situation are in no way served by those who merely mourn the past, and

[1] *Zentralblatt*, 1919, pp. 672–3. Order of December 6, 1919.
[2] *The New Education in Europe*, p. 194.
[3] Ibid., p 195.

of the present and future have only doubt and despair." [1]

On the other hand, the minister tried to temper the wind to the shorn lamb. He was not of the Jacobin spirit that would uproot suddenly the whole past. It has already been pointed out that while he insisted on the spirit of scientific objectivity in the class-room, he had no intention of interfering with free expression of opinion outside school walls. And he did not expect every teacher to give up " old and well-loved opinions." [2] After he had issued the orders requiring the removal of evidences of the old régime from the school-rooms, he issued another decree to the effect that the change should not be too sudden, but that the youth should be brought gradually to see that in the schools of the Republic there could necessarily be no place for symbols of monarchy.[3]

So some partisans of the new order thought the Minister had not gone fast enough in his reforms. Several newspapers reproached him with not having set aside the old reading-books used in the schools. They complained that many books were still used in the schools " which in not a few selections offend against the present political reformation in Germany." To these critics a supporter of the administration replied in the year 1921 that a general order might have been issued by the Minister to do away with all the offending books, but that it would have been impossible to carry out such an order. It would have meant that with one blow the millions of reading-books now in the hands of pupils would be made worthless, that in the shortest possible time new millions would have to be printed and published—and would have to be sold. The tremendous shortage

[1] *Zentralblatt*, 1918, p. 712. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., 1919, p. 604.

of paper, the lack of purchasing power on the part of the people, would have made it impossible to carry out this reform. Even had it been possible, contended the Ministry's defender, it would not have been wise, from a purely political standpoint, to attempt such a purification. The new order must have time to grow; a sudden change in the school books would not improve its position.[1]

In spite of such support, however, in spite of his idealism and his statesmanlike policy of "making haste slowly," Herr Haenisch was forced to resign. The forces of reaction were growing stronger. The Prussian Socialists had to form a compromise Government in the latter part of the year 1921, yielding the Ministry of Education to the Right.[2] Haenisch's immediate successor was Herr Becker, a Conservative. After a brief interval he was succeeded by Herr Boelitz, a reactionary.[3]

Under this reactionary minister the conduct of Prussia's educational policy naturally altered. True, the new minister did not repeal the decrees of Hoffman or Haenisch. These decrees still hold good—for those who choose to obey them. But Herr Boelitz made little or no effort at their enforcement.[4] Apparently he was not interested in the development of a spirit of international solidarity, if indeed he was not at heart opposed to it.

On the other hand, he was zealously interested in the intensification of patriotism. Several of his decrees reveal this purpose. In the teaching of history, according to one of these, "stress is to be laid on the share of the German people in modern culture, and on the achievements, tasks, and obliga-

[1] Pretzel, "Zur Lesebuchfrage," *Zentralblatt*, 1921, p. 145.
[2] Roman, op. cit., p. 195 [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

tions of Germany in relation to the civilization of mankind." [1] The Minister regrets that so little attention has been paid in the schools to the Germans living in foreign lands. He requests that there be more instruction regarding them, especially in connection with the study of geography and history.[2] The special task of the school reading-book, according to another decree, is to awaken and foster pleasure in good German literature and in the true spirit of Germany.[3] "The reading-book shall offer a path to German culture." It is to assist in making "our girls and boys, spiritually and from the depths of their hearts, children of the land in which they were born, and in giving them also an understanding of the nature and accomplishments of those foreign cultures which have influenced the spiritual development of Germany. The goal of the reading-book is the whole field of knowledge of Germany." [4] The whole point of view of Herr Boelitz on the subject of patriotic instruction is summed up in a decree of April 6, 1923:

"All schools have the duty of fulfilling their tasks as German schools, while in suitable fashion they work for the intensification of German culture: to inspire youth with enthusiasm for German speech, the German race and German greatness of spirit is a more earnest task than ever before. . . . To-day, more strongly than ever, the old demand holds, that every lesson shall be a German lesson." [5]

Examination of the school programmes shed further

[1] *Zentralblatt*, 1923, p. 65; Order of January 10, 1923.
[2] Ibid., 1923, p. 317; Order of August 21, 1923. Ibid., 1924, p. 6; Order of December 19, 1923.
[3] Ibid., July 5, 1923; Order of May 24, 1923.
[4] Ibid., 1924, p. 6; Order of December 19, 1923.
[5] Ibid., 1923, p. 199.

light on the attitude of official Prussia toward the inculcation of patriotism. In the most recent official outlines for the programmes of the Prussian *Volksschulen* the patriotic purpose reveals itself. "Instruction in geography aims at familiarity with the home region, closer acquaintance with Germany, inclusive of the region of German speech outside the boundaries of the Empire, general acquaintance with foreign lands and regions, and understanding of the position of the earth in the universe." [1] "The object of instruction in singing is to awaken pleasure in singing and joy in song, especially in German folk-song, to bring into the lives of children a love of German song." [2] One of the aims of the study of the mother tongue is to awaken joy in German ways of doing things and German poetry; [3] and a prime purpose of the study of history is "to acquaint the pupils with the chief points in the evolution and the life of the German State, in order to furnish them at the same time with the foundation for an understanding of the present, especially of the State of to-day, to awaken in them the feeling of responsibility for the people and State as a whole, as well as love for folk and Fatherland." [4]

It would be unreasonable to take too much exception to the patriotic purpose as it appears in the foregoing outlines for school programmes. The most captious critic can hardly object to having German children taught to love German folk-songs. But it is a disappointment to find that so little of the spirit of Article 148 of the Weimar Constitution permeates these *Richtlinien*. One searches for it almost in vain.

[1] *Richtlinien zur Aufstellung von Lehrplänen für die Grundschule und die oberen Jahrgänge der Volksschule*, p. 17.
[2] Ibid., p. 20. [3] Ibid., p. 14. [4] Ibid., p. 16.

In the directions for the teaching of history, however, the principle is laid down that " wars are to be emphasized chiefly for their causes and results," [1]—a principle that implies the cutting down of military narrative and of the glorification of war. Of the radiant internationalism of Hoffman and Haenisch this much at least still seems to receive official consecration.

Most regrettable of all, however, is the narrowness of the programme. If its authors do not completely close the door to a knowledge of other countries, they are far from throwing it wide open. The school reader is to awaken joy in German culture and German poetry. Well and good! But it might easily awaken joy in foreign culture also. Examine the typical German school reader and you find that it does not. As for the study of history its material is " the history of the German people, including those of the boundary (i.e. those regions just beyond the present boundaries of Germany, which are inhabited chiefly by Germans) and of foreign parts. . . . *The history of other peoples is to be considered in so far as through it German history has been decisively influenced.*" [2] Even in the upper schools the conception is exceedingly restricted. In class after class, apart from the attention given to antiquity, it is German history, ever German history, which is to be taught; only here and there is a fleeting glimpse afforded of the history of other modern countries.[3] Taken as a whole the programme for history is even narrower than that of France.

[1] *Richtlinien zur Aufstellung von Lehrplänen für die Grundschule une die oberen Jahrgänge der Volksschule*, p. 16.

[2] Ibid., p. 16: " Die Geschichte anderer Völker ist soweit mit in Betracht zu ziehen, als durch sie die deutsche entscheidend beeinflusst werden ist."

[3] *Richtlinien für einen Lehrplan der Deutschen Oberschule und der Aufbauschulen. Sonderbeilage zum Zentralblatt*, etc., vol. for 1924.

As in France, however, geography does afford a glimpse of the outer world. If the emphasis is laid on the geography of the home province, of the State, and of the Fatherland, nevertheless instruction in the *Volksschulen* strives for "a general acquaintance with foreign lands and regions," especially, however, with those lands "in which Germans live and work, and to which Germany bears important relations." [1] In the higher schools geography deals broadly with the various parts of the world, far more broadly than does history.[2] But all this is not enough. The masses never go beyond the *Volksschulen*; and, as in France, the masses must perforce remain, in large measure, mentally isolated from the masses of other countries.

[1] *Richtlinien zur Aufstellung von Lehrplänen für die Grundschule*, p. 17.

[2] *Richtlinien für einen Lehrplan der Deutschen Oberschulen*, etc. One of the most popular textbooks in history is Neubauer's *Grundzüge der Geschichte für Höhere Lehranstalten*. A summary of the subject-matter of the eight parts into which this book is divided shows how little attention is given, even in the higher schools, to the history of countries other than Germany:

Teil I. Bändchen 1.—German history from the migrations to the time of the Great Elector. Bändchen 2.—German history from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the present time.

Teil II. Antiquity and the early Middle Ages.

Teil III. German history from the founding of the National State (i.e. the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation) to the Peace of Westphalia.

Teil IV. From the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna. The development of the great European Powers and of the French Revolution is discussed, but Germany remains the central subject of study.

Teil V. From the Congress of Vienna to the present. This part deals almost entirely with German history and with world history in its relation to Germany.

Teil VI. History of antiquity and the early Middle Ages. The division dealing with the early Middle Ages is concerned almost entirely with German history.

Teil VII. From the founding of the German National State to the end of the eighteenth century. This part deals almost entirely with German history, and world history in its relation to Germany

Teil VIII. From the Congress of Vienna to the present; German history, and world history in its relation to Germany.

Thus, as far as official attitudes toward education are concerned, the pendulum in Prussia has swung from the internationalism of the revolution's dawn to the nationalism of reaction's disillusionment. To intensify a narrow patriotism clearly seems more important to the Prussian Ministry of Education than to develop in the minds and hearts of German children a knowledge, understanding and love of other countries in the spirit of human solidarity.

A somewhat broader spirit than that of Prussia, however, is exemplified in the new programmes for the Baden elementary schools.[1]

The aim of education in the *Volksschulen,* according to the programmes, is at once international and patriotic. Its goal is determined by "paragraph 35 of the school law of Baden and by article 148 of the Constitution of the Reich."[2] In other words, instruction is to be imparted "in the spirit of German patriotism and of international conciliation." To accomplish this purpose the child is first of all to be familiarized with his immediate environment, physical and spiritual. Thus he discovers how closely his own life is bound up with the life and fate of his own home region. From this should develop in him a definite determination to take his place in the common life of folk and Fatherland. In this way the school becomes the effective nursery of true patriotic and civic feeling. And in the end an international outlook is to be developed. "Feeling for the little home district gradually broadens out into feeling for the great German Fatherland and for the whole world of foreign peoples and countries."[3]

[1] Stocker, *Unterrichtsplan für die Volksschule* (*Baden*), *vom* 12 *April*, 1924, *mit Erläuterungen und methodischen Bemerkungen.*
[2] Ibid., p. 20 [3] Ibid., p. 21.

Programmes which support the idea of international conciliation logically oppose the teaching of militaristic history. Wars, as such, are not to be glorified, though the presentation of examples of individual heroism is encouraged. And since the wars themselves are too important to be neglected, emphasis is to be laid, not on the events, but on the causes and results, particularly on their destructive, blighting effects on civilization.

"Wars, those phenomena which cut deep into the life of the people, can naturally not be excluded from historical treatment; instruction regarding them, however, is to be limited to whatever is necessary for the understanding of the progress of history. In this instruction are to be considered, above all, the causes of war and their fearful effects on the political and cultural life of man, and on human life in general. Examples of heroism, of the noblest fulfilment of duty in the service of the social whole, and of unselfish love of Fatherland, are to be suitably emphasized." [1]

All these provisions of the programmes of Baden are in the spirit of the Weimar Constitution, of international conciliation. But in the more specific instructions, relating to the teaching of individual subjects, it is generally the patriotic rather than the international purpose that is emphasized. In the teaching of singing, for example, the patriotic song, through its influence on the spirit, is expected "to contribute permanently to the patriotic education of the children." [2] Because of its content the study of the mother tongue is looked upon as an especially fruitful instrument for patriotic education. The subject-matter of reading is to be, before all else, German national life, German customs, German

[1] Stocker, *Unterrichtsplan für die Volksschule* (*Baden*), pp. 42–3.
[2] Ibid., pp. 56–7.

economic and political life, the different classes and their work in the past and present, and kindred material.[1] History is to develop "the living feeling of membership in the German land and people," and the knowledge "that the fate of every individual is indissolubly bound up with that of the whole people."[2] Geography is expected to foster "a warm home feeling" and a true love for the German Fatherland.[3] Even when geography deals with the whole Continent of Europe it is to be, before all else, "Fatherland knowledge"; for material relating to other countries is constantly to be placed in comparison with material relating to Germany.[4]

It is especially in connection with the teaching of geography that the patriotic aim verges on the narrowly nationalistic—at a point where German nationalism is most sensitive: the study of "the lost provinces," the provinces detached from the Fatherland by the Peace of Versailles.

"The study of the German Fatherland," according to the programmes, "does not stop with the political boundaries forced on us. German knowledge of German folk concerns itself also with Germanism in the boundary lands. In the time of our great national distress it is a quite special duty of the school to keep alive in our youth the knowledge of an inward cultural kinship with all those who speak our mother tongue, and who even in foreign lands wish to be, and to remain, Germans."[5]

In the programmes of Baden, then, as in those of Prussia, the influence of nationalism is strong—though in Baden there is, at the same time, a more distinct deference to the ideal of international conciliation.

[1] Stocker, *Unterrichtsplan für die Volksschule* (*Baden*), pp. 26–7.
[2] Ibid., p. 42. [3] Ibid., p. 40. [4] Ibid., p. 89. [5] Ibid., p. 89.

There is less of a departure than in the decrees and programmes of Prussia from the spirit of Article 148 of the Weimar Constitution. But it must be remembered that Baden is a small State, Prussia a very large one. By reason of Prussia's size her spirit is necessarily typical of the greater part of Germany. And the programmes of the Prussian *Volksschulen* are nationalistically exclusive, focusing attention on the Fatherland to the neglect of other countries. Only geography remains a possible "open sesame." As far as the pressure of the Ministry of Education is brought to bear on the Prussian teacher it is not, as in the days of Hoffman and Haenisch, pressure toward international conciliation, but toward nationalism. The teacher is expected to be a fervent patriot. In other words, as far as the idea of reconciliation of peoples is concerned, Prussian officialdom has become reactionary. It remains to be seen whether the German textbooks are reactionary too.

CHAPTER VII

THE GERMAN TEXTBOOKS

A FLOOD of new textbooks is pouring from the German Press. Improved economic conditions and financial stabilization in part account for this. In part it results from the need of adapting such texts as reading-books, geographies and histories to the changed political conditions resulting from the war, the Peace of Versailles and the Revolution. In part it has come from the appearance of new school programmes, themselves largely due to the circumstances in which the new Germany finds herself. The programmes for the *Volksschulen* of Baden, for example, and the most recent *Lehrplan* for the elementary schools of Baden, appeared in 1924. New programmes necessitate new texts, or old texts garbed in the dress of new editions.

This readjustment means that the authors of school readers, geographies and histories stand at a parting of the ways. On the one hand they have the opportunity of building up understanding of foreign countries and foreign peoples, as well as sympathy for them. The authors of historical texts, particularly, even if they are confined by the programmes for the most part to German history, nevertheless have the opportunity to present that history modestly, faithfully, impartially, criticizing courageously German leaders and German policies, where the best historical scholar-

ship has found these deserving of criticism, attempting to appraise sympathetically the great men and policies of foreign countries, emphasizing the causes and the destructive effects of war rather than its military glories. If the programmes of States like Prussia tend to-day toward nationalism, nevertheless they do not exclude the presentation of material in the spirit of international conciliation; and, of course, a strict adherence to Article 148 of the Weimar Constitution would necessitate such presentation.

On the other hand, if they so choose, the authors of new texts may write in the spirit of old-fashioned, pre-war nationalism. Article 148 of the Weimar Constitution apparently commands but little respect. Protagonists of a narrow nationalism are free if they choose to blind the eyes and stultify the spirits of rising generations of Germans. They are free to prepare for another catastrophe.

The question of nationalism in the schools might be tested in many different ways. One might study the treatment the texts accord Frederick the Great, for example, or Bismarck, or the attitude of the writers toward wars and battles throughout the centuries of German history. But one must pick and choose. It will serve here to discuss (1) the general attitude of the authors of the new textbooks toward the ex-Kaiser and the Imperial Government; (2) their explanation of the causes of the Franco-Prussian War; (3) their explanation of the causes of the Great War and their attitude toward the Treaty of Versailles; (4) the treatment they accord the United States; and (5) a few influences, among students and teachers, making for international conciliation.

Attitude toward the ex-Kaiser.

Between Kaiserism and nationalism there is a logical connection. Loyalty to the House of Hohenzollern was of the very essence of nationalism in pre-war days. And to-day a monarchist restoration of the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, or some other royalist would necessarily accentuate the spirit of narrow nationalism in Germany and antagonize other countries. The supporters of such a movement at the present time are largely the extremists of the Right, the die-hards, the irreconcilables. It is true that there can be nationalism without monarchism, but there can hardly be monarchism without nationalism. Any evidence of monarchism in the school books of Germany is therefore *ipso facto* almost certain to be evidence of nationalism.

Now the Dotation Carnegie has discovered in textbooks in use in Germany since the Revolution distinct evidence of sentiment favourable to the ex-Kaiser,[1] and almost no criticism of him. It has reached the conclusion that "one single manual, among all the books which our investigators have examined, permits itself in regard to the German personages who have been at the head of affairs any criticisms: that of Neubauer. Others guard themselves carefully against indulging in the least reproach against the Imperial Government."[2] And, again, in another passage the statement is made that "all the German textbooks, with the sole exception perhaps of the manual of Neubauer, keep silent in regard to the faults and the crimes of the fallen Government."[3]

[1] Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête*, pp. 177, 178, 204, 217–20, 232–36, 273, 274.

[2] Ibid., p. 173.

[3] Ibid., p. 178.

The present investigation sustains the point that praise of the ex-Kaiser and of the monarchical idea are to be found in certain textbooks now in use in German schools; but it does not sustain the contention that Neubauer's manual is the only text directing reproaches against the fallen leaders or the fallen Government of Germany.

That the influence of Kaiserism persists in the schools of the Republic a few examples from textbooks will reveal clearly. "Ah, but that was a golden word that Kaiser Wilhelm spoke at the opening of the war," exclaims Meerkatz, the author of a newly published historical manual. "'I know no parties any longer; I know only Germans.'"[1] "Trust in God, feeling for duty, lofty understanding of his sovereign calling distinguished the new Kaiser," says another writer.[2] And a school reader, published before the war, but reprinted and now in use in the schools of Cologne, devotes a whole section to "Unser Kaiserhaus."[3] Among the selections is a poem by Karl Friedrich Zelter, entitled "Dem Kaiser."[4] The whole poem is permeated with humble, heartfelt, grateful devotion to the former monarch, a devotion strangely out of place in the schools of a republic which is supposed to have repudiated the ex-Kaiser and all his works. One verse runs thus:

E'en as my father, love I him;
E'en to my final breath.
What boots if he my Kaiser is?
He is my father too.

[1] *Neuzeitliche Geschichtsbilder*, Teil II, p. 49.
[2] Lang, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Geschichte*, p. 244.
[3] Herold, Reinke, etc., *Deutsches Lesebuch*, Band I, Unterstufe, pp. 267–82.
[4] Ibid., p. 267; quoted in Scott, "The German Child and the Kaiser," *London Daily Mail*, April 27, 1925.

He looks down from his hero throne
With joy on every German son.
Long live my Kaiser lord![1]

Further light is shed on the persistence of the monarchical sentiment in a tribute paid by the author of a new historical text used in the schools of Baden to the former Grand Duke of that State:

"With a strong and wise hand Frederick's eldest son, Frederick II, grasped the reins of government in 1907. He was born on the 9th of July, 1857, and in 1885 he married Princess Hilda of Nassau, with whom, on the 20th of September, 1910, he celebrated his silver wedding, with the warmest sympathy of the whole State. Until 1902 he stood in active military service, in the end as commanding general at Coblentz.

"The Revolution has brought an abrupt end to his rule. But with the noble ruler, who always wished what was best for his people, go the best wishes of the greater part of the people of Baden, for him and his house. With dignity he has descended from his throne, and his last words as land father (*Landesvater*) were wishes of blessing for our dear homeland. May fulfilment be their destiny."[2]

But compliments to his quondam Majesty the Kaiser and his quondam Grace the Duke do not tell the whole story. If little is said of what the Dotation Carnegie calls the Kaiser's "crimes," there are a number of textbook writers who do not hesitate to

[1] Wie meinen Vater lieb' ich ihn
bis zu dem letzten Hauch;
was gilt's, wenn er mein Kaiser ist
mein Vater ist er auch.
Er blickt von seinem Heldenthron
mit Lust auf jedes Deutschen Sohn.
Der Kaiser lebe hoch! etc.

[2] Eiermann, *Geschichtsbilder zum Gebrauch der Volksschule*, p. 80.

call attention to his faults. The authors of a *Realienbuch* used in the schools of Baden point out that after the fall of Bismarck, "in place of the man 'of blood and iron' came flattering, submissive advisers, who quietly allowed full play to the immoderate self-conceit of the young ruler."[1] Kahnmeyer and Schulze, in one of the most generally used texts in the schools of Germany—a text of which over 300 editions have been printed—state that the Kaiser was versatile, and busied himself with technical, scientific and artistic questions. "But not even the most careful man can be master in all these fields. Admirers and flatterers, however, strengthened the Kaiser in the belief that in all this he had attained mastery, and could lead and direct in everything." So he would be not only his own chancellor, his own army chief, but he even tried to direct scholars and artists. Furthermore, while he spoke many a beautiful and fine word, he often offended sections of the people, and made certain speeches which "injured us very much abroad."[2] Kumsteller points out that the Kaiser, having become his own chancellor after Bismarck's fall, there was lacking a strong personality to hold him in check. But "the majority of the German people were contented with the outward splendour of the new Kaiser's rule and were silent."[3] Stillich, a pacifist writer, criticizes the Kaiser and his advisers severely for their share in bringing on the war. He attributes to them the chief guilt—possibly the sole guilt—of precipitating the catastrophe.[4]

As to the Kaiser's flight from Germany after his

[1] Hüffner und Mattes, *Badisches Realienbuch*, Teil II, p. 148.
[2] *Realienbuch*, i (*Deutsche Geschichte*), pp. 150–1.
[3] Kumsteller, etc., *Geschichtsbuch*, p. 242
[4] *Katechismus*, p. 103

abdication there is little criticism, little comment of any kind. Brettschneider, however, says:

"In the evening the Kaiser betook himself from Spa to Holland. Hindenburg remained at his post." [1]

If there is no concrete criticism in this last statement, there is at least an interesting juxtaposition of affirmations.

There are no diatribes against the Kaiser in the books I have examined. On the contrary, it is clear that there is no inconsiderable amount of praise. Stillich's manual, which frankly assigns a large share of war guilt to the Kaiser's government, is exceptional rather than typical. But praise, especially in its more gushing forms, is to be found largely in the texts which have been carried over from before the war, and which will inevitably be gradually replaced by newer works. In some of these newer works, it has been shown, appraisal of the Kaiser's character includes frank comment on his faults and weaknesses. In others there is a tendency to ignore the ex-monarch. Still more do the writers of these texts ignore his heir-presumptive and presumptuous, the ex-Crown Prince. Certainly there is no general and careful cultivation of the monarchical sentiment in these new manuals. For the more rabid manifestations of nationalism we must look elsewhere.

The German Textbooks and the Causes of the Franco-Prussian War.

The war of 1870 has faded sufficiently into the past to be treated with something like scientific objectivity. If some of the evidence bearing on the question is only now beginning to see the light of day, nevertheless

[1] *Hilfsbuch*, Teil III, p. 123.

there has long been material enough to establish in their broad outlines the responsibilities for the war. It has already been pointed out that many of the French texts agree with the findings of historical research in dividing between France and Germany responsibility for the conflict, though it was admitted that one reason for this approach to impartiality of presentation was to be found in the Third Republic's repudiation of the Government of the Second Empire, whose bungling diplomacy had precipitated the catastrophe. But whatever the reason, the fact of relative impartiality remains.

The presentation in the German texts, on the other hand, is, generally speaking, anything but impartial. It is one-sided, narrowly nationalistic. By most writers France, and France alone, is held guilty.

" Prussia's brilliant victories and her rise to a position of world power," write the authors of a *Realienbuch* for the schools of Baden, where instruction is supposed to be imparted in a spirit of international conciliation, " filled France with hatred and envy. Napoleon and the Emperor of Austria sought to prevent the entrance of Southern Germany into the North German Confederation. Both countries entered into secret war plans to overthrow Prussia. Only a successful war could make firm the insecure throne of Napoleon. The question of succession to the Spanish throne furnished a very favourable occasion for such a war. In 1868 the Spaniards had deposed their queen and had chosen as their king Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, a distant relative of the King of Prussia. Napoleon saw in this selection a danger to his country, because it ' destroys the European balance of power and imperils the honour of France.' To avoid war for his fatherland, Prince Leopold refused

the Spanish throne. Not contented with this, however, the French Emperor, through his ambassador Benedetti, demanded of King William that 'he promise, for all future time, never again to give his consent' (to the candidacy). On this the king refused to receive the French ambassador again. France, feeling herself insulted, declared war on Prussia, July 19, 1870." [1]

Other authors write in similar vein. Napoleon III wanted war with Germany, they maintain. He had demanded compensation of Bismarck as a *quid pro quo* for his consent to German unification north of the River Main. Bismarck had refused; and Napoleon had felt his throne begin to shake. He was filled with fear that if he did not satisfy the vanity of the French they would hurl him, or if not him, his son, from the throne. The French were envious of Prussia's great victory over Austria.[2] "Since the time of Richelieu, it was a political dogma with the French that a powerless Germany was the primary condition" of the hegemony of France.[3] "They lived in the conceited hope of being the first nation in Europe." [4]

After the publication of the Ems dispatch, "the German people were conscious that the French had willed the war." [5] And after the declaration of hostilities, according to Dienstbach, "the Germans said to themselves: 'It was right for the Prussian king to refuse the demands of the presumptuous French.'" [6]

[1] Hüffner und Mattes, *Badisches Realienbuch*, Teil II, pp. 138–9.

[2] Kumsteller, Haacke und Schneider, *Geschichtsbuch für die deutsche Jugend*, p. 215; Neubauer, *Grundzüge der Geschichte*, Teil I, Bändchen 2, p. 46; Meerkatz, *Neuzeitliche Geschichtsbilder*, Teil II, p. 41; Kahnmeyer und Schulze, Teil I, p. 136; Dienstbach, *Lehrbuch der Erdkunde und Geschichte*, Teil I, p. 52.

[3] Lang, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Geschichte*, p. 228.

[4] Neubauer, *Grundzüge der Geschichte*, Teil I, Bändchen 2, p. 46.

[5] Ibid., Teil V, p. 30.

[6] *Lehrbuch der Erdkunde und Geschichte für Mittelschulen*, Teil I, p. 52.

It is what these explanations omit even more than their criticisms of the French that reveals nationalistic bias most definitely. No suggestion that the war was in part a terrible but logical consequence of Bismarck's policy of blood and iron. No criticism of his shifty, deceptive diplomacy toward Napoleon and towards Austria. No hint that France might well be alarmed at Prussian annexations after Prussian victory in 1866. No criticism of the chauvinistic attitude of a portion of the Prussian Press. No criticism of Bismarck for his insistent and chauvinistic policy of supporting the Hohenzollern candidacy to the throne of Spain, "that project so loaded with dynamite." [1] No condemnation of him for his tricky manipulation of the Ems dispatch, which recent research so strongly re-emphasizes.[2] Uncritical German youth, studying the accounts given in the German textbooks, inevitably receives the impression that France alone caused the war, and naturally draws the conclusion that her defeat was the just punishment of her envy and presumption.

The Causes and Results of the World War in the German Textbooks.

Recent research is freeing Germany from some of those accusations of criminalty which war propaganda and war hysteria fastened upon her. But it can never clear her of a heavy share in the responsibility for the great conflict. In the crisis following the Serajevo murder, it has been pointed out, the foolhardy Government of the Kaiser risked world war by insisting on standing by Austria. Proposals looking toward a peaceful solution it stupidly blocked until it was too late. Long before the war, too, a strutting militarism

[1] Lord, *Origins of the War of* 1870, p. 5. [2] Ibid., pp. 101–2.

was all too powerful in the State ; and an egotistically nationalistic system of education stimulated the psychological causes of war. But Germany's chief responsibility lies in her pursuit of " world power." [1] Her demand for " a place in the sun " and " a future on the water," voiced in the bombastic bravado of the Kaiser's speeches, her vigorous attempts to secure this *Weltmacht,* naturally alarmed the other Powers, drew them closer together, and contributed powerfully to that tension that led to war. Under William II Germany became the chief disturbing factor in world politics.

But of all this there is very little in the new German textbooks. To read them one would suppose that Germany was a lamb among wolves. One gathers the impression that her *Weltpolitik* was a policy of justifiable, inevitable expansion, while the aims of the other Powers were nefariously imperialistic. Scheming together, they united against Germany. Germany's rise to world power, according to one writer, " was a life-necessity for the German people." [2] Another asserts the " moral right " of the Germans to have colonies, and maintains that during the World War the natives of the German colonies were the only colonial natives to be entirely faithful to the mother country.[3] " Germany," says another, " held to the fundamental principle of justice, of the open door. France, Russia, England pursued (a policy of) imperialism." [4] So the chief underlying cause of the Great War, according to the majority of textbooks, was the encirclement policy (*Einkreisungspolitik*) of the

[1] This does not, of course, imply an ambition of dominating the whole world.
[2] Brettschneider, *Hilfsbuch.* Teil I, p. 107.
[3] Schmidt-Voigt, *Lebensgut,* Teil VI, pp. 309–11
[4] Schmidt, *Das 19 und 20 Jahrhundert,* p. 99.

Allied Powers.[1] Germany's "rise to power was displeasing to all the world," so the three great States "joined together for her destruction."[2] With the completion of the Triple Entente, "fester war der Ring um Deutschland geschlossen."[3]

As the countries of the Entente are vehemently criticized for their collective responsibility for the war, so they are vigorously attacked individually. According to one text, three varieties of lust constitute the original cause of the war: French lust for *revanche*, Russian lust for power, English lust for wealth (*Französische Revanchegier, Russiche Machtgier, Englische Habgier*).[4] England's alleged envy of the growth of German trade is frequently referred to,[5] and the character of England's imperialism is severely criticized. "England grudged us our ships because she alone wanted to rule the sea; she grudged us also our growing trade, which had almost caught up with hers."[6] As evidence of England's envy and greed is quoted, in German translation, the notorious article which appeared in the *Saturday Review* for September 11, 1897, the writer of which stated that if Germany were destroyed the next day, every

[1] Kraffzick, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte für Mittel- und höhere Mädchenschulen*, p. 80; Henche, *Geschichte in Tatsachen*, Heft 4, pp. 61–2; Schmidt, *Das 19 und 20 Jahrhundert*, p. 107; Kumsteller, *Geschichtsbuch*, p. 246; Brettschneider, *Hilfsbuch*, Teil I, p. 107; Kahnmeyer und Schulze, *Realienbuch*, ii (*Der Weltkrieg*), p. 157; Meerkatz, *Neuzeitliche Geschichtsbilder*, Teil II, p. 49.

[2] Lang, *Lehrbuch*, p. 250.

[3] Kumsteller, *Geschichtsbuch*, p. 246.

[4] Schmidt, *Das 19 und 20 Jahrhundert*, p. 107; Brettschneider, *Hilfsbuch*, Teil I, p. 110.

[5] Brettschneider, *Hilfsbuch*, Teil I, p. 110; Meerkatz, *Neuzeitliche Geschichtsbilder*, Teil II, p. 48; Schmidt, *Das 19 und 20 Jahrhundert*, p. 107; Kahnmeyer und Schulze, *Realienbuch*, II, p. 157; etc.

[6] Dienstbach, Teil I, p. 62; Meerkatz, *Neuzeitliche Geschichtsbilder*, Teil II, p. 48.

Englishman would be the richer.[1] The article runs, in part:

"A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be the richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession; must they not fight for two hundred and fifty million pounds of yearly commerce? . . . To this pass has the muddling of the German Emperor brought Germany, and at a time when England has awakened to what is alike inevitable and her best hope of prosperity. 'Germaniam esse delendam.'"

The authors of an historical text describe the methods by which imperialistic Britain is supposed to have taken control of one bit of territory after another:

"In the midst of peace England set fire to Alexandria, took possession of the Suez Canal and the most important cities of Egypt. The ruler of that land was no longer master in his own house (1882). Had England a right to these territories? Well, here she needed more hinterland for her harbours, here a naval station, here a people must be freed 'in the name of humanity' from 'misrule,' 'despotism' or 'anarchy.' Such was her right!"[2]

The arch-conspirator of *Einkreisungspolitik*, the textbooks claim, was Edward VII of England, "Der schlaue König Eduard."[3] Indefatigably, it is said, the English king journeyed from court to court to cast suspicion on Germany and rob her of her friends.

[1] Kumsteller, Haacke und Schneider, *Geschichtsbuch*, p. 234; Brettschneider, *Hilfsbuch*, Teil I, p. 110.

[2] Kumsteller, Haacke und Schneider, *Geschichtsbuch*, p. 234.

[3] Kahnmeyer und Schulze, *Realienbuch*, ii, p. 157.

"He even tried it with the old Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria." [1] "Germany must be isolated and encircled" was the king's motto.[2] For it was England's purpose to drive Germany from the seas.[3]

France runs a close race with England in textbook unpopularity. Kraffzick, for example, holds that England was the chief culprit in bringing on the war [4]; but with others the favourite is France. "The oldest enemy sat in the west; it was France, who could not get over the defeat of 1870–1, and even taught the children in the schools that they must take revenge on Germany." [5] Meerkatz, in a lyrical outburst of hatred, searches history from the seventeenth to the twentieth century to express his indignation effectively. He passes in review wrongs old and new: Louis XIV's invasion of the Palatinate, his destruction of the Heidelberg castle, his rape of Alsace-Lorraine in 1697 (*sic*), Napoleon's humiliation of Prussia in 1807, the attack of 1870, the provocation of the Great War. "Comrades," he concludes, "for the present grievous suffering of our Fatherland at bottom we must thank our old hereditary enemies, the French." [6]

Over against these pitifully distorted explanations of the causes of the World War, and these diatribes against England and France must be set saner points of view to be found here and there in a few textbooks. For example, Dr. Eiermann, the author of a little historical text used in the schools of Baden, gives a sober, careful and approximately impartial account

[1] Kumsteller, etc., op. cit., p 246; Schmidt, *Das 19 und 20 Jahrhundert*, p. 107.
[2] Kraffzick, *Lehrbuch*, p. 80.
[3] Kahnmeyer und Schulze, op. cit., ii, p. 157; Kraffzick. *Lehrbuch*, p. 80.
[4] Kraffzick, *Lehrbuch*, p. 80.
[5] Dienstbach, *Lehrbuch*, Teil I, p. 63.
[6] *Neuzeitliche Geschichtsbilder*, pp. 51–2

of the causes of the World War. William II's ambition for world power, he says among other things, necessarily brought Germany in conflict with those nations which had already attained world power. He speaks of the "so-called" *Einkreisungspolitik* of Edward VII, and calls English policy inimical to Germany (*deutschfeindliche*). But he admits that "England did not exactly aim at war," though she "wished to hold in check Germany, whose preparations on land and water seemed dangerous to her." [1] So, too, the popular and influential *Realienbuch* of Kahnmeyer and Schulze, though not as impartial, on the whole, as Eiermann's text, is not completely dominated by the nationalistic spirit. In speaking of Germany's economic development before the war, for example, the authors say: "Germany was becoming rich—perhaps too quickly rich. Many people, even leading men, looked upon the chase for gold and property as the highest task of life." And when Germany had attained world power, "it is easy to understand that not everywhere in Europe was this change seen with joy, and that there arose enemies to the Empire." [2]

Two other manuals among those I have examined discuss the causes of the war in a laudable spirit of objectivity—that of Henche and that of Stillich. Henche claims, justly enough, that to assert Germany's sole guilt, as the Versailles Treaty has done, is unhistorical and immoral. The war, he says, was inevitably fated, growing primarily out of the controversies of world politics and the friction resulting from international economic developments. It came also from the race of armaments, the imperialistic system,

[1] *Geschichtsbilder zum Gebrauch der Volksschule*, pp. 66–8.
[2] Kahnmeyer und Schulze, *Realienbuch*, ii (*Der Weltkrieg*), pp. 1–2.

coalition politics, more particularly from hostility developing between Germany and England as a result of Germany's economic growth and new-born national feeling, on the one side; and on the other, England's vanity in claiming the right to preserve for all time her former superiority. It came also from the hostility of France and Russia to Germany. German statesmen were gravely at fault, says Henche, in not having done their best to effect an agreement with England, even if this meant a break with the incapable Austria. As a result of all these influences, the Governments of the European countries stumbled into a war detested by their peoples, and resulting in immeasurable destruction of goods, material and ideal. Such a conflict makes intelligible the words of Moltke, that "every war is a misfortune to all nations concerned." [1]

Stillich finds the fundamental causes of the war in the anarchistic relationships of the great countries with one another, in their mistrust of one another, in their continually increasing armaments, in their imperialism and greed for colonies.[2] As to the immediate causes, he distinguishes three kinds of guilt: *Mitschuld*, *Hauptschuld* and *Alleinschuld* (complicity, chief guilt, sole guilt). The Kaiser and his advisors he finds guilty of *Mitschuld*, of *Hauptschuld*, possibly of *Alleinschuld*.[3] The whole tone of Stillich's book is anti-militaristic. He leans far more to the left than does Henche; but it is safe to say that his book is far less influential than Henche's, for it is published by a little-known peace organization, while Henche's text comes from one of Germany's leading publishers,

[1] *Geschichte in Tatsachen*, Heft 4, pp. 61–2.
[2] *Katechismus*, p. 13
[3] Ibid., p. 103.

Hirt. It must be emphatically asserted, however, that even such moderate works as those of Eiermann and Henche are by no means typical in their attitude toward the causes of the war, for the general tone of the majority of texts varies on this question from blunt prejudice to bitter, blind nationalism.

Writers who hold the Great War to have resulted from the machinations of the Triple Entente naturally rage against the Treaty of Versailles. Kahnmeyer and Schulze state that "in its provisions was to be found no trace of justice and the spirit of international conciliation, but only fury, hate and fear." [1] The Englishman Keynes is quoted as saying that a war which was waged in defence of international treaties ended with the breach of the holiest promises on the part of the victors.[2] The assertion in the treaty that on Germany and her allies rests the sole guilt of the war is denounced as a lie. "On this lie," says Neubauer, "was the terrible cruelty of the 'punishment provisions' for 'criminal' Germany founded." [3] Upper Silesia is rich in coal and ore; therefore it was forcibly seized by Germany's enemies. To Poland was given not only territory inhabited principally by Poles, but even regions almost entirely German. The Alsace-Lorraine region, for centuries a seat of German life, was turned over to the French to satisfy their demand for the Rhine boundary. Such are some of the contentions of a geographical text.[4] "Never," says the author of a manual of history, "has a people been made to pay more cruelly for a lost war." [5] Another writer pays tribute to the ideal of reconciliation

[1] *Realienbuch*, ii, *Der Weltkrieg*, p. 36.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Neubauer, *Grundzüge der Geschichte*, Teil V, p. 78.
[4] Kaiser, *Erdkunde für Mittlere Schulen*, pp. 29, 40, 56
[5] Lang, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Geschichte*, p. 263.

set forth by the Weimar Constitution, adding: "We will not perpetuate the ghastly rule of hatred in the civilized world, but we shall not cease to fight with spiritual weapons against the folly and injustice of (the treaty of) Versailles until it is set aside." [1] "Germany has been deceived," says Kraffzick. "Every German must remember that for the future." [2]

Those of us who believe, as the present writer believes strongly, that the peace should have been one of reconciliation rather than of punishment, may find it difficult to criticize German resentment against the Treaty of Versailles. A peace based on retribution is even weaker in theory than it is strong in fact. In the first place it bears heavily on many men, women and children—especially children—who are not guilty at all; in the second place, as research reveals more and more the divided responsibility for the war, one wonders why the Central Powers should be singled out for punishment. "Let him that is without guilt throw the first stone," it has been said. But if stones must be thrown, why not throw them at victors as well as vanquished? Ought they not to be punished, too? Finally, the strongest argument against this treaty, with its fundamental punishment theory, is that it has given rise to numerous new and dangerous problems. It has made for "peaceless Europe."

Nevertheless, if the German textbooks continue to discuss the Pact of Versailles solely in a spirit of bitter resentment, as so many of them are now doing, they will do a grievous injury to their own country and to the cause of world peace. Stillich, in his *Katechismus*, outlines a finer and wiser method of treatment. The treaty, he points out, was signed by the Germans.

[1] Gierth, *Von Verlorenen Deutschen Brudern*, p. v.
[2] *Lehrbuch*, p. 96.

The fact that they had nothing to say in the making of it means little. Defeated countries always dislike the terms of peace, and consent to them only because they must. Once signed, the treaty ought to be observed—*Pacta servanda sunt.* If the treaty has brought grievous losses to Germany, those losses matter less than they could have mattered in former times. "As long as Germany was an imperialistic country, striving for power and expansion, boundary questions were of prodigious importance. . . . From the standpoint of a system of politics higher than the old, its geographical situation is not the factor decisively important for a country, but something entirely different, namely its cultural accomplishments and its common work with others. Whether Germany as a State is somewhat greater or smaller does not matter so very much." Furthermore, the treaty has righted certain old wrongs, such as the partition of Poland. In general, according to Stillich, the baseness of Germany's enemies is not primarily responsible for the treaty, but those are responsible who brought the war on, gloried in it, justified such acts as the invasion of Belgium, and helped to prolong hostilities.[1]

Stillish in no wise maintains that the treaty is a just one; he simply attempts to place it in its proper perspective. Not every German teacher or textbook writer can rise to Stillich's broad-minded spirit of objectivity, but at least he can approach it. The alternative (an alternative all too prevalently adopted in the new texts) is the treatment of the treaty in a manner resentful and bitter—a treatment which, if it does not actually inculcate *revanche* in German youth, certainly tends to inspire it. In the discussion of no subject more than of the Treaty of Versailles is

[1] *Katechismus*, pp. 11, 15, 18, 19, 83, 94.

instruction in the spirit of Article 148 of the Weimar Constitution of crucial importance.

The United States in the German Textbooks.

The United States fares much better at the hands of the German textbook writers than do France, England and Russia. This is to be expected. As between France and the United States, so between Germany and the United States, there has existed a long tradition of friendship. The German, von Steuben, gave the Americans aid during the Revolution. If the hated Hessians were on the other side, indignation has been stronger against the British for employing them than against Germany for giving them birth. Germans emigrated to the new world in large numbers, were easily assimilated for the most part, were well liked, and contributed much to the development of the United States. American students flocked to the German universities to sit at the feet of German professors. . Travel in Germany was popular with tourists from the United States ; and the Hofbraühaus in Munich was the Mecca of many a thirsty American. This long tradition of amity was broken only by the Great War. Such criticism as there is of America, therefore, centres chiefly around her part in the Great War and the Versailles Peace. Even so, it is more personal criticism of President Wilson than general criticism of America and Americans.

Of the causes for the entrance of the United States into the Great War, the one direct, clearly established reason is America's clash with Germany's submarine policy. Certain German textbook writers clearly recognize this. Neubauer, in his widely used history, simply says that President Wilson declared war on

account of the unrestricted U-boat warfare.[1] He does not criticize America's decision. Kumsteller and his colleagues specify the same cause, but add that President Wilson had been negotiating with Bethmann-Hollweg for a general peace, and felt himself deceived when the chancellor yielded to von Tirpitz's demand for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare.[2] Such statements are reasonable, untainted with nationalism.

These simple explanations of American reasons for participation in the conflict, however, do not suffice the authors of other school manuals. President Wilson had shown himself hostile to the German Empire from the beginning of the war, according to the authors of one text; and they add that war was declared only after America had been sufficiently worked up to it.[3] Kraffzick calls the resumption of submarine warfare a "vile pretext" for America's entrance.[4] Another writer says that a victory of the Central Powers would have menaced the great debt which the Entente had contracted in the United States. The financial interests therefore made up their minds to avert such a result. President Wilson was merely a tool in their hands, and the passions of the peace-loving people were stirred up against the German Emperor. The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare furnished a welcome pretext for a declaration of war which had long been planned.[5]

Brettschneider lists five "true" causes for the entrance of the United States into the war:

[1] Neubauer, *Grundzüge der Geschichte*, Teil I, Bändchen 2, p. 69; ibid., Teil V, p. 73.
[2] Kumsteller, Haacke und Schneider, *Geschichtsbuch*, p. 263.
[3] Kahnmeyer und Schulze, *Realienbuch*, ii (*Der Weltkrieg*), p. 23.
[4] *Lehrbuch*, pp. 92–3.
[5] Weller, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte*, Teil V, p. 223.

1. The profits to American industry from the sale of munitions.
2. The heavy indebtedness of England and France to America.
3. The close relationship between the Anglo-Saxon peoples.
4. The exaggerated national feeling of a young country, which felt itself called upon to guard the rights of nations and international peace.
5. The ignorance of the American people and of their leading statesmen in regard to European relations.[1]

It is not our purpose to discuss in detail these alleged reasons for American participation in the war. A full, scholarly account of the causes for the entrance of the United States remains to be written. But as regards the antipathy of President Wilson to the German Empire, the pressure of financial interests to prevent the loss of Allied debts to Americans, the influence of profit-making from the sale of munitions, it can be definitely affirmed that none of these is a proved cause of American participation. Such explanations belong, not to the field of sober history, but to that of conjecture. But taught in the schools as sober history, swallowed whole by many a German youth, they inevitably militate against good relations between Germany and the United States.

Comment on President Wilson at the Peace Conference is partly favourable, partly unfavourable. According to Neubauer, Mr. Wilson, "in vain pride, thought of himself as an apostle of world peace," but he did not possess the necessary knowledge of affairs nor sufficient political ability nor character,

[1] Brettschneider, *Hilfsbuch*, Teil III, p. 120.

so he finally gave in to Clemenceau, and set his name to a document whose provisions contrast sharply with the principles he had proclaimed.[1] According to another text, President Wilson was in a difficult position. "Often enough he threatened to return home. But finally Clemenceau and Lloyd George wrested his fourteen points from him, one after the other."[2] Weller comments on the anti-German aims of Clemenceau and Lloyd George. "Only Wilson," he says, "wished to carry out his fourteen points," but by reason of his lack of knowledge of European affairs could not do so.[3] On the whole the German textbook point of view, where it is not distinctly "anti-Wilson," seems to be that the American President meant well, but that because of inefficiency or unfamiliarity with European affairs he was, as Mr. Keynes once delicately expressed it, bamboozled.

In general, however, very little is said in the texts about the relation of the United States to the Great War. Very little is said about that country, in any case. A *Realienbuch* for the *Volksschulen*, which in 1922 had reached its 312th edition, contains, among other material, 236 pages of history. In all this there is perhaps a total of half a page relating to the United States: a few references to her part in the Great War, and a brief mention of the Germans in America. In the same book there are 152 pages of geography. About four of these treat of the United States, and are illustrated with pictures of Brooklyn Bridge and cotton-picking in the South.[4] Furthermore, the present writer was informed by a teacher in Leipzig that on account of crowded programmes, material

[1] Neubauer, *Grundzüge*, Teil V, p. 78.
[2] Kumsteller, Haacke und Schneider, *Geschichtsbuch*, p. 277.
[3] Weller, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte*, Teil V, p. 223.
[4] Kahnmeyer und Schulze, *Realienbuch*.

relating to foreign countries is often further reduced in actual instruction. Perforce the child leaves the *Volksschule* with very, very little knowledge of a country which, for weal or woe, is playing a highly significant part in the making of world commerce and world history.

As far as the United States interests these writers of textbooks at all, it interests them largely as a land to which Germans have emigrated, and in whose development Germans have played an important part. As such it exercises for some a certain romantic attraction. One school reader, for example, carries a selection by Sven Hedin, telling of the arrival in America of an immigrant boy. New York is vividly described, with its big buildings, Brooklyn Bridge, Central Park, and Fifth Avenue, with its houses of millionaires and billionaires. A spirit of wonder at American achievement breathes through this little narrative.[1] Kahnmeyer and Schulze point out that every year the Germans of North America celebrate "German Day" in honour of the first German settlers, who established themselves near Philadelphia, October 6, 1683. Of the German immigrants to America, some came to the land of freedom to escape religious or political persecution, others for economic reasons, others through love of adventure.[2] Germans are urged not to forget their native tongue in foreign lands.[3] There are about eleven million German-Americans in

[1] Daub, *Nordwest-deutsches Lesebuch*, Teil I, pp. 215–21.

[2] *Realienbuch*, II (*Der Weltkrieg*), p. 40.

[3] Hofstaetter, Neumann und Berthold, *Wagen und Wirken*, Teil V, p. 174 (quoting Felix Dahn):

"Die Sprache Shakespeares trägt der Brite
Ich lob' ihm drum! wie seine Sitte
Getreu in fremder Lande Mitte
Und Schiller soll vergessen sein?
Ihr Deutschen Männer, rufet 'Nein.'"

the United States, says von Seydlitz, and perhaps thirty million people of German extraction.[1] In another book the statement is made that in more than half of the people of the United States flows German blood![2]

Neubauer tells the story of the American Revolution, under the leadership of George Washington, "a man of faultless honour and disinterested character."[3] Unfortunately, however, "the troops of the revolutionaries were lacking, above all, in training and discipline." To their rescue came "a former Prussian officer, von Steuben, who "won great merit in their army."[4] No mention is made of Lafayette. Another writer claims that out of seventy-two persons who signed the first Declaration of Independence forty-eight were Germans.[5] After the Treaty of 1783, says Neubauer, "the new State, with which Frederick the Great concluded a treaty of friendship, received the form of a Federal Republic."[6]

What the Germans have done for the United States is summed up by Tischendorf, the author of a geographical manual. Among other points he brings out that the Niagara Falls Bridge and the Brooklyn Bridge were constructed by Germans. German scholars, he says, have given to American education, especially to American universities, a tremendous stimulus. German architecture and German painting have left enduring and valuable examples in all the great cities of the United States. "In short, the Germans, through German activity and German know-

[1] *Geographie für höhere Lehranstalten*, Heft 3, p. 87.
[2] Daub, *Nordwest-Lesebuch*, Teil IV, p. 285.
[3] *Grundzüge der Geschichte*, Teil IV, p. 37.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Daub, op. cit., Teil IV, p. 285.
[6] *Grundzüge*, etc., Teil IV, p. 38.

ledge, German faithfulness, German thoroughness, German thrift and German devotion to duty, have contributed immeasurably much to raise the Union to the proud height on which it now stands." But, alas! the influence of German-Americans in American public life is but slight, he continues. They do not hold together. Many Anglicize themselves, deny their origin, change their names, use only the English language and adopt English manners and customs.[1] One gathers the impression from this writer that while the Anglo-Saxons may have rendered some slight assistance, the real builders of the American structure hailed from the "Fatherland." One weakness of these German-Americans he admits: a willingness to be assimilated.

The treatment of the United States in the German texts furnishes but one more example of the influence of the cult of nationalism in education. There is little criticism of Americans as Americans. One writer does indeed say: "They say of the Yankee that he is crafty, persevering and very fond of gain, and that he places 'business' before all else."[2] But there is less of this sort of general criticism of Americans than one finds scattered here and there in some of the French texts. As far as the United States is concerned the nationalism of the German texts reveals itself chiefly in three ways: (1) in criticisms of that country for its part in the war and the peace treaties, though even here criticism is generally much more mild than is criticism of France and England; (2) in the tendency to over-emphasize and exalt the part played by Germans in the development of the United States; and

[1] Tischendorf, *Hilfsbücher für den geographischen Unterricht*, Teil V; *Die Aussereuropäischen Erdteile*, pp. 118–19.

[2] Hüffner und Mattes, *Badisches Realienbuch*, Teil II, p. 43.

(3) in the very, very scanty amount of space devoted to American history, American geography and American institutions.

Some Influences Making for Peace.

A writer in the *Enquête* of the Dotation Carnegie has said: "It is therefore certain that at this very hour, from Cologne to Königsberg, all the younger generation is being impelled toward *revanche*." [1]

The assertion is an exaggeration. In the first place it is one thing to mourn "lost provinces," to complain bitterly of Germany's treatment at the hands of other countries, to find these responsible for the wars in which Germany has fought; it is quite another to inculcate *revanche*, to preach a new war for the recovery of lost territory. Admittedly there is a tendency in certain texts to awaken a sentiment of *revanche*, but direct incitement to it has certainly not been shown to be general. The evidence set forth by the Dotation Carnegie is far from sustaining the indictment it makes. The nationalism of the German textbooks is bad enough without painting it blacker than it really is.

In the second place there are distinct movements among German students and teachers looking toward world peace. One of these, the *Jugendbewegung*, or Youth Movement, holds forth gladdening possibilities of a regeneration of German, even of European, civilization. Beginning some ten years before the war, near Berlin, under the leadership of Karl Fischer, it spread spontaneously and rapidly among the young men and women, the boys and girls of Germany. Essentially it is a revolt of youth against the materialism

[1] Page 9.

and decadence of modern life. It links itself with none of the great political and social movements of its elders. It is not "socialist or anti-socialist, it is not pacifist or military, it is not Christian or anti-Christian. It is the effort of youth to think for itself, to get away from the whole atmosphere of modern society and make a fresh start." [1] All over Germany the traveller sees these young people, of both sexes, in "sport" clothes, with knapsacks and musical instruments, marching, playing, singing; and if he is not thrilled as he hears their joyous song, there is something dead in his own soul. The Youth Movement harks back to poetry and folk-lore, to happy contact with Nature, to simplicity of life, to primitive Christian virtues. If it refuses to associate itself with pacifism as such, it nevertheless makes for conciliation among the nations through its ardent belief in the brotherhood of man and the sincerity of its idealism. True, the movement has had its excesses, and it has lost something of its early spontaneity. Nationalists and others, witnessing its success, have begun the regimentation of youth for their own purposes. But none of these things can rob the *Jugendbewegung* of its mystical vitality.

Among the teachers, the outstanding group working for world peace is the Bund Entschiedener Schulreformer. Professor Oestreich, the leader of this organization, says that the "Bund" is an organization of German pacifist teachers, and that it numbers between 5,000 and 6,000 members.[2] It has sponsored a number of publications calling for school reform, and issues a review known as *Die Neue Erzielung*

[1] Booth, "The German Youth Movement," *Hibbert Journal*, April 1924, p. 470.

[2] In a letter to the present writer.

which is thoroughly permeated with the spirit of internationalism in education. In the number for October 1924, for example, there are articles on the international idea in the teaching of history on "Die Welt als Heimat" by Professor Oestreich and on "Weltgefühl" by E. Goldbeck. In the same number a writer criticizes the latest *Lehrplan* for the *Volksschulen* of Berlin for its narrowness in providing that "the history of other peoples is to be taken into consideration only so far as through it German history has been decisively influenced." "Where," asks the author, "rests the responsibility for world history?" [1]

At the present time, however, courageously as the Bund is working for peace, its influence does not appear to be very strong.[2] Pacifism seems to be making little headway among the teachers as a whole. A review looking toward international peace through education, which was started by a prominent intellectual leader, died out after a few numbers had been issued. A school teacher of pacifist sympathies, in a letter to the present writer, points out one great positive gain in education since the war: the expurgation from school books of passages tending toward *revanche*. He also says that examples of pacifist sentiment are to be found in certain texts; but in the avalanche of new school books which has deluged Germany since the war, not one breathes a pronounced pacifist spirit. He adds that no one has brought together these fragments of pacifist sentiment in a book, and that if anyone did so he would find no publisher who would consent to print them, no State Government which

[1] Feuerstack, "Gedanken zu den neuen Richtlinien und dem Lehrplan für die Berliner Volksschulen," *Die Neue Erziehung*, Oktoberheft, 1924.

[2] This opinion was expressed by a prominent German professor very sympathetic with Professor Oestreich and the Bund.

would permit their introduction into actual instruction in the schools. He concludes by requesting that if any use be made of his letter publicly his name be omitted, "for a process for high treason is easily set on foot in Germany." [1]

Evidence indicates that the vast majority of university professors and secondary school teachers in Germany are reactionary. Dr. Roman says that "at least four-fifths of all the university professors and the teachers in the higher schools of Prussia are in favour of the restoration of the Hohenzollern or some form of constitutional monarchy." [2] A university professor of liberal sympathies, in a conversation with the present writer, said that in his own university perhaps 75 per cent. of the teaching staff were nationalists and reactionaries. "But the secondary school teachers are the worst," he added. "They are overwhelmingly reactionary." In spite of all this gloomy evidence of narrow nationalism in the teaching profession, however, there runs among the elementary school teachers a strong current of republican feeling and internationalism. Dr. Roman bears witness to this,[3] and says that he found many teachers in Germany working honestly for world peace, opposing the teaching of hatred among the nations.[4] Furthermore, it ought not to be forgotten that the present is not necessarily definitive, that the stone which the builders reject to-day may to-morrow become the headstone of the corner. So if the school reformers courageously persist in their work, they may yet live to see their

[1] See Appendix I.

[2] Op. cit., p. 195.

[3] Ibid. The university professor to whom reference has been made above confirmed Dr. Roman's statement. In a letter to the present writer a German teacher says that, with rare exceptions, the elementary school teachers are strongly anti-monarchical.

[4] Ibid., p. 201.

influence radiate far beyond its present limits. But the movement among the teachers against the inculcation of narrow nationalism seems at present to be weaker in Germany than it is in France.

General Conclusions.

It is clear from what has been said that as in France, so in Germany, hearts and minds of children are being stirred to bitterness toward quondam enemies. It is an exaggeration, it is true, to say that "from Cologne to Königsberg all the younger generation is being urged toward *revanche*." Among the manuals, a few, at any rate, are written in the spirit of international solidarity. Individual teachers, especially in the elementary schools, are working, inside and outside the class-room, for the reconciliation of peoples and the peace of the world; and of the direct incitement to *revanche* one finds little evidence in the textbooks.

Nevertheless, the authors of many German school books are gravely culpable. They foster hostility to France. They foster hostility to England. They make it appear that Germany was the object of unprovoked attack in 1870 and again in 1914. They fail to condemn Bismarck's policy of blood and iron and the chauvinistic spirit in Germany that grew out of that policy. They criticize the imperialism of France, England and Russia; that of Germany they justify or even praise. They falsely represent the Great War as originating solely or chiefly in the machinations of the Allied Powers. The archives of Germany and Austria have been open for several years, yet these writers make little or no attempt to sift the evidence resulting from these revelations. They betray their high calling in violating the canons of historical

impartiality. Under the compulsion of Government decrees and official programmes, they teach next to nothing, in Prussia at any rate, of the history of other countries, except where it touches German history; and it touches German history chiefly through the story of wars. Some writers go further, and actually laud the Government which republican Germany is supposed to have repudiated, thus lending their aid to civil strife.

In all this these writers of textbooks, and the teachers who follow them, are incurring a heavy responsibility. In keeping alive in the new generation old antagonisms they necessarily arouse in other countries suspicions of Germany's good faith; and these other countries are still in a position to make Germany suffer for real or apparent lack of good faith. These writers and teachers are doing their part to bring on a new conflict. It has been said that the Prussian schoolmaster won at Sedan, but it may have been the Prussian schoolmaster who lost at Spa; and even now he may be preparing the way for even greater misfortunes to his Fatherland.

CHAPTER VIII

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN BRITISH EDUCATION

No intelligent foreigner can visit England for any length of time without realizing how strong and vital is the British tradition of freedom. Hyde Park, in London, on a Sunday afternoon is typical of it. This big green space in the heart of London is one of the greatest open forums in the world. In one corner a soap-box atheist denounces Christianity and fulminates against the supposition of a soul in man. Near him a cowled monk bears fervent witness to the truth of Catholicism's venerable creed. Here a Communist, reddest of the red, upholds the rule of the proletariat. There a British Fascist denounces Communism, calling for loyalty to the existing Government. Hecklers vie with orators for the crowd's attention, while the good-natured London policeman looks on, ready to interfere only in case of actual disorder or infraction of the laws of trespass.

This strong and wholesome tradition of freedom prevails in education. The hand of the British Government rests lightly on the school. A certain amount of authority, it is true, is centralized in the Board of Education, which is composed of the Minister of Education, five Secretaries of State, the Commissioner of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Local educational authorities are expected

to conform to the Education Acts of Parliament and to the Educational Codes issued from time to time by the Board. The curriculum and time-table of each school must be approved by the Board, which maintains also a system of school inspection. Its authority over the schools, however, is not that of direct compulsion, but is derived chiefly from its right to disburse the parliamentary grants in aid of education. If a school fails to conform to the requirements of the Board, its grant may be withheld by that body. Naturally the schools conform, and a certain uniformity in education is thereby maintained.

This uniformity, however, is of the broadest character. In the matter of the curriculum, for example, liberty is permitted within the very widest limits. The codes for both the elementary and secondary schools outline the curriculum only in the most general way. They give nothing like the specific instructions that one finds in the French programmes or in the Prussian *Richtlinien*. Similarly the tendency of the local authorities is to permit the greatest latitude. "The foreigner, on arriving at any of the English elementary schools," says Dr. Roman, "asks to see the curriculum. He expects to be handed a booklet which contains the course of study for all the schools in the city. Instead he is referred to a poster on the wall, which represents the curriculum and time-table for that particular school; there may be no other like it anywhere. The same freedom obtains in a great measure regarding the selection of texts and methods of teaching." [1]

Similarly the Board of Education concerns itself little with the inculcation of patriotism. In the regulations for secondary schools the question of teaching

[1] *The New Education in Europe*, pp. 31–2.

patriotism is not even mentioned.[1] In the elementary school code it is touched but casually. Provision is, indeed, made that certain virtues ought to be emphasized in connection with moral instruction, among which virtues is love of country. But moral instruction is not necessarily given as a separate course as in France, but may be "incidental, occasional, and given as fitting opportunity arises in the ordinary routine of lessons."[2]

Again, in the Suggestions issued by the Board for the guidance of teachers, it is pointed out that "in his lessons on such subjects as literature and history" the teacher "can bring home to the children by numerous examples the worth of courage, loyalty, patriotism, public spirit, indeed of all the qualities which make for good citizenship."[3] But there is nothing compulsory, of course, in these suggestions.

All this is of vital significance. Generally speaking, within broad limits the individual school is left free to inculcate patriotism or not as it chooses. Societies of patriotic bent, textbook writers emphasizing love of country, are free to interest the individual school and the individual teachers if they can. But there is no State-enforced cult of patriotism in England.

If there is no State cult, however, there is a very real emphasis on patriotism in British education. Shortly after the war the British Association for the Advancement of Science made a report on "Training in Citizenship," which embodies many recommendations on this subject. A syllabus prepared by a

[1] Board of Education, *Regulations for Secondary Schools*, England, 1922.

[2] Board of Education, *Elementary Education Provisional Code*, 1922, pp. 10–13.

[3] Board of Education, *Suggestions for the Consideration of Teachers*, p. 7.

committee of the association illustrates the character of these recommendations. Section XII, for example, under the title "National Defence," includes among other topics the following:

"The Experience of the Great War."
"No Nation safe against unscrupulous aggression unless it is able to defend itself."
"Recent and rapid development of aviation. Command of the air even more important than command of the sea."
"No nation secure so long as the nations of the world watch each other with jealous, unscrupulous eyes." [1]

Section 15 is entitled "Patriotism." *Inter alia* are given under this heading:

"The sentiment natural to civilized humanity."
"Spirit of service, sacrifice and sympathy."
"Children to learn at school patriotic poetry."
"Patriotism either true or false. Chauvinism and Jingoism forms of false patriotism."
"German patriotism before the war both aggressive and immoral, as taking no account of the rights or claims of other nations than Germany. Evil tradition of military power descending from Frederick the Great in Germany. Influence of modern historians, e.g. Treitschke."
"True patriotism recognizes an ascending scale of duties from family to city, from city to country, from country to humanity; as the interest of family must give way to that of city or country, so must the interest of city or country give way to that of humanity." [2]

In general the report recommends a patriotism which "fears God and keeps its powder dry," a reasonable and balanced patriotism, however, anti-Chauvinist in character, ready to subordinate the interests of

[1] *British Association for the Advancement of Science*, p. 12
[2] Ibid., p. 13.

country to the interests of humanity. Pre-war Germany provides the "awful example" of what patriotism ought not to be. The effect of this report on the schools cannot be accurately measured; but the very issuance of such a report by the highly honoured British Association indicates the importance attached by an influential body of public opinion in England to the teaching of patriotism.

In the textbooks a patriotic purpose often reveals itself in the praise accorded British achievement, especially in the glorification of heroic deeds of war. "A glance at the list of contents of this volume," says the editor of a school reader, "will show that the greater number of the prose selections are narratives of action, not a few of fights, or at least of heroic struggle against the forces of Nature. In these latter accounts the dogged courage and unfailing resourcefulness of our race are seen no less remarkably than in the stories of battles against the king's enemies." [1] So, too, Messrs. Buchan and Newbolt, in the Preface to their *Days to Remember*, a school book dealing with British heroism during the war, state that "it is not desirable that young minds should think too much about the war, for they should be looking forward; but it is even less desirable that they should forget it, for it is a thing for eternal remembrance and pride."

Martial poetry plays an important part in the inculcation of patriotism, and one finds much of it scattered through the pages of school readers.[2] Such poetry pays stirring tribute to soldiers and sailors, especially

[1] Wyld, H. C. (editor), *The New World Literary Series*, Book V, Preface, p. 7.

[2] *Blackie's New Systematic English Readers*, passim; *Highroads of Literature*, passim; *The Temple Literary Readers*, passim; *King Alfred Readers*, passim; etc

to sailors, as is natural in a nation whose strength is derived so largely from sea-power. One of the favourite poems is Campbell's "Ye Mariners of England":

> Ye Mariners of England!
> That guard our native seas;
> Whose flag has braved a thousand years,
> The battle and the breeze.[1]

So runs part of the first stanza.

A line of a poem entitled "Sons of Britain" runs:

> Our submarines are sharks of steel that prowl the waves below.

But patriotic fervour reaches its full height in the poem "Rule, Britannia," "a song which," says one textbook writer, "every English boy and girl ought to know by heart."[2]

> When Britain first at Heaven's command
> Arose from out the azure main,
> This was the charter of her land,
> And guardian angels sang the strain:
> Rule, Britannia! Britannia rule the waves!
> Britons never shall be slaves.

Thus runs the first verse; and the second begins:

> The nations not so blest as thee
> Must in their turn to tyrants fall,
> Whilst thou shalt flourish great and free,
> The dread and envy of them all.[3]

Much emphasis, too, is being laid in British education at the present time on loyalty to the British Empire as a whole. "Empire Day" is set aside to be observed by the children with appropriate

[1] Wyld, *The New World Literary Series*, Book VI, pp. 9–10.
[2] Ibid., Book V, Preface, p. 8.
[3] Ibid., Book V, pp. 15–16; *Chambers's Periodic Histories*, Book VI, pp. 290–1; etc.

ceremonies, though enthusiasm for it does not appear to be particularly strong in many schools, and observance sometimes falls into desuetude. "Think imperially!" urges the author of a geographical text.[1] "The British Empire," according to another school geography, "is a federation of equal partners joined by a common patriotism, a common loyalty, and the knowledge that all have made great sacrifices for the sake of the future peace of the Empire and the whole civilized world."[2] A text suggested in this same book reads:

> On an outline-map of the world insert the ten most important imperial cities in red. Sketch the probable entirely British airways connecting them and mark, in black, the necessary intermediate aerodromes.[3]

Many other examples of emphasis on the imperial idea might be cited.[4] The staid old British Association for the Advancement of Science rises to such enthusiasm in this matter that it asserts that "the British Empire is the greatest human institution under heaven, the greatest secular organization for good."[5]

This movement to encourage the interest of English school-children in the Empire is an outcome of one of the wisest of policies. The strongest ties that bind together the various parts of this great "Commonwealth of Nations" are not those of material interest, but those of a common good will. Nowhere has

[1] "*Far and Near*" *Geographical Series*, Book VI, p. 7.
[2] Wallis, *Macmillan's Graphic Geographies. The British Empire*, p. 31.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Berry, *Britannia's Growth and Greatness*, p. 3; L'Estrange, *Progressive Course of Comparative Geography*, p. 129; *Highroads of History*, Book VII, pp. 294–6; *Blackie's New Systematic English Readers*, The Fifth Reader, pp. 9–16; Bell, *The Way of History*, Book IV, p. 209; etc.
[5] *Report on "Training in Citizenship,"* Syllabus, p. 12.

England shown her skill in government more fully than in her ability to gain and hold the loyalty of her self-governing dominions. Nowhere has the British ideal of freedom more fully demonstrated its worth. The Great War weighed that loyalty in the balance and did not find it wanting. The more the rising generations of Englishmen can rid themselves of insularity, the more they can think in terms of imperial unity, the firmer will be the foundations on which the British Empire rests.

Many school readers and geographies, of course, make little or nothing of the teaching of patriotism. In those in which the patriotic motive is prominent it is not always easy to draw a distinct line between the inculcation of a reasonable, desirable love of country and a narrow nationalism. The one shades imperceptibly into the other. Thus the glorification of war for war's sake is certainly not the purpose of editors and compilers in including so many martial poems and prose selections in certain school readers. Their object is rather to interest the child in well-written poetry and prose, and to inculcate such virtues as courage, chivalry, unselfishness and devotion to fatherland. Yet the development of a bellicose spirit might easily be a resultant by-product of some of their efforts. Pedagogy has not yet discovered a "moral equivalent of war"; or if it has discovered, it has not made full use of it. Certainly a poem like "Rule, Britannia," is of the essence of "pooled self-esteem." And the dogma set forth by the British Association for the Advancement of Science that the British Empire is "the greatest human institution under heaven, the greatest secular organization for good," is not one that is likely to meet with unquestioned acceptance on the part of

unprejudiced supporters of the idea of international unity.

If a narrow nationalism makes itself evident at times in a too great glorification of heroic exploits, in an over-emphasis of Britain's part in the world, it appears also in places in a biased treatment of history. The influence of nationalism on the discussion of Anglo-French and Anglo-German relations in the past will be brought out later. Here this bias may be sufficiently illustrated by the treatment of a single incident: the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807. Compare the late Professor S. R. Gardiner's discussion of the affair with that of Mr. R. B. Mowat. Professor Gardiner gives the following fair-minded, critical account:

"At sea England was almost as high-handed as Napoleon by land. They searched neutral vessels for goods destined for France, confiscating them in accordance with decisions of their own Admiralty Court in a fashion which would not be tolerated now. Shortly after the Treaty of Tilsit, Canning learnt that Napoleon meant to seize the fleet of Denmark, *which was at that time neutral*, and to employ it against Great Britain. A British fleet and army were sent to Copenhagen, and *the Crown Prince of Denmark was asked to deliver up the Danish fleet on a promise that it should be restored at the end of the war. On his refusal, Copenhagen was bombarded* till at last the Danes gave way. The fleet was surrendered, and *the British Government*, on the plea that it had been driven to use force, *refused to be bound by its offer to restore the ships ultimately to their owners*. There were many in England who found fault with the whole proceeding, and even George III seems to have been very much of their opinion. Speaking to the gentle-

man who had carried to the Crown Prince the message asking him to give up the fleet, the old king asked whether he found the prince upstairs or downstairs. 'He was on the ground floor, please, Your Majesty,' was the reply. 'I am glad of it, for your sake,' said the king, 'for if he had half my spirit he would have kicked you downstairs!'" [1]

Professor Gardiner's attitude is clearly one of frank disapproval of the whole proceeding. Mr. Mowat, on the other hand, says:

"The news of this swift act of the British Government staggered Napoleon, and upset all his plans for bringing England to bay—the seizure of the Danish fleet, in fact, destroyed the whole Tilsit scheme, and robbed France of the fruits of her sacrifices and Russia of the fruits of her perfidy. The memory of Canning's stroke has remained an inspiration for British statesmen and a cause of uneasiness to foreign schemers. That is what the German Emperor, William II, meant a hundred years later, when he told Admiral Sir John Fisher that he suspected the British Admiralty of meaning to Copenhagen the German fleet." [2]

A more barefaced defence of the doctrine that the end justifies the means it would be difficult to imagine. Does its incorporation in a textbook mean that English children are to be taught that a breach of international law is "an inspiration for British statesmen"?

But one must beware of making too much of the nationalism of the textbooks. Not only are there many texts, as has been said, which concern themselves little or not at all with patriotic aims, but frank criticism of British policy does not hesitate to assert

[1] *Student's History of England*, pp. 860–2. (The Italics are mine.)
[2] *History of Great Britain*, Section 3, p. 575.

itself,[1] and now and again a warning word is uttered against a patriotism too boastful or aggressive. Mr. Kenneth Bell, in his *Way of History*, has ably exemplified the writing of history in a manner at once patriotic yet moderate, fair-minded and tolerant. In speaking of Nelson's attack on the Danish fleet in 1801, under circumstances somewhat similar to those of the incident of 1807, he says: "It certainly was unworthy of the best traditions of the British Navy to attack the fleet of a neutral Power."[2] And of one of England's wars against China he says that "it was very doubtful whether the British had a good case against the Chinese at the beginning of the war."[3]

Against narrow nationalism the author of one of the *King Alfred Readers* cautions in commenting on Shakespeare. "No one," he says of Shakespeare, "can stir in us stronger enthusiasm, no one gives more powerful reasons for loving our own England, no one warns us more strongly against false patriotism and idle boastfulness than does Shakespeare." The lesson is always a noble one—

> Nought shall make us rue
> If England to herself do rest but true.[4]

The sum of the whole matter is that there is room in the British school system both for the boastful nationalist and for the frank critic of his country's characteristics and policies. As an education official expressed it to the present writer: "We feel that a teacher's attitude on these questions is his own business."

[1] Especially in their discussion of the American Revolution, as will be shown later.
[2] *The Way of History*, Book III, p. 150.
[3] Ibid., Book IV, p. 160.
[4] *King Alfred Readers*, Book VII, p. 90.

If there is room in British education for nationalism and for national self-criticism, there is room also for the development of the ideal of international unity. To foster it in the schools is one of the objects of such societies as the League of Nations Union, the International Council of Women, etc. "More and more teaching in the senior classes of our schools," said a speaker at a meeting of the International Council of Women, "is based upon a world-wide outlook, and the view is taken that one function of history is to give the child some idea of the successive civilizations of the world, together with more definite information of the development and growth of his own country." [1]

The British Association for the Advancement of Science, in its *Report on "Training in Citizenship,"* to which reference has been made, makes strong recommendations in the direction of international brotherhood. Its syllabus on citizenship training suggests, *inter alia*, the following topics for consideration:

1. Under Section 3, Citizenship—

"Common prejudices to be guarded against—national—depreciation of members of other nations and races." [2]

2. Under Section 12, National Defence—

"No monarch or Government to make war without the consent of the people." [3]

3. Under Section 15, Patriotism—

"The League of Nations the supreme instrument for moralizing international life." [4]

[1] International Council of Women, *The Prevention of the Causes of War*, p. 64 (address by Mr. Sainsbury).
[2] *Report on "Training in Citizenship,"* p. 7.
[3] Ibid., p. 12.
[4] Ibid., p. 13.

4. Under Section 17, International Relations—

"Nations have historically regarded each other as enemies but they are really friends. Their interests are reciprocal, if not identical.

"The League of Nations an attempt to bring the moral senses of civilized humanity to bear upon one offending nation.

"Owing to facility of communication the world becoming one family." [1]

Encouragement of knowledge of the League of Nations, and loyalty to it, is playing an increasingly important part in the education of young Britons. In hundreds of schools, for example, special lectures have been given by authorities on the subject. The Association of Assistant Masters in Secondary Schools passed a resolution :

That the League of Nations is of such great importance for the protection of peace and justice between nations that it deserves the whole-hearted support of the people of this country, and that therefore this association pledges itself to support the League of Nations Union and to further its work in every possible way.

And a similar resolution was passed by the corresponding Association of women. The National Union of Teachers gave up a whole session at one of its annual conferences to a discussion of the League in its relation to education. The Local Education Authorities, too, are doing what they can to strengthen interest in it among teachers and pupils, and individual schools are making various experiments with the same end in view.[2]

The reception accorded the League of Nations in the textbooks published since the war, however, varies

[1] *Report on "Training in Citizenship,"* pp. 14–15.

[2] League of Nations Union, *Teachers and World Peace*, passim.

with the individual author. In none of the books that I have examined is the League denounced, but in some it is received with scepticism. "The League of Nations, devised at the instance of President Wilson and supported by Great Britain," comments Woodward, "is as yet an uncertain factor in the world-settlement."[1] Another writer says of it: "It is enough to say that many statesmen and communities still doubt the practicability of the whole scheme, and that, unless the League's decisions are backed, not by statesmen only, but by the public opinion which these represent, then clearly means will lack of compelling their acceptance, and the nations must inevitably resort once more to the suicidal alternative of war." After speaking of the establishment of the machinery of the League, he points out that "before many months were out, its decisions (were) flouted by the irresponsible antics of an elderly Italian poet!"[2]

A larger number of textbook writers, however, greet the League with favour, and some with fervour. "The League of Nations is seeking to liberate mankind 'from the cruel thraldom of war,'" says the author of a school history.[3] "The League is well equipped for its grand work," says another, "and has always endeavoured to handle with fairness and prudence any question referred to it, although it has not always been able to bring about a settlement."[4] "The League of Nations is the child of this great war for right," says a third. "Any nation which declines to adhere to this Covenant deliberately turns away from the most telling appeal ever made to its con-

[1] *Outline History of the British Empire*, p. 246.
[2] Robinson, *History of England*, Book IV, pp. 325–6.
[3] Guest, *Outlines of British History*, p. 234.
[4] Mowat, *European History*, 1878–1923, p. 124.

science and its manhood." [1] And a fourth says that " the founding of the League of Nations has been called the ' Greatest event since Christ.' " [2]

That the League needs the reinforcement of a strong, sympathetic public opinion to make it effective is pointed out in two of the texts that I have examined. " Each one of us," according to one of these, " must try to understand the ways and needs of other nations, to cultivate international sympathy and brotherhood, and to create a well-informed public opinion without which a League of Nations must perish in times of great crisis." [3] The authors of the other, emphasizing the part the school must play in the development of the international ideal, write as follows :

" We learned many things in the Great War that we shall hand on to the children of the future. Most of us are ready to say with valiant Edith Cavell, ' Patriotism is not enough.' Facing the life to come, she felt the need of a greater love than that, and the aftermath of war has driven home to us her dying words.

" During the next half-century the teachers of Great Britain may make a new army of heroes, not only willing to give all for their own country, but ready to live or die as friends of mankind. Perhaps more than we care to acknowledge, the future of the League of Nations is in the hands of the teachers of the great mass of our boys and girls." [4]

If an interest in the development of an international spirit reveals itself directly in such expressions of

[1] Nisbet's History Class Books, *History of England, Modern Times*, p. 125.
[2] Lay, *The English People*, p. 196.
[3] Nisbet's History Class Books, *History of England, Modern Times*, p. 125.
[4] Cox and Whimster, *The Way of Friendship*, Foreword.

opinion as those just quoted, it reveals itself indirectly in many school geographies and geographical readers. These books are a delight to the eye and a feast for the child's mind. The readers are often written in story form, and are bountifully illustrated, frequently with beautiful illustrations in colour. These books can hardly help but awaken in the mind of the child, a romantic interest in other lands. From this interest a spirit of sympathy will easily develop and a feeling of friendliness for other countries and peoples. "Geography," says Professor Roxby, "can engender precisely that attitude of mind and outlook on life which will have to become far commoner than at present if the democracies of the world are to learn the difficult art of collective living and if the ideas underlying the League of Nations are to be translated into realities." [1]

Take it all in all, there are probably few more fertile fields for the germination and growth of the international ideal than England. In the first place, that ideal will flourish best in an atmosphere of freedom and frankness, such as prevails in that country. There one may stand up fearlessly for any creed. In the next place, England is a "satiated State." She has no thirst for colonies, as Germany had before the Great War, no stinging sense of loss as Germany has to-day. Her territorial ambitions gratified, she wants no disturbance of international peace. In the third place, her isolation makes for the growth of sentiment for peace. She is far less subject than the great Powers of the Continent to the nationalist alarms and fears that make for war—though, of course, the development of aviation may, in time, work havoc with that isolation. Finally, her economic interests, more

[1] Winchester, *The Teaching of Geography to Children*, Preface by Professor Roxby.

than those of any other country, demand the comity of nations. If her close-packed population is to live, she simply must buy and sell abroad in large quantities. Tranquil markets are her very life-blood. For reasons such as these, her schools may in future become the greatest breeding-grounds in the world for the sentiment of international unity. Already there is one flourishing school—at Bembridge, in the Isle of Wight—one of whose chief purposes is that of developing in its pupils that very feeling.

There is, however, one important force militating against the success of internationalism in British education: the Briton's belief in the essential rightness of the British Empire, his tendency to identify the welfare of the Empire with the welfare of humanity. It was this belief that once led one of the most honoured of British statesmen to justify the opium traffic on the ground that it was desirable for the welfare of the British Empire. It is this belief that leads the British Association for the Advancement of Science to speak of the Empire as "the greatest human institution under heaven, the greatest secular organization for good." It was firm faith in this theory that led Lord Curzon to dedicate his *Problems of the Far East* "to those who believe that the British Empire is, under Providence, the greatest instrument for good that the world has ever seen, and who hold with the writer that its work in the Far East is not yet accomplished."

"Where, in the history of mankind," says Price Collier, commenting on this dedication, "may one look to find such a magnificent assumption of virtue and omniscience, coupled with incomparable self-satisfaction? It makes one fearful for the destinies of the race when one sees it proclaim itself thus arrogant.

Here is a haughty egotism that would make Alexander, Cæsar, or Napoleon turn pale. Who believes that the world is better where England dominates? The English. Who believes that India is happier? The English. Who believes that the East under English protection is happier? The English. Who believes that North America is happier? The English. But what do the four hundred millions of people, controlled by these million English gentlemen whose omniscient prophet Lord Curzon is—what do they think? What do they say?" [1]

To train English boys to a belief in the essential rightness of the British Empire may seem harmless enough in normal times. But if ever the apparent welfare of the Empire should come seriously in conflict, as it well might, with the true interests of humanity, the danger to world peace will have been distinctly aggravated by such preachings and such teachings. It will not be easy, at that time, for persons trained blindly to this belief to see the situation clearly or to act for humanity's best interests. Not every British boy, of course, is being brought up in all the fullness of Lord Curzon's faith. But the tendency to identify the good of the world with the good of the Empire is widespread. John Bull cannot do his best for enduring peace as long as so many of his sons and daughters cling to this dogma.

[1] *England and the English*, pp. 74–5.

CHAPTER IX

FRANCE IN THE BRITISH TEXTBOOKS

HATRED of Englishmen for Frenchmen is traditional. "Our great national hero, Nelson," says Mr. H. W. Nevinson, "writes in one of his letters, 'The very name of Frenchman makes my blood boil. My first rule to my midshipmen is that they shall hate every Frenchman, whether Royalist, Republican, or nothing at all—they shall hate every Frenchman as they hate the devil.'" [1] To test whether such prejudice against Frenchmen persists in English education, let us see (1) what the historical textbook writers have to say about some of the wars in which Englishmen and Frenchmen have fought, and (2) what sort of opinions of France and of Frenchmen are expressed in school geographies and readers.

Regarding the causes of the Hundred Years' War, the usual interpretation of the English textbook writers is decidedly different from that of the French. The French writers emphasize the ambitions of Edward III of England, stressing his aggressive aims, pointing out that his claim to the French throne was a mere pretext for conquest. Of the aid that the French king was giving the Scots, who were at war with the English, of the encroachments of the French king on the English possessions in France, the authors of

[1] Whitehouse and Gooch, *Wider Aspects of Education*, Introduction by H. W. Nevinson, p. vi. (Mr. Nevinson quotes from memory.)

those French textbooks that I have examined say nothing.

Yet these latter are precisely the points that certain English writers of textbooks emphasize.[1] Thus the author of a book in the series *Highroads of History* says: "The French kings cast longing eyes on the fair lands which still remained in the hands of the English, and constantly strove to win them back. They kept nibbling at the frontier, and by the time Edward III came to the throne they had seized a number of towns, which they refused to give up. This was the chief cause of the long struggle known in history as the Hundred Years' War."[2] Professor Prothero gives four principal causes of the war: (1) The French encroachments on Gascony; (2) the alliance between France and Scotland, resulting in French aid to the Scots; (3) the desire of the English king to secure alliance with the Flemings, "who, being great weavers of cloth, were good customers of the English wool merchants"; and (4) the rivalry between England and France for the command of the Channel. "But," he concludes, "the independence of Flanders and the command of the Channel were only minor causes of the war. The chief reasons for it were Edward's desire to keep hold of Gascony and his wish to prevent the French from sending aid to the Scots."[3]

There is, however, a certain amount of frank criticism of Edward and the English for their part in causing the war. While some writers make no comment on the question of the validity of Edward's

[1] Chambers's *Periodic Histories*, Book VII, p. 124; Tout, *History of Great Britain*, pp. 140–2; *Highroads of History*, pp. 179–80; Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, etc., p. 125.

[2] *Highroads of History*, Book IV, pp. 179–80.

[3] Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, p. 125.

claim to the French throne,[1] others outspokenly call it a pretext.[2] "As usual," says one writer, "most people believed exactly what they wished to believe. In these enlightened days, however, when we look at the matter calmly and without prejudice, we, as fair-minded Englishmen, must admit that Edward's title was a very flimsy one." [3] "It is possible that he may have believed in his claim," writes the author of one of the books in that objectively written series, *The Way of History*, "but it is more likely that he merely knew his kingdom was rich and strong, and hoped to make himself still more powerful by means of a successful war." [4] Arnold Forster sums up the whole question of the causes of the war by saying: "It matters little nowadays what were the rights or the wrongs of the quarrel. Both sides were ready for the fight, and if one excuse had not been enough, they would soon have found another." [5]

Clearly the English historical texts, in interpreting the causes of the Hundred Years' War, present no uniform front of nationalism. Yet there is a nationalistic bias in certain of them, of which their authors are probably unconscious. These texts stress the provocations under which Edward III laboured: French encroachments on Gascony, French aid to the Scots, French attempts to crush the Flemings. But they make little or nothing of the ambitious motives of Edward in undertaking what was primarily a war of conquest. In other texts, however, the treatment

[1] *Highways of History*, Book IV; Newman, *Beginners' Modern History*.

[2] Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, p. 125; *Chambers's Periodic Histories*, Book VII, p. 125; Tout, op. cit., p. 142; Bell, *The Way of History*, Book I, pp. 128–129.

[3] *Chambers's Periodic Histories*, Book VII, p. 125.

[4] Bell, *The Way of History*, Book I, pp. 128–9.

[5] *History of England*, p. 211.

of this ancient struggle between England and France reveals no nationalistic emphasis whatsoever.[1]

In dealing with the causes of the Seven Years' War, and more particularly with that part of it known as the French and Indian War in America, a certain difference of opinion between some of the French and English writers of textbooks again appears. Most of those French writers whose texts I have examined stress the covetousness of England, bringing out such factors as her jealousy of the prosperity of the French colonies, her desire for *revanche*, her hope of ruining the French Navy and French commerce, her purpose of driving the French out of America. It is also pointed out that England made war inevitable by attacking French vessels of commerce on the high seas, without formal declaration of hostilities. The English writers, on the other hand, in interpreting the origins of the struggle in North America, make much of the hemming in of the English between the Alleghany Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean.[2] "In North America," says Prothero, "the British colonies, scattered along the coast, were in danger of being hemmed in by the French, who held all Canada to the western limit of

[1] Professor Ramsay Muir, writing of Edward III and the Black Prince, says: "Edward III, who founded the most noble order of Knights of the Garter in honour of the fair Countess of Salisbury, thought nothing of breaking his pledged word to the burgesses of Parliament, and was only with difficulty persuaded by the implorings of his queen to spare the lives of the merchants of Calais who came out from the besieged city to beg his mercy. His son, the Black Prince, the most gallant and chivalrous knight of his age, . . . saw nothing unchivalrous in ordering the cold-blooded massacre of three thousand men, women and children of Limoges, who had angered him by defending their city."—*Short History of the British Commonwealth*, Part I, p. 123.

[2] *Chambers's Periodic Histories*, Book VI, p. 81; Bell, *The Way of History*, Book III, p. 85; Barnard, *America in Pictures*, p. 85; Tout, *A History of Great Britain*, p. 337; Finnemore, *Peeps at History*, America, p. 26; Newman, *Beginners' Modern History*, p. 94.

the Great Lakes, and had established a colony at the mouth of the Mississippi, which they called Louisiana. From Canada they had travelled down the Ohio and the Mississippi to Louisiana, and on this ground they claimed all the land west of the Alleghany Mountains. This claim the British colonists disputed, because it would have prevented all chance of their expanding westward." [1] "The French, who already held Canada," says Wilmot-Buxton, "had planned to seize all the southern region round the River Mississippi, and by building a line of forts to drive the English colonists into a narrow strip of land between the mountains and the sea." [2] Such explanations of the causes of the struggle in North America are typical.

On the whole, the English textbook writers seem to approximate the truth in regard to the causes of the war more closely than do the French. Historical research has emphasized the point that the main issue in North America was one of expansion, English expansionist aims conflicting with French, and on this the authors of English historical texts lay stress. As for the French statements that the war was caused in part by England's hope of ruining French commerce and the French Navy and her hope of driving the French out of America, it seems to the present writer that the authors of British texts might, with equal reason, make similar conjectures regarding far-flung French ambitions as leading to the conflict. But, generally speaking, the English authors do not make such assumptions. There is perhaps a shade too much emphasis in some of the texts on the aggressiveness of French expansion in North America and the defensive

[1] Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, p. 312.
[2] Wilmot-Buxton, *Junior History of Great Britain*, p. 180.

character of English resistance. The English violation of international law in attacking French vessels of commerce before the outbreak of hostilities is not mentioned in the English school histories I have examined. Yet it is a fact, easily verifiable, and mentioned in larger works of English historical scholarship.[1] Even allowing it to be but a minor cause of war, it would not be unreasonable to expect to find allusion to it in some of the texts, were these entirely untinged with nationalism.

But these are minor criticisms. Generally speaking, the English textbook writers, on the question of the causes of the Seven Years' War, show little or no animus against the French.

The story of the Napoleonic wars, taken as a whole, affords no adequate test of nationalism in the texts because of the general opprobrium which attaches to Napoleon's methods and actions. To criticize Napoleon severely is not necessarily to show nationalistic prejudice against him; it has been pointed out already that there is much harsh criticism of him even in French textbooks. But there is sufficient controversy regarding the renewal of war in 1803 to reveal at times the bias of a writer, if he has one. Of the French writers, some attribute the renewal of hostilities in that year principally to Napoleon's ambition, others to British aggression. Among the English authors of school histories there is a general tendency to attribute the guilt of breaking the peace entirely to Bonaparte. "The Emperor Napoleon soon picked a quarrel with England," says Tout, "and war with France, which had only ended in 1802, began again in 1803. Napoleon was now at peace with all Europe, and thought that it would be a splendid chance of

[1] Robertson, *England under the Hanoverians*, pp. 126–7.

attacking England by itself." [1] Napoleon seems to have made peace in 1802, according to another writer, "chiefly with the objects of establishing his position in France, and preparing for a life-and-death grapple with the rest of Europe." [2] Others emphasize his ambition and need for military glory [3]; the extension of French influence in Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy; [4] his appointment as consuls in Britain of men who were really spies; his desire to prevent British newspapers from criticizing him; [5] and his demand for the expulsion from England of French exiles who were plotting against him—a demand refused by the British Government.[6] "Finally," says Prothero, "he published a report on the state of Egypt, which showed that he intended to renew the attempt to conquer it; and he demanded the immediate cession of Malta. Great Britain insisted on its retention for ten years, and, on this being refused, declared war (May 1803)." [7]

With most, if not all, of these reasons advanced for the renewal of war in 1803 impartial historical research would find itself, I think, in general agreement. If nationalistic bias reveals itself at all in the English textbook explanations of the reasons for the overthrow of the Treaty of Amiens, it is rather in what the writers do not say than in what they do. There is no hint, for example, in the books that I have examined that the British were at fault in not evacuating Malta, as they had agreed to do in the treaty; nor do all of

[1] Tout, *History of Great Britain*, p. 360.
[2] *Chambers's Periodic Histories*, Book VII, p. 262.
[3] Newman, *Beginners' Modern History*, p. 94; Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, p. 355.
[4] Bell, *The Way of History*, Book IV, pp. 150–1.
[5] *Chambers's Periodic Histories*, Book VI, pp. 132–3; Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, pp. 355–6.
[6] Prothero, op. cit., ibid.
[7] Ibid.

them make clear that the actual declaration of war came from England, not from France. But it must be admitted that if the English explanations of the causes of the renewal of war stood alone, they would not constitute very strong evidence of nationalism in the texts. The most "anti-British" historian can hardly deny the provocative character of Napoleon's high-handed actions. Taken in connection with their accounts of the causes of the Hundred Years' War and the French and Indian war in America, however, these explanations help to sustain the proof of a tendency on the part of certain of the authors of books used in English schools to interpret national history from a "pro-British" point of view.

That this nationalistic bias is more the result of an unconscious tendency to defend Great Britain against all comers than of a conscious prejudice against the French is indicated by certain tributes to their quondam enemies that one finds here and there in the pages of English school histories. In speaking of the Hundred Years' War one writer says: "There were on the side opposed to us heroes as brave and noble as any of our own, and in this chapter we propose to think rather more of our heroic foes than of our own brave knights and soldiers." [1]

The heroism of Jeanne d'Arc receives due praise.[2] "She could neither read nor write," says one writer, "but she was good and kind."

"You may be sure that Joan was much loved by the French people," continues the same author. "Now I must tell you of her cruel death.

[1] *Gateways to History*, Book V, p. 81.

[2] *Chamber's Periodic Histories*, Book VII, p. 144; Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, p. 145; etc.

"One day she was caught by the soldiers of a prince who hated the French king. This prince gave her up to the English.

"You already know that they thought Joan was a witch. They had her tried by a French bishop and other French judges.

"The bishop and the other judges agreed that Joan was a witch. Now in those bad, cruel times they used to burn men and women who were thought to be witches.

"So the brave maid was burnt at the stake. Even her foes shed tears when they saw her die.

"One Englishman who stood by said, 'We are lost, for we have burnt a saint.' He was quite right. The English lost France soon afterward." [1]

Of France under Napoleon Bell says, after recounting the Corsican's achievements as a statesman: "In the early days of his rule . . . France was better governed than any State had ever been before. There was efficiency everywhere." [2] And another writer, recounting the history of France in the nineteenth century, points out that "France, as in 1789, so again in 1830 and in 1848, led the way for liberty." [3] Another speaks of "Montcalm, the gallant Frenchmen"; [4] while still another refers to "the chivalrous Lafayette." [5] Such comments are illustrative of the willingness of English writers to accord just praise to their former foes.

Of France and of French characteristics, too, many a friendly word is written in school geographies and school readers. "If we examine a map of France,"

[1] *Highways of History*, Book I, pp. 58–64.
[2] Bell, *The Way of History*, Book IV, p. 17.
[3] *Blackie's New Systematic English Readers*, Sixth Reader, p. 92.
[4] *Highroads of History*, Book V (A), p. 164.
[5] *Chamber's Periodic Histories*, Book VI, p. 105.

says Bryson, "we discover that highways and railroads generally follow the river valleys. Here, no doubt, lies the secret of the beautiful arrangement of all the ways of travel in that fair land." Of Paris the same writer says: "Above all things, Paris is a centre of art and learning. One sees the fine artistic taste of the people in the well-placed, beautifully carved statues of the streets and squares, in the dress of the women, and in the goods displayed in the shop-windows, particularly in the rue de Rivoli." [1]

"The people are, as a whole," says Mill, "polite and obliging, highly intelligent, and also gay and fond of pleasure. Although often excitable and impulsive in their actions, they are courageous and enterprising. Their manufactures are distinguished by a taste and finish attained by no other nation." [2] "Education is good and cheap," says another writer, "and France has given to the world many of its leading ideas. In recent years the French have been the first to perfect submarines, motor-cars and aeroplanes, and to supply their army with quick-firing guns. The French language is understood by all educated men." [3] The same writer also says of them: "The French are lively, clever and industrious, and in many respects are the most highly civilized people on earth. Their tact, good taste and politeness are renowned. They love beauty in all its forms, and they give great encouragement to the artist, the musician, the painter and the actor. In the humbler art of cookery they have no rivals. . . . There are no more gallant soldiers in the world than the French." [4] A word of criticism one may find here and there, but it does not

[1] *Europe and its People*, p. 27.
[2] *General Geography*, p. 90.
[3] *Highroads of Geography*, Book IV, p. 46.
[4] Ibid., Book IV, p. 65.

offset the generally friendly tone of these texts where they have occasion to comment on the French.[1]

All this does not mean that the English have learned to love their neighbours across the Channel as themselves. No people has yet attained such beatific unselfishness. Furthermore, it has been shown that even in the schools a nationalistic bias sometimes influences the interpretation of the history of Anglo-French relations. But this bias is, on the whole, of a mild type. In general it would seem that as far as the English school takes cognizance of the French at all, it educates to good will toward them rather than to antagonism. All in all, the attitude of the English texts towards France is less prejudiced and more fair-minded than that of the French texts toward England.

[1] *Here and There Stories*, Junior No. 1, p. 5; *Highroads of Geography*, Introductory Book, p. 13.

CHAPTER X

GERMANY AND THE GREAT WAR IN THE BRITISH TEXTBOOKS

To rise above ancient enmities is not the simplest matter in the world, especially when those enmities were as protracted as were those between France and England. Old grudges are not soon forgotten. It has just been shown, however, that the authors of many English school books have surmounted the old prejudices against France, and have dwelt on the finer qualities of the brave people across the channel rather than on their faults. Such nationalistic bias as still persists in English textbooks with regard to the French is but the pale ghost of the hot-blooded antagonism of times gone by. But to rise above recent and intensely bitter enmity, such as that between England and Germany, is an even more difficult matter. It remains to be seen how far English writers of these books have been able to free themselves from prejudice against their chief foe in the Great War.

In 1911, three years before the world took up arms, the author of a geography used in the schools of England could write of the Germans with a complimentary friendliness only slightly tinged with criticism. He praises the patience of the Germans, their love of the romantic and the beautiful, their devotion to learning, though he holds their patriotism to be rather too narrow and exclusive in its character. "The

people of Germany, as a whole," he says, " are patient and plodding, succeeding both in trade and in war by their willing submission to discipline. A deep current of romance and emotion flows through these prosaic qualities, and the love of the beautiful in art, music and poetry is widespread amongst all classes. Patriotism is a passion, and there is consequently much jealousy of other nations. There are twenty-one universities, and these, like the technical colleges, are more crowded, the fees are lower, and the learning of the professors, as a whole, greater than in any other country." [1]

It redounds to the credit of British fair-mindedness and sportsmanship that, even after a four years' struggle of unparalleled bitterness, certain writers are still able to dwell on the good qualities of their recent foes. Thus the author of one of the *Cambridge Geographical Readers*, published in 1921, says that " the Germans are an industrious, steady, loyal, and thoughtful people, and show intense love for their country, which they proudly call the 'Fatherland.' Their system of education was carried to great perfection, and their technical schools were probably the best in the world. . . . Thoroughness and method in doing things are strong points in the German character." [2] " It says a great deal for German determination and hard work," says the author of another geographical text, " that before the war, which broke out in 1914, the over-sea trade of this country stood second in the world." [3] " As a rule, the German people are industrious, thrifty and home-loving," comments a third. " The German . . . makes an excellent soldier, and in civil life he

[1] Mill, *General Geography*, p. 110.
[2] *Cambridge Geographical Readers*, Book IV, p. 115.
[3] Wilson, *The Progress to Geography*, Stage V, p. 110.

does not mind being governed by rules and regulations which we should think very burdensome." [1] "Now that she has learned that every nation has a right to live and a mission to fulfil in the world," says a fourth, "Germany may discover her own place in the scheme of things, and all people will profit by her gifts." [2]

True, the praise that these authors of geographical texts accord the Germans is sometimes not unmixed with criticism. "No people could have a greater love of country or of their homes," says the writer just quoted, "but unfortunately their patriotism has been of a narrow kind. It was of that sort that not only makes a nation blind to its own faults, but renders it incapable of appreciating the good points of others.

"This lack of kindly feeling towards other nations led them to have a very exalted opinion of themselves. Misled by those in authority, they imagined that the welfare of the world depended on Germany being at the head of it, and their overweening ambition brought about their downfall." [3]

In spite of such strictures, however, the general tendency of this and many other geographical textbooks is to stimulate a romantic and æsthetic interest in Germany. From such interest it would be the most natural thing in the world for sympathy and liking to develop. Such textbooks, then, are distinctly serving the cause of world peace. Would one could say the same of the school histories! The historians' task, indeed, is more delicate than that of the geographers. In dealing with contemporary history, they must, perforce, deal with the World War and its causes; and in dealing with the World War and its

[1] *Highroads of Geography*, Book IV, p. 98.
[2] Bryson, *Europe and its People*, p. 124.
[3] Ibid., pp. 124–5.

c es, more than in dealing with any other subject, their prejudices are likely to warp their judgment. It would be a satisfaction to record that the authors of historical textbooks used in English schools had, generally speaking, treated this vexed question in a thoroughly broad-minded spirit. Unfortunately this ca not be done.

In discussing the causes of the World War the authors of these school histories show little disposition to hold England in any way accountable; and as far as the immediate causes of the conflict are concerned their attitude is justified. Of all the great Powers entering the war in 1914, England bears the least share of direct responsibility. Whether she is the least indirectly responsible is a question that cannot at present be solved, but if imperialism was one of the great underlying causes of the war, England is certainly responsible through her share in that imperialism. She " played the game " with a vigour second to none. In blocking the extension of the Bagdad railway to the Persian Gulf, in supporting French policy in Morocco, in joining hands with Russia to partition Persia into spheres of influence, it must be admitted that her policy was provocative to Germany and contributed to the irritation that underlay the final outbreak. Is it an unconscious belief in the " essential rightness of the British Empire " that hinders acknowledgment of this?

If there is little disposition to assign responsibility to England for a share in bringing on the war, there is likewise little tendency to hold France accountable. Nor should the authors of school histories be much criticized for this. The newer evidence implicating French officials and a portion of the French Press has only recently become known. Most of the post-war

texts were published before it had appeared. Furthermore, there is still a strong disposition to question it. Apart from any question of nationalistic sympathies and antipathies, even the newer texts could hardly be expected to incorporate such material until a more settled opinion should prevail regarding it. But taken with the other evidence that has appeared since 1918 it ought, in the more recently published histories, to make for greater caution in the assessment of war guilt.

That the authors of many textbooks, in England as elsewhere, have failed to exercise due caution in assessing war guilt may be emphatically asserted. Buchan and Newbolt, for example, in speaking of the part played by Russia after the assassination of Serajevo, state that Russia "mobilised her armies on her *southern* frontier." [1] The author of one of the books in the series, *Highroads of History*, after speaking of Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, says that Russia "began to call together her *southern* troops for the purpose of preventing Austria from overrunning Serbia." [2]

Although the first of these books was published in 1923 and the other in 1922, the authors of neither seem to realize that Russia's mobilization was not partial, but general—not merely against Austria, but against Germany also, and therefore a far greater provocation to the latter Power than the mobilization of Russian troops on the southern frontier alone could possibly be. Professor G. P. Gooch, England's foremost historian in the field of recent European history, says on this point:

"According to Sukhomlinoff, the Russian War

[1] *Days to Remember*, p. 4.
[2] *Highroads of History*, Book V (A), p. 284.

Minister, the Tsar signed the order for general mobilization on the afternoon of July 29th; but, after a friendly telegram from the Kaiser, he ordered that mobilization should only take place against Austria. The War Minister, however, and the Chief of the Staff allowed the general mobilization to continue, while concealing it from the Tsar and denying it to the German Military Attaché." On July 30th "the Tsar's consent was obtained." [1]

Gaskoin, in a little historical textbook published in 1923, speaks of Russia's general mobilization, but says that Germany "provoked a general mobilization of the Russian armies by false reports that she had ordered one herself." [2] The false reports alluded to are presumably those published by the *Lokal Anzeiger* on July 30, 1914, about one o'clock in the afternoon. It has been clearly established that they did not reach St. Petersburg until some time after the Russian orders for general mobilization had been issued.[3] Of the fact that general mobilization had been long considered by high diplomatic and military authorities as equivalent to a declaration of war, the authors of the school histories that I have examined make no mention.[4]

Disinclined to attach to England, France, or Russia any but the vaguest and most general responsibility for the war, these writers naturally concentrate their fire on Germany and Austria. As German writers of textbooks accuse England of envy and hatred of Germany in pre-war days, so one finds an English

[1] *History of Modern Europe*, p. 546.
[2] *Britain in the Modern World*, chap. vii.
[3] Morhardt, *Les Preuves*, Préface, pp. ix–x.
[4] "Moreover, it was understood between the French and Russian experts that mobilization was equivalent to a declaration of war." —Gooch, *History of Modern Europe*, p. 547.

author accusing Germany of envy and hatred of Great Britain :

" Why, we may ask, did Germany cast covetous eyes on the British Empire ? She needed more and better outlets to the open ocean, yet it was clear that she could only secure them by conquest."

In speaking of the Kaiser, the same writer says that " when the Boer War was in its doubtful early stages he and his advisers believed that the British would be beaten and that their empire would go to pieces. It was openly said by many Germans that if they had then possessed a powerful navy they would have been able to capture some of the British colonies."

In another passage he asserts that " envy and hatred of Great Britain were fostered in every possible way. The Germans confidently believed that when the day arrived they would make an end of Britain and enter into her heritage." [1]

The writer just quoted is only one of a number who emphasize the vaulting ambitions of the German Empire.[2]

" The main cause of the war was, beyond question, the ambition of the German Empire," says Prothero.[3] " It is clear enough now," according to another, " that Germany had long prepared to make us fight for our trade, our colonies, our national life." [4] " Germany had, it is now clear, been planning to rob France of her colonies, to make herself mistress of Europe, and to overthrow the British Empire," is another author's

[1] *Highroads of History*, Book V (A), pp. 279–80. I am informed that this is one of the most widely used historical textbooks in the elementary schools of London.

[2] Buchan and Newbolt, *Days to Remember*, p. 3 ; Somervell, *British History*, p. 102.

[3] *Nelson's School History*, p. 488.

[4] Blackie & Son (publishers), *Short History of Great Britain*, p. 263.

summary of the modest aims which he attributes to England's late enemy.[1]

The thought suggested by the writers just quoted, that Germany "willed the war," is reinforced by others. "Germany meant war to come," says Warner.[2] "The real cause of the world-wide war was the will of Germany and her readiness for war," says Arnold Forster.[3] Buchan and Newbolt only go so far as to say: "Germany was seriously considering the possibility of some bold stroke which would put her beyond the reach of rivalry."[4]

The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand provided the occasion. In the summer of 1914 "the rulers of Germany had decided that some great effort must soon be made."[5] "The German Kaiser and his War Lords . . . had determined that the time was come to act."[6] "Germany considered that the moment had come for establishing 'world power.'"[7] "The Central Powers believed that a war was inevitable in the near future, and that the present occasion was favourable for themselves."[8] Such are some of the textbook indictments of Germany for wilful precipitation of the catastrophe, though the careful scholar who, according to Gooch,[9] has written the most impartial discussion of the immediate causes of the war has, after patient research, reached the conclusion that the "new documents from Berlin and Vienna . . . clear the German Government of the

[1] *Brief Survey*, etc., p. 249.
[2] Ibid.
[3] *History of England*, vol. ii, p. 832.
[4] *Days to Remember*, p. 3.
[5] Buchan and Newbolt, op. cit., p. 4.
[6] Newman *Beginners' Modern History*, pp. 153–4.
[7] Somervell, *British History*, p. 102.
[8] Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, p. 490.
[9] *History of Modern Europe*, p. 532.

charge that it deliberately plotted or wanted the war." [1]

So, too, in spite of what we now know to the contrary, certain writers maintain that it was Germany who egged on Austria rather than Austria who entangled Germany. "Even when Austria might have listened to the British appeal for peace," says Prothero, "Germany would not allow her to recede from the position she had taken up." [2] "Germany . . . induced Austria to refuse all mediation," maintain Buchan and Newbolt.[3] "We now know that Germany had stood behind Austria, egging her on to fight," [4] says another writer. Such statements, of course, take no account of the belated efforts of the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg to restrain the reckless Berchtold, and are directly opposed to Professor Fay's contention that "when . . . Bethmann strove for peace at the eleventh hour, he failed partly because Austria and Russia were so unyielding, and partly because events marched so rapidly that he could not keep control over them. In this sense Germany had war forced upon her, not, of course, by England, as has been so commonly believed in Germany, but by her own ally and by Russia." [5]

The case against the Central Powers in the school histories culminates in certain texts in a sweeping, flaming assertion of their guilt. "They, and they alone," says one, "must therefore be held accountable for the war, with all the suffering and all the horrors that it brought in its train." [6] Holding Germany more responsible than Austria, another asserts: "There

[1] Fay, "New Light on the Origins of the World War," *American Historical Review*, October 1920, pp. 51–2.
[2] Prothero, op. cit., p. 490.
[3] *Days to Remember*, p. 5.
[4] *Highroads of History*, Book V (A), p. 284.
[5] Op. cit., p. 52.
[6] Marten, *The Groundwork of the War*, p. 728.

is no shadow of doubt that Germany was the evil genius that brought about the war." [1] "Beyond the shadow or semblance of doubt," says Professor Ramsay Muir, "it (the war) was deliberately precipitated by Germany and Austria. The circumstances of the moment were utterly insufficient to justify their action. They were not thinking primarily of Serbia; they were thinking of world power and of the chance of ruining all their rivals." [2] There is the less excuse for Professor Muir's sweeping statement in that his book was published in 1924, at a time when the bulk of the new evidence on the origins of the war was available, at a time when painstaking scholarship was reaching conclusions very different from that which he so confidently proclaimed.

It would not be fair to leave the impression, however, that all English school histories interpret the causes of the war from a strongly anti-German point of view. A few of those which I have investigated treat the origins of the conflict cautiously and with approximate impartiality. Among these are Guest's *Outlines of British History*,[3] Book VII of *Chambers's Periodic Histories*,[4] and Bell's *Way of History*.[5] To these

[1] *Highroads of History*, Book V (A), p. 284.

[2] *Short History of the British Commonwealth*, Part VI, p. 773.

[3] Part III, p. 231: "It would be difficult to state briefly the *real causes* of the Great War. The seeds of the conflict had been sown years before. But the occasion of the war was the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, and his consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg. . . . Austria was the close ally of Germany, who, it was commonly believed, was only awaiting her opportunity to engage in a great war in order to extend her sphere of influence. Acting on the advice of Germany, the Austrian Government asserted that the assassination had been planned and carried into execution by Serbs. Although this accusation could not be substantiated, Austria adopted a most arrogant attitude towards Serbia, and on July 28, 1914, declared war," etc.

[4] Pp. 299–300.

[5] Book IV, pp. 268–75.

historical textbooks may be added Wilson's *Progress of Geography*, which brings out in an interesting way the geographical influences leading to the war.[1] Bell, it is true, takes a brief flight into the realm of fancy in speaking of the German people as "eager for military glory and for the mastery of the world."[2] But, generally speaking, historical scholarship will have little quarrel with the interpretations of these writers on the score of partiality, even where they have not taken full advantage of the evidence which has come to light since the end of the war.

In the *Enquête* of the Dotation Carnegie, M. Prudhommeaux has shown how much is made in many French textbooks of German war atrocities. English textbooks dwell far less than do these French *livres scolaires* on these alleged barbarities, nor do any of those that I have examined bring out such horrible details as those on which certain French school books feed the imaginations of their youthful readers. A number of English textbooks which have occasion to deal with the war, indeed, make no mention whatsoever of German barbarities.[3]

This cannot, however, be said of all.[4] Certain books make such comments as the following:

"The Germans deliberately adopted a policy of massacre and destruction. In order to warn other

[1] Stage V, pp. 12–13.

[2] Op. cit., p. 275

[3] Bell, *The Way of History*, Book IV; Munro, *Shorter History of Great Britain*; Muir, *Short History of the British Commonwealth*, Part VI; Arnold Forster, *History of England*, vol. ii; Blackie and Son (publishers), *A Short History of Great Britain*; Woodward, *An Outline History of the British Empire*; Warner, *Survey of British History*; Guest, *Outlines of British History*.

[4] Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, p. 491; Oman, *History of England*, Division III, pp. 743–4; Miller, *Beginners' History of England*, pp. 258–9; *The Abbey History Readers*, Book VI, . 160; Marten, *The Groundwork of the War*, p. 759.

small peoples of the danger of disputing with Germany, they perpetrated crimes which were without parallel in European history since the seventeenth century." [1]

"In their advance across Belgium the Germans had committed atrocities in the way of wholesale massacre and incendiarism such as had not been seen since the Thirty Years' War." [2]

"In the course of the war in Belgium the Germans displayed great brutality and vandalism. In Louvain, the Oxford of Belgium, a town rich in rare specimens of mediæval architecture, learning and art, everything was destroyed save the town hall. The unfortunate town of Malines, after being evacuated, was shelled three times from sheer wantonness, and everywhere the civilian population was treated with the utmost cruelty." [3]

All the English textbook accounts of German brutality which have come under my eye, however, are brief. In none of these books have I found any mention of the mutilation of Belgian children, that story spread so widely during the war itself, though one text, in commenting on the destruction of Louvain and Aerschot, speaks of "the indiscriminate massacre of men, women and children." [4] There is no evidence of deliberate attempt to stir up hatred of the Germans through this most effective means of appealing to the emotions of children; yet even these brief accounts, of course, are of a character to stimulate anti-German feeling.

Evidently the war between the Allies and the Central Powers is not discussed in the English textbooks, generally speaking, with the same measure of objectivity as

[1] Prothero, *Nelson's School History*, p. 491.
[2] Oman, *History of England*, Division III, pp. 743–4.
[3] Miller, *Beginners' History of England*, pp. 258–9.
[4] *Abbey History Readers*, Book VI, p. 160.

are the wars between England and France. Nor are Germany and the Germans, generally speaking, treated with the same sympathy as are France and the French. Some, no doubt, will rejoin that they do not deserve to be—as though Germans were of a different and baser clay from the rest of us. One cannot disprove this dogma, any more than one can prove it. Only be it remembered that something over a hundred years ago people in the countries then allied against Napoleon were saying much the same things about the French that "good" people in the countries recently allied against Germany are now saying about the Germans. "The enemy" is always different from the rest of us—always wicked. Too often is it forgotten that the barbarities attributed to the depravity of a particular people are the barbarities of the monster War itself. It was not of the conduct of the Germans that Sherman—was thinking when he said, "War is hell."

In reality it is not because the Germans are different from the rest of us that they are treated in the textbooks of England with less objectivity than are the French; it is rather primarily because the war is so recent and the wounds so deep. Geographers may rise above war's wounds, speak kindly of the German people, and stimulate romantic interest in the German land, but historians—or rather, it would be fairer to say, some historians—not yet.

Yet Germany and the Germans fare better at the hands of the British textbook writers than they do at the hands of the French. There is less disposition to vituperation in the English textbooks, less disposition to dwell on atrocities alleged to have been committed by the Germans. Those errors in British school books, that now affect the interpretation of the causes of the war, if they are in part the result of nationalistic bias

are in part due to unfamiliarity with the results of recent research. The conclusions of honest investigagation will meet with less resistance in England, I think, than in any other country, for the prevalent atmosphere there is one of tolerance and free speech. And the gradual infiltration of the results of historical research will put the causes of the war in a clearer light in the schools of Great Britain.

CHAPTER XI

THE UNITED STATES IN BRITISH TEXTBOOKS

On the Aldwych lintel of Bush House in London is carved the motto : " To the friendship of the English-speaking people." On both sides of the water the proclamation of this sentiment naturally strikes a responsive chord. Whether one be ardent nationalist or optimistic believer in a comity of nations, one finds oneself in sympathy with it. The nationalist in each of the two countries responds to the call of race to race across the sea. The supporter of international unity sees in Anglo-American friendship one of the most effective instruments for the realization of a less anarchical world-order. Old sources of friction are losing their potency. Each of the two countries has an instinctive trust in the other. Yet much still remains to be done before old prejudices can be completely conquered and the two nations work together in harmony for their individual interests, their mutual interests, and the peace of the world.

The American school, it must be admitted, has not done its best to promote Anglo-American friendship. Many Americans can testify to the prejudiced way in which they were taught American history in their childhood. " Americans," wrote Professor Morse Stephens a decade ago, " are taught from childhood to hate Britishers by the study of American history, and not only the descendants of the men who made the

Revolution, but every newly arrived immigrant child imbibes hatred of the Great Britain of to-day from the patriotic ceremonies of the public school." [1] Professor Stephens s statement has in it something of exaggeration, it is true ; and in the ten years that have passed since he wrote the attitude of the American school toward England has improved. Furthermore, it ought in justice to be said that the teaching of English literature has always in part counteracted the nationalism of American history. Children who were brought up to detest the memory of George III, and to dislike Burgoyne and Cornwallis, were at the same time trained to love the England of Shakespeare, of Dickens and Thackeray. But there still remains in the teaching of American history much that is unfair to Great Britain.

To judge from the textbooks, the English school is more tolerant than the American. The generally friendly attitude of the writers of school books toward his country and his countrymen cannot but warm the heart of an American. The usual interpretation of the causes of the American Revolution, for example, is broad-minded, sympathetic toward the colonists; that of the causes of the war of 1812 is, on the whole, less sympathetic, but not entirely unfriendly. There is high praise for American statesmen, soldiers and literary men. American life and American characteristics are generally interpreted in the same generous way. Here and there one finds a gibe, here and there a criticism, here and there a piece of misinformation; but the teachings of the textbooks, as a whole, are of a character to develop liking and respect for America and Americans rather than distrust of them or prejudice

[1] "Nationality and History," *American Historical Review*, January 1916, p. 236.

against them. These points will be brought out in some detail in the present chapter.

British textbook interpretation of the causes of the American Revolution may be divided for convenience into three classes: "pro-American," "neutral," and "anti-American." "Pro-American" explanations are the most numerous in the books I have examined. So favourable to the colonists is the tone of certain writers that were one to encounter their statements in American textbooks they would almost seem like evidence of American nationalism. "How was this striking change brought about?" says Finnemore, referring to American independence. "By the stupidity of George III, then King of England, and of his Ministers, who tried to fetter the limbs of a free people, and found that all ties, whether friendly or unfriendly, were broken in the struggle." [1] "Britain," says Black, "did not govern her colonies wisely; she interfered in their affairs and imposed unjust taxes. At last the thirteen states on the Atlantic sea-board, south of Canada, revolted." [2] Another writer speaks of Parliament's taxation and of the sufferings of Americans "from the ill-effects of Britain's bad old 'colonial policy'—a policy based upon the mistaken principle that all colonial trade ought to pass through the mother country." [3] "The quarrel was, perhaps, inevitable," says Prothero, "but it certainly was hastened by the obstinacy and unwisdom of the king." [4]

The author of one of the *King Alfred Readers* emphasizes as the chief cause the unyielding objection of the colonists to taxation without representation.

"The chief cause of the quarrel," he says, "may

[1] *Peeps at History*, America, p. 27.
[2] *America in Pictures*, p. 50.
[3] *Chambers's Periodic Histories*, Book VII, p. 248.
[4] *Nelson's School History*, p. 324.

be expressed in a few words. The British Parliament wished to tax the colonists to help to defray the expenses of the war with the French. In this case it may have been quite right that the colonists should help to pay for the work which had been done for them at tremendous cost. But a principle was at stake. This was expressed succinctly in the cry raised in all the colonies, 'No taxation without representation.' The colonists were not represented in the British Parliament, which claimed the right to impose the tax. They would tax themselves through their own governing bodies or they would not be taxed at all.

"Thus the revolutionary movement took shape, though all the while there was little desire on the part of the colonists to separate from the mother country. They wanted what they considered was justice. They were Englishmen, and like their English brethren across the water in the country which at that time they always referred to as 'home,' they were prepared to fight for a principle." [1]

Were such interpretations of the causes of the American Revolution lifted bodily from their setting and transferred to American textbooks, no "hundred per cent. American," searching for "un-American" heresies, could object to them. They furnish striking evidence of British fair-mindedness and readiness to forget past enmities. If they are to be criticized at all, it is not for nationalism, but for not emphasizing sufficiently the provocations that the colonists gave to the mother country.

What may be called the "neutral" point of view is one that does not especially favour either side, but seems to hold each about as responsible as the other. This point of view is typified by Newman and

[1] Book VII, *Folks Beyond the Sea: the Americans*, p. 195.

by Tout. Newman shows that the colonists had been glad enough to have the aid of English troops in wars against the French, but later on were unwilling to pay taxes to meet the cost of maintaining these troops. Possibly the colonists were not as grateful as they should have been, he points out, but "if some blame does lie at their door, the Home Government was largely responsible for the discontent which prevailed." [1] Tout says that "the blame was by no means all on one side. It was stupid of George and his Ministers to force the Americans to pay taxes without asking their leave. But there were some Americans who wanted to be independent of England, and did their best to make their grievances seem bigger than they really were. The truth was that neither the Americans nor the British took a really broad view of the situation. The only man who did so was Chatham. He was enthusiastically on the side of the Americans in resisting the Stamp Act and the other taxes. But he gloried in the fact that nearly all North America had become subject to British rule, and he thought that it was the most important thing of all that the British race should all keep together in a single State under a single king. He was grieved to hear how easily the Americans forgot that they were Englishmen in their hatred of George and Great Britain." [2] If these explanations of the causes of the Revolution are not as gratifying to American *amour-propre* as those first quoted, it is not probable that a careful American historical scholar would find fault with them.

The only distinctly anti-American interpretation that I have found in the books I have examined is that of C. R. L. Fletcher and Rudyard Kipling. In

[1] Newman, *Beginners' Modern History*, p. 96.
[2] *History of Great Britain*, pp. 344–5.

their *School History of England* these writers explain as follows the origins of the Revolution :

" Soon after the peace of 1763 we began to perceive one result of the conquest of Canada which few people had expected. Our American colonies, having no French to fear any longer, wanted to be free from our control altogether. They utterly refused to pay a penny of the two hundred million pounds that the war had cost us, and they equally refused to maintain a garrison of British soldiers. They intended to shake off all our restrictions on their trade, and to buy and sell in whatever market they could find. When our Parliament proposed in 1764 to make them pay a small fraction of the cost of the late war, they called it ' oppression,' and prepared to rebel. ' We are Whigs,' they said. ' Whigs always resist oppression. You English Whigs did so in 1688.' " [1]

Nothing is said here of the galling restrictions of England's mercantile policy, of the obstinacy of George III, nor of a possible justification for the principle of " no taxation without representation." Admitting that much may rightfully be said against the attitude of the colonists towards the mother country, it is nevertheless clear that it is not the findings of impartial historical scholarship that underlie this explanation of the causes of the American struggle, but nationalistic bias. If further evidence of an anti-American animus in this book were necessary, it could be found in the following poem, which precedes the authors' interpretation of the causes of the Revolution :

'Twas not while England's sword unsheathed
Put half a world to flight,
Nor while their new-built cities breathed
Secure behind her might ;

[1] Fletcher and Kipling, *A School History of England*, pp. 199–200.

Not while she poured from Pole to Line
Treasure and ships and men—
These worshippers at Freedom's shrine
They did not quit her then!

Not till their foes were driven forth
By England o'er the main—
Not till the Frenchman from the north
Had gone, with shattered Spain;
Not till the clean-swept ocean showed
No hostile flag unrolled,
Did they remember what they owed
To Freedom—and were bold.[1]

So important was the war of 1812 in the history of the United States, so much is made of it in American textbooks, that it is only on second thought that an American remembers that to Great Britain it was but an episode. She was engaged at that time in a life-and-death struggle with Napoleon; she could give comparatively little thought or attention to a fight with what was then a relatively unimportant Power. So in the English school histories little space is given to this second war with America. In Mowat's *New History of Great Britain*, a work large enough to be published in three slender volumes, all that is said of the war of 1812 is that "from 1812 to 1814 England had been involved in hostilities with the United States over the 'right of search' at sea. This was terminated by the Treaty of Ghent, December 24, 1814."[2]

As far as the causes of this conflict are treated at all in the textbooks, interpretation of them varies from the "pro-American" to the distinctly "anti-American." That Great Britain gave the United States provocation the author of none of the texts

[1] Fletcher and Kipling, *A School History of England*, p. 199.
[2] Section 3, p. 592.

that I have examined denies. Two grievances of the United States are brought out: the search of American vessels, with the consequent impressment of British and American seamen, and the British Orders in Council, which almost prohibited neutral ships from trading with France,[1] "After five years of bickering and recrimination," says Oman, "the Americans declared war on us—though they might with equally good logic have attacked Napoleon, whose conduct had been even more harsh and provoking than that of the Perceval Cabinet." [2] Another writer implies that whatever might have been the provocations England gave America, that country ought not to have declared war, for British needs were transcendent, and Britain was fighting for liberty.

"In 1812 the United States engaged in the most purposeless war known to history. Britain, during the last years of her long struggle with Napoleon, required every fighting seaman she could find, and so claimed the right of seizing on the high seas native-born British subjects who, to avoid service, had become American citizens. Sometimes it happened that native-born citizens of the United States were arrested in error. In 1812 the United States, acting with a selfish intolerance towards a country which was stoutly striving to preserve the liberties of down-trodden peoples, made this a pretext for war." [3]

This interpretation makes no allowance for the effect on the United States of British provocations, or for the awkward position in which the American

[1] Oman, *History of England*, p. 626; Arnold Forster, *History of England*, vol. ii, p. 712; *Britain and her Neighbours*, Book VII pp. 83–4; *King Alfred Readers*, Book VII, p. 202; etc.

[2] Op. cit., p. 626.

[3] *Britain and her Neighbours*, Book VII, pp. 83–4. For an American textbook interpretation of some of the causes of the war of 1812 see Appendix II.

Government was placed through British violations of international law. It savours of the dogma of "the essential rightness of the British Empire." More "pro-American" is the explanation of the author of one of the *Abbey History Readers*, who calls the war "an unhappy quarrel about the right of American vessels to trade with the Continent. England was so powerful at sea that she sometimes forgot to be just in her demands of other nations." [1] Another writer, in speaking of the conduct of the war, points out that "both sides displayed great heroism, and the American vessels were successful beyond expectation, for the little navy was fighting the greatest maritime power in the world." [2] Curiously little is made of the fact, of which nationalist writers might have made much, that some of the most important matters in dispute were being settled satisfactorily to the United States Government before that country declared war.[3]

Whatever they may think of the causes of the War of Independence and of the war of 1812, the authors of British textbooks could hardly be more generous in their praise of British heroes than they are of American statesmen and soldiers. The fact that some of these soldiers fought against England seems in no way to diminish admiration for them. Washington is a hero to them, as he is to Americans.[4] "His patience, wisdom, coolness, and unselfish patriotism," says one writer, "had procured the success of a long and bitter struggle." [5] "He was of the true order of great men," says Finnemore; "he had wisdom and courage, and

[1] *Britain and her Neighbours*, Book V, p. 87.
[2] *King Alfred Readers*, Book VII, p. 202.
[3] The news that the British Orders in Council had been repealed did not reach the United States until after that country had declared war.
[4] Turner, *The World*, p. 300
[5] *King Alfred Readers*, Book VII, p. 199.

loved his country; he was eager to do and dare, but never rash; he was true and honest in all he undertook; and, above all, he was lofty of soul and serene in temper under the harshest trial. No matter how black the future seemed, or how severely he was tried by the treachery or ingratitude of those for whom he laboured, he went calmly, steadily on, doing his duty, and never fearing but that the right would prevail." [1] Gaskoin quotes an American as saying to an English princess: "'I can hardly believe . . . that I was brought up to abhor the memory of George III.' 'That is very unfair,' replied the princess, 'for I was brought up to adore the memory of George Washington.'" [2]

Of Benjamin Franklin the author of a school reader says that "he was a man of great energy as well as strength and tenacity of purpose." [3] The same writer quotes from the poem, "Paul Revere's Ride," which cannot but stir the blood of English lads as it does those of Americans.[4] He tells also of Decatur's exploits in the war with the Barbary pirates, and says that "this officer afterwards distinguished himself . . . in the war with England in 1812 when he captured the English ship *Macedonian* after a plucky fight." [5] Another writer in the same series accords high praise to Lieutenant Hobson for his exploit in sinking the coaling-vessel *Merrimac*, at the mouth of Santiago Harbour.[6] Of James Garfield, Synge says in his *Growth of the British Empire* that he "was a man of whom America might well be proud. Upright, steadfast, hard-working, true as steel, he grew from boyhood to manhood,

[1] *Peeps at History*, America, p. 29.
[2] *Britain in the Modern World*, p. 135.
[3] *King Alfred Readers*, Book VII, p. 201.
[4] Ibid., p. 201.
[5] Ibid., p. 202
[6] Ibid., Book IV, pp. 66–74.

until he became an example to all peoples and all nations." [1] And, finally, tribute is paid to Lincoln, who "had few opportunities for educating himself, yet by perseverance and determination he raised himself step by step to the highest position his country could afford. The successful issue of the (Civil) war was in a large measure due to his genius for organization and his untiring energy, inspired by a high and lofty purpose." [2]

American literature is studied with a certain amount of care in England, and many a compliment is paid in school readers to American writers. Longfellow is described as "'the poet of the hearth and home.' A large number of his poems are general favourites with both old and young." [3] Edgar Allan Poe, "American prose-writer and poet, had, beyond all other writers, the power of haunting his readers alike with his melodies and eerie imaginings. In his poems he displays a wonderful choice of words and flow of rhyme, and his musical cadences are wellnigh flawless." [4] Thackeray is quoted in praise of Oliver Wendell Holmes: "'No man in England . . . can write with his charming mixture of wit, pathos and imagination.'" [5] And the words of the same great English writer are used in expressing appreciation of Washington Irving: "'He came amongst us bringing the kindest sympathy, the most artless, smiling good will. His new country (which some people here might be disposed to regard rather superciliously) could send us, as he showed in his own person, a gentleman who, though born in no very high sphere, was most finished,

[1] *King Alfred Readers*, Book IV, p. 107.
[2] Ibid., Book VII, p. 205.
[3] *The Temple Literary Readers*, Book IV, p. 110.
[4] *Highroads of Literature*, Book VI, p. 166.
[5] Ibid., p. 259.

polished, easy, witty, quiet, and, socially, the equal of the most refined Europeans.' " [1]

In the school readers that have come within my ken I have encountered no slur, no sneer, no criticism to offset in any way these favourable appraisals of American statesmen, soldiers and writers. Examination of every school reader in England might, of course, reveal here and there a nationalistically biased criticism, but the books to which reference has been made are typical and popular, and there can be no doubt that where the great men of America are mentioned at all in school readers there is a general tendency to praise them.

There is less unmixed approval of American life and American characteristics (or what are reputed to be American characteristics) than there is of American heroes and distinguished men of letters. Take, for example, what is said of American cities. Here favourable and unfavourable comments are intermingled in no definite proportion. Washington appears to be chiefly notable for its wide streets,[2] New York for rapid growth, skyscrapers, noise and money-making.

" New York," says Palmer, " has covered the whole of Manhattan Island and spread out into other cities beyond. Brooklyn alone has nearly the population of Manchester, and Jersey City that of Bradford. The whole life of this great mass of cities may be said to centre in Broadway and in Fifth Avenue, where all is noise, restlessness and money-making." [3]

Philadelphia and Boston are prime favourites. " In Philadelphia visitors notice an order and quiet-

[1] *Highroads of Literature*, Book VI, p. 145.
[2] Palmer, *Asia, Africa and America*, p. 180; *Cambridge Geographical Readers*, vol. vi, p. 179.
[3] Palmer, op. cit., p. 178.

ness which are not usual in America." [1] It "spreads over a considerable area, instead of piling up ugly skyscrapers like those of New York. . . . Its great natural park is said to be the finest possessed by any city in the world." [2] Boston is "famous . . . as the centre of learning and culture." [3] It is, in fact, "one of the chief educational and literary centres of the United States, and indeed of the civilized world, and most of the great writers and thinkers of the country have in some way been connected with the famous university city." [4] It is "a stately city of about 700,000 inhabitants. In its appearance there is a refreshing absence of that monotonous regularity so characteristic of American towns. Its irregular streets present quite a comfortable, home-like appearance. . . . Most Bostonians consider their city the 'hub of the universe.'" [5]

Baltimore is "a city of which all Marylanders are justly proud." [6]

Rochester is "a great petroleum centre on Lake Ontario." [7] This statement may come as a surprise to many Rochesterians. In vain the full-page advertisements in American popular magazines of "clothing tailored in Rochester!" In vain the slogan, "If it isn't an Eastman, it isn't a kodak!" "Rochester is a great petroleum centre!"

Chicago seems to find little favour in the eyes of the

[1] *Chambers's Twentieth-Century Geography Readers*, Book VIA, pp. 269–70.

[2] *Cambridge Geographical Readers*, Book VI, p. 179.

[3] Ibid., p. 179.

[4] Wilson, *The Progress to Geography*, Stage VI, p. 164. It is not clear whether in calling Boston a university city the writer extends the idea of Boston to Cambridge, or whether he has in mind Boston University.

[5] Palmer, op. cit., pp. 179–180.

[6] *Cambridge Geographical Readers*, Book VI, p. 180.

[7] Heaton, *Regional Geography*, etc., Book III, p. 45.

textbook writers. It is "a place of skyscrapers, fine buildings, straight streets, rush and activity, feverish work relieved by more or less boisterous pleasure." [1] "It owes its greatness to its position. Prairie lands and forests pour their wealth into it, and its trade in corn, timber, cattle, pigs, meat and tallow is colossal. Hard things have been said about Chicago, perhaps not undeserved. It is a city of extremes, but its people are proud of it, which is more than anyone else is. The boast of Chicago is that it slaughters more cattle and pigs than any other place on earth, and in quicker time. The feverish bustle and scarcely scrupulous methods in business and in public affairs of many of its inhabitants have given Chicago an extremely dubious reputation." [2]

Arnold Bennett once said that Chicago was a city that was anxious about its soul. If one takes literally the remarks of the writer just quoted, it has reason to be—provided it may be assumed to have any soul to be anxious about. But one English writer does say that it has "splendid parks and drives." [3] Perhaps these parks and drives redeem it from the utter damnation and outer darkness of unqualified materialism.

Let us turn for a moment from individual cities to life in the cities as a whole. That kindly commentator on things American, the late Lord Bryce, once gently chided the United States for what he termed "the uniformity of American life." It is something of this sort that the authors of an excellent little geographical reader have in mind in the following succinct characterization of certain features of the American scene :

[1] Wilson, *Progress to Geography*, Stage VI, p. 162.
[2] Palmer, *Asia, Africa and America*, p. 179.
[3] *Cambridge Geographical Readers*, Book VI, p. 187.

"Whether in New York or San Francisco, in New Orleans or Chicago, there are the same kinds of ideals of living. Magazines circulating over the whole of the United States appeal to a common understanding. Houses are largely built on the same plan; wood is used to a very great extent both for construction and roofing; they are fitted in the same way. Mosquito-netting is almost as familiar as glass. Refrigerators and telephones are as much part of the common life as is crockery. The iceman comes as regularly as the milkman, and if he fails to appear it is much more of a domestic catastrophe." [1]

So much for the cities. As for the characteristics of the American people, some of those that seem to have made an impression are their spirit of enterprise,[2] their restless energy,[3] their optimistic courage and their power of absorbing alien peoples who come to American shores. "Their business men," says Barnard, "are noted for 'cuteness' and 'hustle.'" [4] "We find the American," says the author of one of the *King Alfred Readers*, "never daunted by difficulties, however enormous. He is ever ready to adopt new ideas and lead the way for the nations. He delights in experiments, and these must be on a large scale. He lives at high pressure, and privately thinks that the people of the Old Country are very slow to move." [5] "This vast country," according to another writer, "shows a wonderful power of absorbing men of different

[1] Fairgrieve and Young, *Human Geographies for Secondary Schools*, Book II, p. 273.

[2] *Chambers's Twentieth-Century Geography Readers*, Book VIA, p. 270.

[3] Mill, *General Geography*, p. 257.

[4] Barnard, *America in Pictures*, p. 50. The American expression "cute" is often misunderstood in England. In the United States the typical American business man would hardly be called "cute."

[5] Book VII, p. 182.

nationalities, and turning them into loyal citizens of the United States. Whatever the land of their birth, they soon become proud of the country of their adoption." [1]

To the general truth of such characterizations of the American people, Americans themselves, I think, will subscribe. They will agree less readily to some of the characteristics attributed to American children :

" The little people who live in these (American) towns and cities are, I think, much too grown-up for their years. They do not seem to be children at all. The girls do not care for games or toys ; all they seem to like to do is to dress up in fine clothes and behave just as if they were already grown up.

" The boys, unlike the boys of Canada, are not fond of sport. They would rather study and learn all they can, that they may have a good chance of being rich men by and by. Of course, this is all very well as far as it goes, but all work and no play is apt to make Jack a dull boy. At any rate, he will not grow up as strong, nor as hardy, as the boy who does both, and does them with all his might.

" Here, it is the girls who seem to be the most hardy and to take the lead in most things ; but the boys do not seem to mind—they take it all as a matter of course.

" The children of the United States are very smart, or ' cute,' as they call it there ; but I am afraid if you were to hear them talk to their parents you would think them very rude indeed. They do not mean to be rude ; it is only the way in which they are brought up, for their parents treat them much more as grown-up

[1] *Chambers's Twentieth-Century Geography Readers*, Book VIA, p. 269 ; *Cambridge Geographical Readers*, Book VI, p. 167 ; Parkinson, *Regional Geography of America*, p. 56.

folks than yours treat you. This make them seem older than they really are, and they often go out to work much sooner than English boys of the same age.

" Of course, the boys have some games which they play ; but they play them in a much rougher style than we do, and they seem to play more to win than for the sake of the game itself. Football and baseball are the two games which they play the most often.

" Like the children in all lands in all parts of the world, these little people are fond of sweets and sugar. You would not hear them say that they were going to buy some sweets, but that they were going to buy candy, for this is the name they give to all kinds of sweets.

" The houses in which these boys and girls live are sometimes so tall that a lift has to be used to reach the top floors. Inside they are very much like our own, except that where we should have easy-chairs or arm-chairs these people all use rocking-chairs." [1]

An over-sensitive Americanism with a deficient sense of humour might be inclined to resent such passages as this last or the poems earlier quoted from Fletcher and Kipling's *History*, but a little reflection should calm ruffled pride. Be it remembered, in the first place, as has been said before, that many hard things have been said of Great Britain in American textbooks, and that the American interpretation of the War of Independence has been less tolerant than the British. In the second place, be it remembered that whatever gibes or slurs are to be found here and there in British textbooks, their general tone, where they have occasion to consider America, is one of warm friendliness. British textbook writers emphasize the

[1] Tapsell, *Little People in Far-off Lands : The New World*, pp. 24–7.

fact that Englishmen and Americans are basically of the same race. The Americans "are mainly the descendants of British settlers who left our islands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. . . . They are therefore not foreigners, but kinsmen of the British." [1] "The bulk of the nation is of the British stock, and its people are proud to think that they share with us the great traditions of our race, and that the glory of the famous men our little island has produced in past ages is their heritage, as it is ours." [2] "What the future holds for this great race no man can tell. But through all there will run a strong feeling of brotherhood between the American race and the British. This must ever assert itself, for the two races are really one. In combination they have a power whose greatness cannot be measured. May this power ever be used in the best interests of humanity." [3]

If this be nationalism, it is a type of nationalism that makes for the friendship of the English-speaking peoples, and so for international understanding and peace.

It is more unfortunate, from the international point of view, that, comparatively speaking, British knowledge of America is so scanty. The references to that country in the present chapter may seem to present a rather formidable total, but they have been culled from widely scattered sources. Here and there in textbooks one finds some rather glaring errors. For example, one writer states that "in the southern part of the United States there are more black men than white men"; [4] and a geographical textbook published in 1921 gives the population figures for the

[1] *King Alfred Readers*, VII, p. 180.
[2] *Cambridge Geographical Readers*, Book VI, p. 167.
[3] *King Alfred Readers*, Book VII, p. 210; ibid., p. 182.
[4] *Highroads of Geography*, Introductory Book, p. 115.

United States as 91,560,000.[1] If population figures are worth teaching at all, they are worth teaching correctly. If a certain amount of attention is given to American literature, very little is given to American history. The late Ambassador Page was once asked to give a talk on the United States to the lads of one of England's most noted public schools. In accepting, he asked how much knowledge of American history he might assume on the part of the boys. "Assume none at all," was the reply. "The contrast between our careful study of American literature and our almost studied and systematic neglect of American history and institutions," says the distinguished British historian, G. P. Gooch, "is very extraordinary."[2]

Since the war there has been some improvement. The recently established Harmsworth professorship of American History at Oxford is doing something to stimulate the interest of older students, and the results of their work will gradually filter to all grades of education. At one of the most forward-looking of English public schools (at Bembridge, in the Isle of Wight) the ideal of international friendship distinctly dominates the curriculum. The headmaster, Mr. Whitehouse, is an enthusiastic friend of America, and in the course of study he lays special emphasis on the teaching of American history and the study of current events in the United States. "This is done," he says, "with the deliberate intention of cultivating the closest feelings of friendship and admiration for that country.

[1] Smith, T. A., *Geography of America*, p. 73. In an English private school, according to a well-authenticated story, a teacher told her pupils that the capital of the United States was New York. When an American pupil ventured to assert that it was Washington, she told him that he was mistaken. When the boy's father later wrote a note to the teacher confirming his son's statement, he was informed by the teacher that he also was mistaken

[2] Whitehouse and Gooch, *Wider Aspects of Education*, p. 25.

It is, in many ways, the best country with which to begin experiments in international education, for there is no language difficulty." [1] But even apart from such interesting and hopeful experiments there is evidently a very strong desire in England to strengthen friendship with the United States and a realization of the possibilities inherent in education for attaining that end. An excellent start has already been made. I think it is clear from what has been brought out that the general attitude of the British school toward the United States is more friendly than is the attitude of the school in England, France or Germany toward any other foreign country that has come under consideration in this investigation. This friendly attitude is one of the most encouraging signs to those who believe that the school may become one of the most effective instruments for the realization of international accord.

[1] Whitehouse and Gooch, op. cit., p. 77.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

FREE education has long been acclaimed as one of the world's greatest blessings. And such it surely is. Yet for all that, it must be clear from what has been said, it operates as one of the most persistent menaces to the peace of the world. The State, where it has taken control of education, has often been congratulated on freeing the school from the baneful influence of religious dogma. Yet under the protecting ægis of the State, and sometimes with the actual encouragement of the Government, there has developed in education the dogma of nationalism, whose influence may ultimately prove more baneful than has ever been the religious dogma. In normal times such teaching may seem to matter little; but when war threatens, as examination of the psychological causes of war clearly reveals, the school-fostered dogma of narrow nationalism becomes tinder to the match of the Chauvinist.

Of the three types of nationalism in education examined—French, German and English—the English is clearly the least invidious. True, there is evinced in certain texts too much of a belief that to " take up the white man's burden " is to render inestimable service to the " lesser breeds," too much of the " marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she (Britain) is spreading light among nations dwelling

In darkness," [1] too much of an assumption that "fighting for the right" justifies violations of international law, particularly on the high seas, but there is also evident an earnest desire to be fair and just, even at the expense of national pride. The British textbook story of the American Revolution shows that. There is less tendency than there is in France or Germany to foster prejudice against other nations or to harbour old grudges; there is a disposition to write of other countries in a spirit of generous sympathy; there is a disposition to welcome the idea of international accord; and, above all, there is no State-encouraged or State-enforced cult of nationalism in England.

As between the nationalistic education of France and that of Germany, it is hard to say which is more inimical to international good will. French nationalism seems to be the more vehement and vituperative. The material set forth in the *Enquête* of the Dotation Carnegie, though the collaborators themselves do not draw any such conclusion, gives evidence of greater vituperation of the Germans in the French textbooks than it does of the French in German textbooks. So of the material used in the present study. Prejudice against England in the French school books is of a milder type, yet there is more of it than there is of prejudice against France in the British school books. Patriotism the French Government expects and requires to be taught in the schools, and it has been shown that this patriotism shades off, all too easily, into a narrow nationalism.

In spite of all this, however, I am inclined to think that German nationalism is more deeply rooted than that of the French. If there is less vituperation in the German than in the French textbooks, there is

[1] *Saturday Review*, September 11, 1897, p. 278.

more glorification of the national past. If some criticism of the ex-Kaiser has crept into the new school books, Bismarck and Frederick the Great are still considered almost flawless heroes. Bismarck's shadow still falls over the young tree of the German Republic and dwarfs its growth.[1] The history of countries other than the homeland is more generally ignored than it is either in France or in England. German history is taught as a great nationalist epic, dazzling the eyes of the young Germans with the glorious achievements of its heroes, and at the same time blinding them to the defects of these and to the better qualities of Germany's enemies.

Furthermore, the reaction against too much nationalism in education seems to be stronger in France than it is in Germany. The French Government is making fruitful efforts to foster belief in the League of Nations and loyalty to it; writers of books of moral and civic instruction are teaching the difference between true and false patriotism, between a boastful Chauvinism and a quiet, self-sacrificing love of country; and through such organizations as the teacher's syndicates and the Ligue de l'Enseignement Laïque a gallant battle is now being waged against the teaching of militarism and hatred.

Germany, it is true, saw the light for a brief moment after the Revolution. It was in that moment of glorious vision that Article 148 was incorporated into the Constitution; then the clouds gathered again. A nation cannot break suddenly with its past, and in none of the great countries of the world in pre-war days was the cult of patriotism so highly exalted as

[1] "Solange Bismarcks Schatten über den jungen Baum der deutschen Demokratie fällt, kann dieser nicht gedeihen und für die äussere und innere Politik Früchte tragen."—Kantorowicz *Bismarcks Schatten*, p. 5 (pamphlet).

in Germany. In the last few years the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles, the unwise policy of the French in the Ruhr, have intensified feeling against other countries. Nationalism has reasserted itself, triumphant. It is something for Germany to have had a momentary vision; it is something that a few brave individuals and groups are still striving for an education imparted in the spirit of reconciliation of peoples; but these individuals and groups seem to be relatively weaker than they are in France, the nationalist opposition stronger. For such reasons nationalistic education is likely to have a strong influence on German foreign policy for some time to come, and I am inclined to think that it will be harder for the Germans to learn to think internationally than for the French.

Boastfulness runs through the education of all three countries. In each, too, there is the tendency to ignore the study of nations other than the homeland, especially of their history. In each there is the tendency to interpret the causes of wars from a nationalistically biased point of view. This tendency reaches its height in the study of the Great War, the interpretation of whose causes in the majority of school histories in all these countries reflects rather the garbled evidence and propaganda of war-time than the findings of impartial historical inquiry. The Great War has become the chief instrumentality for teaching national antipathies.

To counteract the menace of nationalistic education, to promote friendship among the nations, there have been efforts, vigorous enough individually, but feeble in their totality. There have been exchange professorships, and the exchange professors have come home staunch admirers of the countries in which they have been guests, spreading their enthusiasm among

colleagues and students. Unfortunately they have sometimes imbibed the nationalistic prejudices of the lands of their sojourn, and with a less praiseworthy ardour have spread these among friends and followers. There have been Rhodes scholarships to cement friendship between England and the United States; but influential as Rhodes scholars and ex-Rhodes scholars are individually, their number is small in proportion to the total population of Great Britain and the United States. There have been reports published by peace organizations which have proved helpful to teachers and to students. Unfortunately, however, the peace organizations seem to have made little study of the psychology of advertising. Their reports have been insufficiently popularized, and too often they have become, as was once said of the writings of an over-prolific historian, " an eyesore on the shelves of every library." Finally, all these means for promoting international peace are expensive, and funds are limited.

There is no royal road to permanent peace, but the present methods for promoting international friendship through education, praiseworthy as these are individually, can be supplemented by others less costly and more widely influential. One of these, the French Ligue de l'Enseignement Laïque, has been suggested. Let the publishers of textbooks in history, geography and literature in all countries submit one copy of each text published to the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation of the League of Nations, the Committee to pick out and recommend those freest from prejudice. It is reasonable to assume that the endorsement of the League would carry great weight in the schools of the nations included in its membership. It is reasonable to assume that the publishers and writers would then in the course of time try to eliminate from their texts

much or all that savoured of militarism, Chauvinism and international hatred. It is reasonable to assume that they would tend to include more material imbued with the spirit of international conciliation, and such changes would vitally influence the children in the schools.

Suppose the League went farther. Suppose that, instead of merely recommending school books, it extended its supervision to the preparation of courses of study and even of textbooks for the use of schools in various countries. Suppose that these textbooks were made as clear and interesting as the nationalistically biased texts now in use. Would not programmes and textbooks influence education in the direction of international conciliation? And if other international organizations, such as international syndicates of labour or teachers' congresses, were to take it upon themselves to agitate and to recommend textbooks, can it be doubted that in time their recommendations would help to bring about a broader and better spirit in education?

If the ideal of international friendship is ever to become predominant in education, some time or other the school curriculum will have to be adapted and revised to meet its purposes. For one thing this will mean more emphasis on geography, on what the English have well named "human geography." Already the authors of geographies, especially in England, are doing more for the cause of international friendship than the writers of any other kind of textbook; but they need a fuller opportunity than has yet been afforded them, and they could exercise more caution than they now do in treating of national characteristics. The silly, inaccurate generalizations now found in many books regarding the supposed faults (and,

in some cases, even the supposed virtues) of foreign peoples should be expunged. The spirit of the teaching, of course, matters more than the amount of time devoted. There need be no didactic attempt to make children love their neighbours as themselves. It will be enough to stimulate the imagination, to awaken romantic interest in other lands and other peoples. Sympathy with these peoples will follow as a matter of course.[1]

Similarly, school readers could be adapted to the needs of international conciliation. It would be easy to include in these many stories and poems about foreign lands and foreign folk, as well as tributes to the great men of other countries. A universal language, like Esperanto, could be taught in the elementary school, and there could be far more emphasis than is laid at present on the study of modern languages and literatures. Incidentally, from the pedagogical as well as from the international point of view, this study ought to be begun when the children are very young, for it is then that they can best acquire a good accent and a feeling for idiom; and they should be studied, not in the present desultory fashion, but consecutively through all the later years of school life. Finally, adaptation of the curriculum to the needs of international conciliation implies a greater emphasis on history, not the narrow, nationalistic narrative of to-day, but rather history written and taught with an outlook on the whole world. All through it should run the central thread of the evolution of our common humanity.

It will be as hard to put all these changes into effect

[1] The present writer recalls with gratitude the remarkable success of one of his boyhood teachers, Miss Esther Andrews, of the Rutgers Preparatory School, in awakening love for other countries and other peoples through the teaching of geography.

as it is easy to suggest them. "You write on paper," said Catherine the Great of Russia to the philosopher, Diderot, "but I write on human skin." Vested interests in education will stoutly resist changes. The super-patriot will fear lest love of country be undermined, failing to realize that narrow nationalism is the enemy of reasonable patriotism, and that between such reasonable patriotism and a desirable internationalism there is no necessary conflict whatsoever. Defenders of the classics will not willingly surrender their strong fortresses in England and on the Continent, their lesser vantage-points in America, to any new enemies of discipline and culture—as though discipline were a monopoly of dead languages and culture a monopoly of dead civilizations. Defenders of vocational education will not willingly give up any of those commercial courses which so effectively assist in the transformation of bright boys into Babbitts. Only firm faith in the supreme value of international good will can overcome the obscurantism of opponents long established or newly entrenched.

The most essential reform of all will involve no derangement of the curriculum whatsoever: the writing and teaching of history in the spirit of impartial scholarship. It is evident that there is something vitally wrong with the historical profession when the causes of wars can be interpreted so differently in different countries—not only the causes of the Great War, but those of conflicts far removed from the heat of present passion: the Hundred Years' War, the Seven Years' War, the Napoleonic struggles, the war of 1812, and the Franco-Prussian War. The German historians have often been accused of betraying the cause of truth for that of nationalism, but in no country have the historians been free from guilt.

During the period of the Great War it was a painful revelation to see leaders of historical thought, some of whom had themselves conducted courses in historical criticism, giving credence not only to carefully prepared evidence of a character calculated to deceive the unwary, but as well to the most unsubstantial propaganda. In some cases fear of unpopularity and even of persecution checked utterance of truth. In others, war hysteria swept men off their feet. "In times like these," said an American historian of repute to a younger member of his profession, "a little overstatement doesn't matter."

In the nineteenth century the call came to science to defend scientific truth against the attacks of ecclesiastical dogma. Science boldly responded. Darwin, Huxley and a host of devoted followers took up the gage of battle, and the widespread respect now accorded the results of scientific research by enlightened churchmen as well as laymen attests the success of their championship. In the twentieth century the call has come to historians to defend historical truth against the attacks of nationalistic dogma. Before this challenge some will quail, and will continue to write history in that spirit of narrow nationalism so inimical to international friendship. Others, sincere but naïve, will continue to do so out of a misconceived sense of duty, mistakenly believing that in teaching nationalistic history they are serving the cause of patriotism and truth. But others will answer the call. Some have already done so, brave spirits in Europe and America. Men like these will not be daunted by fear of unpopularity or the attacks of obscurantist nationalism, nor will they, for the baubles of reputation and revenue, betray the cause of truth and world peace.

APPENDIX I

Translation of a Letter to the Present Writer from a Teacher in Germany.

Berlin, *January* 30, 1925.

Dear Sir,

Herr —— has addressed to me your request to communicate to you what I know on the subject of pacifist literature in primary instruction. I gather from this that it would be of little advantage to you if I pointed out certain extracts of pacifist character taken from two or three books whose content gives evidence elsewhere of the tendency toward militarism and *revanche*. I assume that what you wish to learn is whether there exists a literature which cultivates conscientiously the pacifist idea and which shows a pronounced tendency in this direction in order to conform with the constitution of the German Empire, which ordains an "education in the spirit of international conciliation." My knowledge is not sufficiently extensive to report for all of Germany. But Berlin being the culminating point of all pedagogical efforts, it may be taken for granted that the opinion which I express here would apply to the greater part of the Empire.

Since the war we have had a veritable avalanche of new manuals for all subjects of primary instruction. Almost all the publishers of school books are publishing new reading-books and other texts. No one of these publications breathes a pronounced pacifist spirit, if one examines the subject-matter relating to moral education. This is due perhaps to the fact that no teacher has taken the trouble to bring together extracts of pacifist content. Nevertheless, if there were one who did so, he would find no publisher and, above all, no Government, who would permit their introduction into actual instruction.

We find some pacifist material in the books which Friedrich Wilhelm Förster has issued for moral instruction. But these books are Christian in tendency and do not meet with favour in the lay schools, though it is in these schools that one finds the pacifist idea, while the Christian (religious) schools in Germany are anything but pacifist.

I do not wish to pass over in silence the expurgation from school books of passages tending toward *revanche*, which has taken place since the war. Little militaristic literature is being printed, and it is met with rarely in the school reading-books, but, on the other hand, one can point to no tendency toward pacifism. It must be remembered, however, that a change of the characteristics of which education has been constructed for centuries cannot be brought about in the twinkling of an eye.

The following would be a desirable course of action :

1. A group of pacifist educators ought to compose new manuals, for as long as pacifist selections have not been brought together, one can reproach no one for the absence of literature of this character.
2. It would be necessary to find a publisher who would consent to publish these manuals.
3. A political party ought to be charged with obtaining a ministerial decree prescribing the introduction of these manuals into actual instruction.

I shall be glad, if you make public use of this information, if you will omit my name, for a process for high treason is easily set on foot in Germany.

Very sincerely yours,

_____

APPENDIX II

An American Textbook Interpretation of some of the Events leading to the War of 1812.

"In 1805 England decided that, contrary to her previous policy, goods from the French colonies transported in American ships could be seized, even though they had been landed in the United States and re-shipped. This was a serious blow to American commerce, which had been thriving in this very trade. In the same year the battle of Trafalgar was won by Nelson; England was henceforth mistress of the seas. She used her power *arrogantly*. British men-of-war were actually stationed just outside New York Harbour to intercept American merchant vessels, search them, and impress their seamen. The *domineering spirit* of the British commanders increased the annoyance and mortification arising from such treatment. Hundreds of sailors were thus in a single year taken from American vessels and forced to fight the battles of England. The ground of seizure was that these men were Englishmen born, and England's assertion was 'Once an Englishman, always an Englishman.' It must be noticed that that country was not unique in holding that a man could not give up allegiance to his native land and become the citizen of another. Other nations held the same doctrine. But in practice England enforced her claims *arrogantly*, seized native-born Americans as well as Englishmen, and *disdainfully* treated American commerce as if the flag at the masthead of a vessel offered no security from *insult* and annoyance. It was plain enough that, much as the Jeffersonians loved peace, the United States must soon fight in defence of its self-respect.

"The crowning act of *insolence* occurred in 1807. The American frigate *Chesapeake* was overtaken not far from Hampton Roads by the British frigate *Leopard*, and the

British commander demanded the surrender of several seamen serving on the *Chesapeake*, whom he claimed to be deserters from the British service. When this demand was not acceded to, the *Leopard*, at the distance of a hundred and fifty or two hundred feet, poured her whole broadside into the American vessel. The *Chesapeake* was unprepared for action. She received three broadsides without being able to answer in kind, and then struck her flag and surrendered. Three men were killed and eighteen wounded. The alleged deserters were taken aboard the *Leopard*. Three of them were Americans, one of the three being a negro. *Perhaps the most exasperating thing about this whole affair was the presumption shown in attacking a frigate that was, if given a fighting chance, a fair match for the 'Leopard.'* But the English did not stop to consider that an American frigate could fight. Within a few years they learned their mistake. This outrage nearly brought on war at once, and it probably would have been as well if that had been the result, *for it was high time that either France or England came to see that the United States could defend herself*. And yet one must strongly sympathize with Jefferson and his advisers, who loathed the barbarity of war, and believed that self-interest and common sense should win all nations to peace. Unfortunately the times were not suited for such humane ideas. Nearly the whole civilized world was rent with strife."

(McLaughlin, A. C., *A History of the American Nation*, 1919 edition, pp. 237–8. Italics are mine.)

In another passage the same writer says :

" *France and England were so utterly brutal in their attacks upon American commerce that they both deserved a whipping ;* but as it was impossible to fight both, one of them should have been chosen for an ally without delay " (*ibid.*, p. 21).

The reader can judge for himself whether or not such teachings serve the cause of international friendship.

INDEX

America, ignorance of, in English schools, 203–5
American characteristics in English textbooks, 200–3
men of letters in English textbooks, 196–7
Revolution, the, in English textbooks, 188–92
in German textbooks, 135
Americanism, "hundred per cent," 17
Anglo-American friendship, 186–7
Association of Assistant Masters in Secondary Schools, 155

Bara, 34
Bérard, L., French Minister of Public Instruction, 31
Board of Education, British, 143–5
Boastfulness, national, in education, 209
Boelitz, Herr, Prussian Minister of Education, 102–3
Boer War, the, 83, 178
Bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, in English textbooks, 151–2, 153
Boston (Mass.), in English textbooks, 198
British Association for the Advancement of Science, report on "Training in Citizenship," 144–7, 149, 150, 154–5
British Orders in Council, 193
Bund Entschiedener Schulreformer, 138

Chicago (Illinois), in English textbooks, 198–9
Classics, the, 213
Clémendot and the question of teaching history, 87
Clémendot's explanation of the causes of the Great War, 70–1
Confédération Générale de Travail, 85
Congress, international, of teachers, 91
Constitution of the German Republic, Article 148; 95, 96, 107, 112, 130, 208
Cours élémentaire, 27, 29
Cours moyen, 27, 29
Cours supérieur, 27, 29, 30
Curriculum, adaptation of, to international needs, 212–13
Curzon, Lord, on the British Empire, 159–60

Decatur, Stephen, in English textbooks, 195
Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête sur les livres scolaires d'après guerre*, 17, 18, 72, 113, 137, 182, 207

Ecole laïque, 22, 23, 24
Education in compartments, 16
Edward VII, King of England, in German textbooks, 123–4
Empire Day, 148–9
England in French textbooks, Chapter III, passim
in German textbooks, 122–4, 125
English people, the, comments on, in French textbooks, 48–50
Exchange professorships, 209–10
Ex-Kaiser, the, 99, 100, 113–17, 120, 121, 178

Fédération des Membres de l'Enseignement Laïque, 85, 91
France in German textbooks, 124 and Chapter VII, passim
praise of, in English textbooks, 169–71
relations with England, 50–1
Franco-Prussian War, 18, 19
causes of, 53–5
in French textbooks, 55–8
in German textbooks, 117–20
Franklin, Benjamin, in English textbooks, 195
Frederick, former Grand Duke of Baden, 115

Garfield, James, in English textbooks, 195
Geography, teaching of, 158, 211
in French schools, 27, 30
in German schools, 104, 106, 109
German Empire, development of, 52–3
Germany in English geographical textbooks, 172–4
Germany's responsibility for the Great War, question of, 120, 121, 126–7
Government, French, centralization of, 24–5
Great War, causes of, 18, 58–61, 63–8
in English textbooks, 175–82
in French textbooks, 53, 61–4, 68–72
in German textbooks, 120–6
discussion of causes of American participation in the, 130–2
German conduct during, criticized in English textbooks, 182–4
criticized in French textbooks, 72–4
the, in German textbooks, 120–32

Haenisch, Herr, Prussian Minister of Education, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102
Herd instinct, the, 14
Hervé, Gustave, 86
History, teaching of, 212, 213–14
in French schools, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 87–90
in German schools, 97, 102, 103, 105, 108, 109, 111–12
Hoffman, Herr, Prussian Minister of Education, 96–7
Hundred Years' War, the, 38–42
in English textbooks, 161–4, 168–9

Impressment of American seamen, 193
Instruction, moral and civic, in French education, 26–7, 35, 77, 78, 79–84
International control, machinery of, 12, 13
Council of Women, 154

Jaurès, J., 93
Jeanne D'Arc, 23
Jugendbewegung, 137–8

Kaiser, the. See ex-Kaiser

Languages, teaching of, 212
Lavisse, E., 34–5, 50, 56, 62
League of Nations, the, 11, 17, 81, 91, 92, 155–7, 208, 210, 211
the Committee for Intellectual Co-operation, 91, 210
the, in English textbooks, 155–7
League of Nations Union, the, 154
Ligue de l'Enseignement Laïque, 208, 210
Lincoln, Abraham, in English textbooks, 196

McLaughlin, A. C., on causes of war of 1812, 217–18
Military training in French schools, 31–2
Minister of Education, the Prussian, 96
Public Instruction, the French, 31, 78, 92
Monarchical reaction, question of, 99
sentiment in German schools, 113–17
Moral and civic instruction. See Instruction, moral and civic

Napoleonic Wars in English textbooks, 166–8
in French textbooks, 38, 44–7

Nationalism, American, 15, 217–18
in English education compared with that in education of other countries, 196–7
in French education compared with that in education of other countries, 207–9
in German education compared with that in education of other countries, 207–9
National Union of Teachers, 155
Neubauer, *Grundzüge der Geschichte für Höhere Lahranstalten*, 106, 113
Neue Erziehung, Die, 138
New York, city of, in English textbooks, 197, 198
Normal schools, 78

Oestreich, Professor, 138, 139

Pacifism, 139
in German education, question of, 215–16
Patriotism, passim
true and false, question of, 79–81
Peace, influences making for, in German education, 137–41
societies, reports of, 210
Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), in English textbooks, 197–8
Poe, Edgar Allen, in English textbooks, 196
Programmes of Instruction for Baden, 107–10
French, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 77, 78, 79
Prussian, 103, 104, 105, 107

Reading-books, 212
German, 101, 103
Revanche, 20, 24, 130, 137, 141, 216
Revisionist scholarship on causes of Great War, 18, 71
Rhodes scholarships, 210
Richtlinien, 104
Rochester (New York), in English textbooks, 198
Roman, F. W., *The New Education in Europe*, 31, 97, 100, 102, 140, 144
"Rule, Britannia," 148, 150

Seven Years' War in English textbooks, 164–6
in French textbooks, 38, 42–4
Sociology in French normal schools, 78
Spanish-American War, the, 15
Stillich, *Katechismus*, 126–7, 128–30
"Syllabus of Errors," The Papal, 21
Syndicates, teachers', 77, 84–7, 90, 93

Third Republic, The French, 20–1, 22, 23, 24
Triple Alliance, The, 13, 61, 62, 63, 67
Entente, The, 13, 61, 62, 63, 67

United States, the, in German textbooks, 130–7
and the Treaty of Versailles in German textbooks, 132–3

Versailles, Treaty of, in German textbooks, 127–30, 132–4
Vocational education, 213

War of 1812, Professor Fish's opinion regarding, 15
causes of, in an American textbook, 217–18
in English textbooks, 192–4
War, outlawry of, 11
psychological causes of, 12–15
Washington, city of, in English textbooks, 197
Wilson, President, in German textbooks, 130–4
World Court, the, 11, 17
Wullens, M., 86

"Ye Mariners of England," 148
Youth Movement, the. See *Jugendbewegung*

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